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THE GENRE OF RATIONAL ARGUMENT 
Perhaps if ideas and words were distinctly weighted and duly 
considered, they would offer us another sort of logic and 
criticism than we have heretofore been acquainted with. 1 
The Problem of Analysis 
Because argument is the substance of rhetoric, 2 calls for a new 
rhetoric are implicitly calls for a new theory of argumentation. A 
few rhetorical theorists have made some effort to heed this call,3 but 
most either dreading the contentiousness and lack of concern for theory 
associated with "debate" or remembering the incredible dullness and 
non-practicality of "logic," have avoided theoretical association with 
1John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, as quoted in 
Logic and Langua_ge, ed. by Anthony Flew (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 
p. v. 
2Karl Wallace, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons," Q .J .s., 
XLIX (Oct., 1963), 239-249. 
3special notice and credit should be given the following: Ray 
Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortenson for "The Limits of Logic," Journal 
of the American Forensic Association, VII (Spring, 1970), 71-78 and 
"Logic and Marketplace Argumentation, ti Q .J .s., LIII (April, 1967), 143-
151, Jesse Delia for "The Logical Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the 
Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse,"~, 
LVI (April, 1970), 140-148, Vasile Florescu for "Rhetoric and Its 
Rehabilitation in Contemporary Philosophy," Philosophy and Rhetoric, III 
(Fall, 1970), 193-223, Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of 
Logic in Rhetoric," Q.J.s., LIV (October, 1968), 260-267, and Stephen 




argument like the plague. Although Chaim Perelman's claim that "the 
study of the methods of proof has been completely neglected by logicians 
and epistemologists for the last three centu~ies114 seems a bit extreme, 
he is essentially correct in his analysis which shows an extreme 
paucity of philosophic concern for the field of argument--at least until 
very recently. 5 
This lack of concern for a theory of argument seems somewhat 
paradoxical in light of Western tradition which makes the thinking, 
rational man its paradigm and which claims that democracy, its leading 
form of government, functions through debate and discussion, in a word, 
through argument. However, a surprising number of analysts are more or 
less agreed as to the causes for the decline in interest for a theory of 
argument as part of the decline of interest in the language arts: 
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. 6 With the rise of the natural 
sciences and the theories of Descartes, the precision of geometry 
became the scientific ideal and science the epitomy of intellectualism. 
The hope was, as Robert Scott states, "to reduce everything to an 
4ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A 
Treatise on Argumentation, trans. by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 1. 
5The publishing of The Uses of Argument by Stephen Toulmin and of 
The New Rhetoric by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca in 1958 and the 
establishment of the journal, Philosophy and Rhetoric, in 1968 seem to 
demonstrate a reviving interest in the interrelations of philosophy, 
rhetoric, and argument. 
6see those mentioned in footnote No. 2. See also Robert L. 
Scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," Speech Teacher, XVII 
(March, 1968), 134-139, Mortimer Adler, Dialectic (N. Y.: Harcourt, 
Brace & Co., Inc., 1927), and William S. Smith, "Formal Logic and Debate," 
Southern States Speech Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 330-338. 
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axiomatic system. This is to say, to discover a finite set of 
propositions that can be accepted without proof and on the basis of 
which theories can be derived with no other means than logic. 117 From 
knowledge of natural laws, those with intelligence, scientists, would 
instruct others in the simple ways of truth, and thus would the wisdom 
of the one correct, valid way be disseminated to all. 
Jesse Delia calls such a theory the "logic fallacy. 11 8 Vasile 
Florescu notes that such demonstration "presupposes not only a perfect 
science, but a perfect audience as well. 119 Naturally, any such theory 
was doomed from the start. In science, Godel's proof concerning the 
impossibility of a simple, functional, axiomatic system shattered the 
illusions of a single, precise, mathematical universe and helped modify 
Einstein's relativity theories. In rhetoric, however, the equating of 
formal logic and rationality with the substance of rhetoric lingers on. 
Many are frustrated at following the formula and express lingering 
doubts about its applicability to real world, substantive arguments. ,, 
Teachers of argument seem to realize "that students seem to gain little 
they can use1110 in that portion of the class spent on analysis, the 
syllogism, and reasoning in general, but their fear of the relativism of 
"psychologic," and the fact that they don't think there are any better 
available substitute methods for looking at argument makes them 
continue in the tradition. 
7scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism, 11 136-137. 
8Jesse Delia, "The Logical 'Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the 
Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 140, 
9vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Philosophy," 207. 
lOwilliam s. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate," 330. 
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It is'little wonder that the preponderant majority of teachers of 
argument and rhetoric continue in the analytic, neo-Aristotelian 
tradition. After all, this tradition seems to have the forces of "logic," ., 
"validity," "rationality," and even of "science" if not of "God" arrayed 
on its side. 11 Through conceptual slippage, which has prevailed for 
centuries, "logic," "validity," "science," and "rationality" have come 
to have extremely narrow functional parameters but extremely broad 
theoretical connotations. In formal usage, logic applies mainly to 
the syllogism. The syllogism, in turn, is composed of logical 
propositions. These logical propositions, must have precise character-
istics as explained by David Shepard in "Rhetoric and Formal Argument": 
••• it is a declarative sentence; the verb is tenseless; 
the pattern is noun+ linking verb+ predicate nominative; 
it is true or false by virtue of its form; the truth or 
falsity is independent of any state of affairs; it is true 
or false for all possible worlds; it is trivial, tautological, 
and imparts no factual information; and the relation between 
the subject and the predicate is definitional. 12 
From such propositions through the rules of the syllogism, the advocate 
arrives at a valid conclusion. This is the "stuff" of argument and, in 
a narrowly conceived sense, of science, for the mechanistic formal 
logicians, the logical positivists, and the analytic philosophers. 
Formally, logi~al arguments are univocal, universal, and timeless. 13 
11Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (Stanford, 
Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 302. 
12oavid Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," 243. 
13this, at least, is the ideal paradigm. Logic is not itself a 
univocal term. There· are other forms of logic than analytic logic, but 
the analytic paradigm has become so preeminent and is so interwound 
with these terms that they will be temporarily employed in a seemingly 
singular sense. 
-s-
Toulmin would call them "context-invariant. 1114 Formal arguments are 
composed of propositions which meet stringent linguistic or symbolic 
rules. Their validity is dependent "on the consistency with which we 
use whatever language we have ••• 1115 As long as the argument is 
consistent, that is as long as it meets the rules, and as long as the 
Law of Non-Contradiction is satisfied, the argument is presumed to pro-
ceed to truth. Many logicians even prefer to use symbols in formal 
arguments rather than words because of the ease of their invariant 
interpretation. Most, assuming conunon meaning, are uncancerned with 
defining terms. Cohen and Nagel even go so far as to contend that it 
is the job of the philosopher, not of the logician or scientist, to 
define terms and to check on the material as versus the formal validity 
of argument. 16 It may be assumed that they would also claim it the job 
of the poet to deal with analogy and metaphor and the perils of shifting 
everyday language. 
Formal logic and argument are, indeed, formal. As Mortenson and 
Anderson point out in their fine article, "The Limits of Logic": 
••• the closer we come to arguments reflecting all the 
tensions of marketplace controversy, loosely of the style 
of an Alfric or a Webster or a Fulbright, the more concerned 
we must be with matters of individual taste and judgment, and 
the less truck the critic has with the 'public' application of 
the rules of syllogistic. 17 
14Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1958), p. 180. 
1~orris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and 
Scientific Method (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1934), p. 17. 
16 ill!!-, p. 24. 
17Mortenson and Anderson, "The Limits of Logic," 75. 
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Formal logic and argument just don't seem to fit everyday reasoning or 
marketplace arguments. 18 Because of the requirement for univocality and 
the demand that propositions be stated in true-false dichotomous form, 
the realm of decisipn and action and the realm of values lay outside 
demonstration and the syllogism. However, despite their narrow formal 
application, logic, validity, and constellatory terms have come to be 
theoretically equa~ed with rationality. In the public mind, only a 
logical or valid argument is a "good" argument. Logic and validity are 
almost universally taken from the narrow realm where they apply and 
are utilized as standards for all argument. To attack these icons is to 
attack tradition and to be declared "emotional" if not outright "irra-
tional.'' 
In addition to the general problem of conceptual slippage noted 
above, two other problems are simultaneously functioning to keep rhetoric 
and argument in a supposedly pure and pristine state. Robert L. Scott 
points to the first of these problems in his article "On Viewing Rhetoric 
as Epistemic": 
The attractiveness of the analytic ideal, ordinarily only 
dimly grasped but nonetheless powerfully active in the rhetoric 
of those who deem truth as prior and enabling, lies iy9the 
smuggling of a sense of certainty into human affairs. 
18Mortenson and Anderson are joined in this assertion by Delia, 
Scott, Toulmin, Perelman, Shepard, Stone, and a host of others. 
19aobert L. Scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," Central 
States Speech Journal, XVIII (Feb., 1967), 12. 
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It is comforting to have a set of formulary rules that will provide 
"truth" and insure "rationality." The analytic ideal supposedly provides 
for both. A second, closely allied problem, is that any substitute for 
the analytic ideal leads invariably to complication. As Vasile Florescu 
states: 
••• as opposed to the theory of demonstration, which is 
concerned only with correct proofs, that is, conforming to 
universally accepted rules, and with incorrect proofs which 
do not fulfill these conditions, things ffje much more com-
plicated in the theory of argumentation. 
It is difficult to fight conceptual slippage, the comfort of certainty, 
and simplicity all at once. 
Nevertheless, we shall take up the challenge for we believe with 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell: 
••• that indistinct boundaries and wider horizons are precisely 
the price we shall have to pay in order to theorize about and 
examine the many language acts which do nof fall easily into 
neat classifications of purpose or genre. 2 
The purpose of this dissertation is to forward the thesis that there 
are alternative methods for looking at rational argument. As Scott 
writes: 
Once free of the false notion that man can make what he thinks 
fully rational, that he can if he simply presents his thoughts 
in proper form win the assent of all worthy listeners, perhaps 
speech teachers can find ways to enable man to take more nearly 
complete advantage of those powers of reason that he does 
possess.22 
20vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Phil." 218. 
21Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Ontological Foundations of Rhetoric 
Theory," Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (Spring, 1970), 106. 
22scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," 139. 
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Through an analytic, synthetic examination of the questions,"~ 
constitutes a rational argument and therefore an argument worthy of 
having an effect on a decision?" and "How ought one to go about 
evaluating rational argument?," the author hopes to provide an 
alternative perspective or perspectives to that of the mathematically 
inclined, symbolic, analytic, positivists who for so long have held the 
theory of argument statically bound in their grasp. 
A study of this sort seems fully warranted on grounds already 
implied. First, the field of argument has been peculiarly devoid of 
new philosophic speculation for some time and theory qua theory is a 
necessity. Second, if theories concerned with the rational man and 
with democracy are to keep pace with the times, a proper theory of 
argument is needed to clarify just what the rational man is and what 
reasons in what form justify democratic decision making. Third, recent 
alternative views toward argument have proliferated in the last few 
years, and it is time that someone with a rhetorical rather than a 
philosophic or legalistic inclination attempted to summarize, synthesize, 
and set in perspective those few gains which have been made. Fourth, 
and finally, if there is ever to be a new rhetoric or rhetorics, the 
substance of rhetoric, argument, must be examined and fitted to the new 
schematas, for mere changes in the calling of the tune through vocabulary 
permutations or speculations with regard to form just will not do the 
necessary job of reformation. 
Method of Approach 
A rather thorough examination of the resources available concerned 
in some fashion with the genre of rational argument reveals a vast 
plentitude of potential materials, in fact, far too much material for 
-9-
one person let alone one dissertation to encompass. Choices have to be 
made in uncertain situations. Therefore, the author will restrict his 
examination to an analysis and synthesis of those theoretical contribu-
tions to argumentation theory which are recognized as most insightful 
and influential and which, at the same time, are outside the analytic 
tradition and might thereby more readily contribute to a rhetorical 
analysis of argument. 23 Three authors' works, one ancient and two 
modern, and correlated materials seem to best fit these prerequisites; 
the works of Aristotle, the works of Ch. Perelman, and the works of 
Stephen Toulmin.24 
Instead of the constantly narrowing process which typifies some 
dissertations, this dissertation will spiral outward. Aristotle, 
Perelman, and Toulmin will be examined individually and their notions 
discussed and critiqued in conjunction with conmentary concerning their 
interpreters and critics. Then their ideas will be combined, compared 
and contrasted, and utilized for leads to a new theory of argument as 
23This criterion will prevent an examination of formal logic, 
logical positivism, and analytic philosophy except as it is involved as 
an anti-thesis to rhetorical argument. Those works with "insight" and 
"influence" are subjectively picked by the author based on wide reading 
in the area and his best analysis of the considered opinions of others 
writing in the field. 
24Aristotle is selected because a misinterpretation of his analysis 
of argument is the basis of '!the logic fallacy" and because he presents 
alternative constructions that can be used as a starting point for 
reconstructing argument. Ch. Perelman has been selected as one of the 
key contributers to the ideas of the "new argument." Toulmin was 
selected on the basis of his subtle analysis of the "lQgic fallacy'' as 
well as for his provocative notions concerning argument. 
viewed in 
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25 ordinary, natural, or everyday language philosophy, 
dialectic, 26 and symbolic interaction. 27 The course does not promise to 
be easy nor the answer reached simple nor entirely satisfactory, but it 
must be remembered that replacing the simple with the complex and the 
static with the dynamic never satisfies those who demand the comforts 
of faith or the illusion of permanent truth. 
Aristotle, the Stagirite, the Master of Them Who Know, might be 
accused of founding the analytic tradition such as we know it today, but 
to view him solely as the intellectually obstruse, totally rationalistic, 
25 Ordinary language philosophy encompasses a number of writers 
in philosophy in the last forty years not all of whom would like the 
designation. Most prominent are Wittgenstein, J. L. Austin, Gilbert 
Ryle, P. F. Strawson, and Stephen Toulmin. For further information 
concerning this school see later references and two dissertations: 
Charles E. Caton, "A Description and Evaluation of the Method of the 
Ot'dinary-Language Philosophers and Its Doctrinal Basis," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956), and John Stewart, 
"Rhetoricians on Language and Meaning: An Ordinary Language Philosophy 
Critique," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern 
Calif., 1970). 
26rhe idea of dialectic is most thoroughly discussed in a now 
dated work by Mortimer Adler. Mortimer Adler, Dialectic. (N. Y,: 
Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927). However, the idea also appears in a series 
of works by Natanson and Johnstone and occasionally appears elsewhere in 
the literature. Maurice Natanson and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., eds., 
Philosophy. Rhetoric. and Argumentation (University Park, Pa.: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1965). Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., 
Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1959). Nicholas Abagnano, "Four Kinds of Dialectic," 
Philosophy Today. II (Fall, 1958), 143-149. Robert Pruett, "The Process 
of Dialectic: A Starting Point for Argument," The Ohio Speech Journal, 
VIII (1970), 42-47. 
27symbolic interaction is another ambitiously broad conceptualiza-
tion. The most prominent symbolic interactionist known to rhetoricians 
is probably Kenneth Burke. For an especially perceptive presentation 
of the relevance of symbolic interactionism to rhetoric see Jackson 
Harrell, "Symbolic Interaction as the Basis for Rhetorical Theory," 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas, 1972). 
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scientist is to take a very incomplete look at the total Aristot~lian 
corpus.28 John Herman Randall, Jr., properly emphasizes that Aristotle 
"distinguished three different kinds of reasoning ••• " 29 the 
dialectical, the rhetorical, and the demonstrative or scientific. Only 
the demonstrative or scientific type of reasoning dealt with apodexsis 
or certain proof proceeding from first causes through necessary forms 
to episteme or science. 30 Dialectical and rhetorical reasoning both 
proceeded from opinions generally accepted by all or, at least, by 
those illustrious few concerned, endoxa, to probabilistic conclusions. 31 
The tool of dialectical and rhetorical reasoning, the enthymeme, was 
socially and culturally determined through the value orientations 
necessarily implicit in ethics, politics, religion, and the law. 32 
28ror purposes of this dissertation that corpus includes all of 
Aristotle's works except his natural science efforts. 
29John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (N. Y.: Columbia University 
Press, 1960), p. 37. 
30ibid., pp. 33-39. 
31tbid. 
32vast interest in the enthymeme as a representation of non-formal 
reasoning has recently been reflected in a plethora of articles including: 
Lloyd Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited,n 0 1J 1Sn XLV (Dec., 
1959), 399-408, Gary Cronkhite, "The Enthymeme as Deductive Rhetorical 
Argument," Western Speech, XXX (Spring, 1966), 129-134, Edward H. Madden, 
''The Enthymeme: Crossroads of Logic, Rhetoric, and Metaphysics," Iru!, 
Philosophical Review, LXI (July, 1952), 368-376, Arthur Miller and John 
D. Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Fall, 
1972), 201-214, Charles Mudd, "The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," 
O.J.S., XLV (Dec., 1959), 409-414, Edward D. Steele, "Social Values, the 
Enthymeme, and Speech Criticism," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 
70-75. All this may seem unimportant, but as David Shepard states in 
"Rhetoric and Formal Argument," 242, "Rhetoricians have brought some of 
their heaviest thinking to bear on the role of formal argument in rhetoric. 
The resulting debate is almost as unprofitable as it is interminable, 
relieved only by occasional expeditions in search of the abominable 
enthymeme." 
-12-
The rational man was not totally scientific in Aristotelian 
theory. Aristotle, a thorough humanist as well as scientist, realized 
) 
that man is a political or social animal as well as an animal who wishes 
to know. To cull out those abilities leading to individual decision 
and action or to societal policy and to call them irrational was not a 
viable Aristotelian choice. Instead, Aristotle encompassed such 
decisions, actions, and policy making within the framework of an enlarged 
view of rationality which a thorough analysis and synthesis concerning 
the three forms of rational argument as developed in The Organon, Ih!, 
Ethics, The Politics, and 'rhe Rhetoric will clearly show. 
Ch. Perelman, Belgian philosopher and legal theorist, argues "that 
the very nature of deliberation and argumentation is opposed to necessity 
and self evidence. u33 . . In a series of essays written over the past 
twenty years34 and in the epochal New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argument, 35 
Perelman lashes out at the analytic tradition and offers an alternative 
perspective for rational argument. Professor Perelman seeks a probabilis-
tic argument which can deal with everyday sorts of controversy. His 
theory of argumentation functions through the creation of "presence," a 
33ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 1. 
34some of these essays are collected in The Idea of Justice and the 
Problem of Argument, trans. by John Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1963). Others of particular significance include: "On Self-
Evidence in Metaphysics," International Philosophical Quarterly, IV (Feb,. 
1964), 5-19, "Proof in Philosophy," Hibbert Journal, LII {July, 1954), 
354-359, "Rhetoric and Philosophy," trans. by Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (Jan., 1968), 15-24, and "Value Judgments, 
Justifications, and Argumentation," Philosophy Today. V (Spring, 1962), 
45-50. 
35Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric. 
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concept similar to Burke's "identification," which gains various degrees 
of "adherence" from varying types of "audience" and is associated with 
"persons' 1 and "actions.1136 Perelman claims that "Only the existence of 
an argument that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can give meaning 
to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable choice can be exercised. 1137 
Through analysis and synthesis of the works of Perelman and his 
interpreters, it is hoped that a vision of rational argument which is 
"neither compelling nor arbitrary" can come clearly to the forefront 
of argumentation theory. 
Stephen Toulmin, former English philosopher and historian of 
science, now resident at Michigan State, has probably caused more 
controversy in speech communication and rhetorical circles with regards 
to argument than anyone since Aristotle. 38 The Uses of Argument has 
been praised, touted, extended, and defended, damned, cursed, inter-
preted and even reinterpreted, but, most of all, used, since its 
publication in 195s. 39 Human Understanding, a more ambitious and thorough 
36words in quotation marks assume special meaning in Perelman's 
works to be defined in the chapter concerning Perelman's theory of 
argument. 
37Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 514. 
3~is statement is based on usage in courses in the theory of 
argument and on the number of citations to Mr. Toulmin in books and 
articles concerned with argument. 
39Praise and extension come from Wayne Brockriede and Douglas 
Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," 
Q.J.s., XLVI (Feb., 1960), 44-53. Criticism comes from H. N. Castenada, 
"On the Proposed Revolution in Logic," Philosophy of Science~ XXVII 
(July, 1960), 279-292, and from J.C. Cooley, "On Mr. Toulmin's 
Revolution in Logic, 11 Journal of Philosophy, LVI (March 26, 1959), 297-
319. Interpretation and reinterpretation come from Albert L. Lewis, 
"Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal," Central States Speech Journal, XXIII 
(Spring, 1972), 48-55. 
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work, the first volume of which only has been published of an 
anticipated three, promises to cause even more pandemonium.40 Perhaps 
to an even greater extent than Perelman, Toulmin offers the modern 
student of argument a non-analytic, optional, interpretative view of 
argument. 
Toulmin begins with the hypothesis that: 
••• the categories of formal logic were built up from a 
study of the analytic syllogism, that this is an unrepresenta-
tive and misleadingly simple sort of argument, and that many 
of the paradoxical commonplaces of formal logic and epistemology 
spring from the4Tisapplication of these categories to arguments 
of other sorts. 
He proceeds from this hypothesis to offer an optional system of analysis 
of arguments based on "field-dependent" criterion as applied to 
"substantive" versus "analytic" arguments. 42 In Human Understanding. 
Toulmin explains that this means that: 
The more positive and constructive aim of this whole argument 
has been to indicate just what 'digging behind' existing 
intellectual procedures implies, and what is involved in 
'bringing to light the underlying comparisons' on which 
rational procedures rely for justification. This positive 
part of our account is encapsulated in the phrase "intellectual 
ecology.' Normally it is evident, from the context in which 
our concepts are employed just what rational enterprise or 
activity we are implicitly concerned with, and what 'point 
of view' the discussion in question is adopting. Once this 
40Toulmin, Human Understanding. Vol. I (Oxford, England: 
Clarendon Press, 1972). 
41Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 146. 
42lbid., pp. 146-210. This idea is far more important, Brockriede 
and Ehninger to the contrary, than the layout of arguments. 
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point of view is clearly identified, we can then use previous 
experience with the concepts and procedures involved to 
define the relevant reservoir of unsolved problems; recognize 
the outstanding intellectual or practical 'demands' which 
accordingly face us in the rational enterprise concerned and 
compare the 'rational merits' of proposed conceptual changes 
by seeing how far, and in what respects, they would give us 
the means of solving the outstanding conceptual problems and43 
meeting the actual demands of the current problem-situation. 
In other words, one determines what field one is dealing with, orients 
oneself to the standards and vocabulary of that field, and determines 
that to be rational which best helps explain perplexing concepts in-
volved in the field. 44 This process involves an understanding of 
specialized vocabulary, standards of authority, and the functional use 
of concepts. Once such understanding is attained, it can then be 
utilized for a theory of argument. This is what our analytic synthesis 
of Toulmin's works hopes to make somewhat clearer. 
Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin deny the concept of a totally 
rational man in a mechanical universe. They are unanimous in their 
opposition to a sterile, mechanistic, abstract theory of argumentation. 
A close examination of their works makes perfectly clear that "the 
traditional equating of 'rational' and 'logical' is simply inaccurate. 1145 
As Scott says "the ordinary sense of rationality ought not simply to be 
43Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 488. 
4~oulmin's meaning for field is elusive but will be made somewhat 
clearer through the more detailed explanation presented in the chapter 
on his view of rational argument. 
45Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: 
A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 141. 
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called into question • • • it ought to be discarded as unsupportable. 1146 
Scott even argues that those arguments which Toulmin calls analytic 
might not be arguments at all. 
It is questionable (although Toulmin does not put the matter 
in this fashion) whether or not analytic arguments should be 
called arguments at all since the word 'argument' suggests 
the drawing of conclusions which are somehow fresh, new, 
unknown, or unaccepted otherwise.47 
It is clear that the totally rational man and the mechanical universe 
have been eliminated as viable models. What is to take their place? 
Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin suggest a number of answers: the 
enthymeme, psychologic, dialectic, presence, adherence, field• 
dependent arguments, etc. But it is critical to note,that their ideas 
are buttressed and extended in the themes of the ordinary language 
philosophers, in dialectic, and in the writings of the symbolic inter-
actionists. 
Ordinary language philosophy starts with the thesis that artificial 
languages are improper as the sole subject matter for philosophers, 
logicians, and students of argument. As Gilbert Ryle states in Dilemmas 
"questions which can be decided by calculation On artifical languages 
S .B.HJ are different toto caelo, from the problems that perplex 
(srdinary language S .B .HJ • n48 Strawson states that "side by side with 
46scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism,,'' 135. 
47scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," 11. 
48Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960), p. 114. 
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the study of formal logic, and overlapping it, we have another study; 
the study of the logical features of ordinary speech. 1149 J. L. Austin 
argues that: 
Our connnon stock of words embodies all the distinctions men 
have found worth drawing, and the connexions they have found 
worth making in the life-times of many generations. In relation 
to everyday practical matters, the distinctions which ordinary 
language incorporates are likely to be sounder than any that you 
and I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs in an afternoon. 
They are to be neglected at our peril; if not the end-all, they 
are certainly the 'begin-all' of philosophy. 50 ,, 
Ordinary language philosophy concentrates on everyday, marketplace 
argumentation. Its strength, thus, is the very weakness of formal logic. 
However, it may be weak where formal logic is strong, in precision and 
clarity. The exploration of ordinary arguments, at best, only 
"establishes the boundaries of related concepts. nSl Ordinary language 
philosophy explores some intriguing problems but as Herman Tennessen re-
marks in "Ordinary Language in Memoriam" "the outlandish, vague, and 
imprecise language of the so-called 'ordinary language philosophers 11152 
may tend more toward individual criticism than a public 'logic.' This 
49P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen 
& Co., Ltd., 1952), p. 231. 
50Quoted in John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Baltimore: 
Penquin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 451. 
51R. J. Howard, "Ryle' s Idea of Philosophy," New Scholasticism, 
XXXVII (April, 1963), 161. See also Steward, "Rhetoricians on Language 
and Meaning: An Ordinary Language Philosophy Critique," pp. 155-157 on 
John Wilson's Thinking With Concepts. 
52Herman Tennessen, "Ordinary Language in Memoriam," Inquiry, VIII 
(Autumn, 1965), 227. 
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remark may, however, represent professional chauvinism and a half-
truth on Tennessen's part, and I shall argue, that for all its 
-weaknesses, ordinary language philosophy starts towards a definition 
of the new argument. 
The boundaries of the new argument are further delimited in a 
renewed study of dialectic. Perelman argues that "philosophical argu-
mentation, especially when it is constructive. is dialectical in 
the sense of Aristotle. 1153 Natanson states in his oft reprinted 
"The Limits of Rhetoric" that "the unification of rhetoric and dialectic 
is really the reapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric because 
dialectic is given a unique interpretation; dialectic constitutes the 
true philosophy of rhetoric. 1154 Mortimer Adler in Dialectic, now 
regrettably out of print, states: 
Dialectic is a convenient technical name for the kind of thinking 
which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when 
they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some 
theory or idea. It is presented here as a methodology significant-
ly different from the procedure of the empirical scientist or the 
method of the mathematician. It is an intellectual process in 
which all men engage in so far as they undertake to be critical 
of their own opinions, or the opinions of others, and are willing 
to face the difficulties that arise in communication because of 
the opposition and conflict of diverse insights.55 
He connects dialectic to ordinary language in the idea that common 
discourse constitutes a vast network of definitions, implied classifica-
53Perelman, "Reply to Henry W. Johnstone," reprinted in Natanson 
and Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, pp. 136-137. 
5~atanson, "The Limits of Rhetoric," reprinted in Natanson and 
Johnstone, Philosophy. Rhetoric. and Argumentation, p. 98. 
55Adler, Dialectic, p. v. 
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tions, and distinctions in constant process. 56 In its formal sense, 
Adler relates and equates dialectic to philosophy as "the emancipation 
of the intellect and the cultivation of the comic spirit1157 which sees 
not only the brute force of things but the multiple, flexible meanings 
of the world of discourse. 
The same world of discourse is the prime staging area for the 
symbolic' interactionists. Toward the end of his penetrating disserta-
tion, written with just a touch of whimsy, Jackson Harrell makes a plea 
for more work with symbolic interactionism as related to argument. 
In addition, work needs to proceed in devising theories of 
argumentation and rhetorical criticism based in this per-
spective. In recent years many writers have attacked the 
fonnal systems of argument which have been relied upon by 
rhetoricians in the past. However, no fully adequate counter-
theories seem to have emerged. Symbolic interaction theory 
would seem to support strongly any move against objectively 
imposed formal systems of argument.SB 
Symbolic interactionists see the world through "terministic screens. 1159 
For them, the world is a world of language. The permutations and com-
hiuations of words with families of meaning constitute arguments. 60 
Symbolic interactionism blends nicely with ordinary language and 
dialectic, pointing the way toward a new argument. 
56Adler, Dialectic, p. 90. 
57.!!tl!!., p. 247. 
58iiarrell, "Symbolic Interaction as the Basis for Rhetorical 
Theory," p. 225. 
59Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (N. Y.: Vintage 
Books, 1957), p. 18. 
GOibid. 
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Resources and Limitations 
As already hinted by the many bibliographic footnotes scattered 
through the first sections of this chapter, the resources for this study 
are copious. Selecting those books and articles which particularly fit 
non-analytic argument is, admittedly, a Gargantuan task. But such 
selectivity is not impossible and does not necessarily involve super-
ficiality as the following synthesis hopefully will prove. A synthetic 
study can be as "deep" as any "particular" analysis. Part;cular analyses 
have been the trend in dissertations, but perhaps it is as important to 
know a little about an important problem as it is to know a lot about an 
insignificant difficulty; the newer synthetic studies certainly deserve 
a chance, at least, to go in this direction. 
The Aristotelian corpus is both deep and broad which is only ~e-
fitting for that rhetor whose guiding hand or "dead hand," depending upon 
how you wish to look at it, has undergirded rhetoric and argument for two 
thousand years. Besides the original sources and articles on the 
enthymeme already mentioned, the author wishes to point to those trans-
lations he thinks are particularly well done and to those secondary 
references of particular penetration. The best translations of The 
Rhetoric are by Cooper61 and Rhys Roberts.62 Each has its individual 
6~e Rhetoric of Aristotle, translated by Lane Cooper (N. Y.: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932). Note that previously cited 
materials are not footnoted in this section unless it was originally 
unclear as to what part of the dissertation they applied. 
62tbe Rhetoric, translated by W. Rhys Roberts (N. Y.: The Modern 
Library, 1954). 
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strengths and weaknesses. Cooper is better at relating The Rhetoric 
to the entire Aristotelian corpus. Roberts is perhaps the more 
felicitous translater. For functional usage it is impossible to pick 
between them. Translations of other Aristotelian works of significance 
to argument can most conveniently be found in Richard McKeon's Th~ Basic 
Works of Aristotle. 63 Among the older translaters, interpreters, and 
commentators the works of Cope64 and Jaeger65 are critical. The best 
modern interpretation of Aristotle on argument is probably John Herman 
Randall, Jr.'s Aristotle, though Richard McKeon has any number of 
works pertinent to an understanding of Aristotle's argumentation theories. 66 
Ch. Perelman's critical works are Justice67 and The New Rhetoric. 
Also important are his articles either done independently or in 
collaboration with Madame L. Olbrechts-Tyteca from whom he gets his 
philosophic background: "How Do We Apply Reason to Value? , 11 "Rhetoric 
and Philosophy," "Proof in Philosophy," "Value Judgments, Justifications, 
and Argumentation," etc.68 The most important interpreter of Perelman 
63aichard McKeon, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (N. Y.: Random 
House, 1941). 
64E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis 
and Notes (London: Macmillan and Co., 1867). 
65werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His 
Development, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948). 
66see, for example, Richard McKean, "Aristotle's Conception of 
Language and the Arts of Language," Classical Philolost~ XLI (Oct., 
1946), 193•206 and XLII (Jan., 1947), 21•50. 
67Perelman, Justice, trans. by Susan Rubin, (N. Y.: Random House, 
1967). 
68see Footnote No. 34. 
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in America is Ray Dearin69 though Henry w. Johnstone, Jr. has also done 
important work on Perelman's ideas in philosophy and argument. 70 
Perelman is better known abroad. There his best interpreters are Max 
Loreau, 71 Julius Stone, 72 and Vasile Florescu's excellent "Rhetoric and 
Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary Philosophy." 
Stephen Toulmin's most important argumentation texts are The Uses 
of Argument and Human Understanding. A short article which he published 
in 1957, "Logical Positivism and After or Back to Aristotle,1173 is also 
particularly illuminating. Logicians have, by in large, not treated 
Toulmin well but among them his most penetrating critics are Castenada, 
Cooley, Cowan, 74 and Manicas.75 Rhetoricians have extrapolated from 
) 
Toulmin for their own purposes (see Brockriede and Ehninger, McCroskey,76 
69Ray Dearin, "Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970) and "The Philosophical 
Basis of Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," Q.J.s,~ LV (Oct., 1969), 
213-224. 
70Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., "A New Theory of Philosophical Argu-
me~tation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XV (1954), 244-252. 
71Max Lore au, "Rhetoric as the Logic of the Behavioral Sciences," 
Q.J.s,. LI (Dec., 1965), 455-463. 
72stone, Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings. 
73.roulmin, "Logical Positivism and After or Back to Aristotle," 
Universities Quarterly. XI (August, 1957), 335-347. 
74Joseph Cowan, "The Uses of Argument--An Apology for Logic," 
t!!rui, LXXIII (Jan., 1964), 27-45. 
75Peter T. Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution to Logic and Argu-
mentation," in Arthur Kruger, Counterpoint (Meuchen, R. J.: Scarecrow 
Press, Inc., 1968). 
76James Mccroskey, An Introduction to Rhetorical Comnunication 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1968). 
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and Windes and Hastings77 ) but Spicer78 and Lewis give him fair 
treatment. Of the three giants of argument cited in this dissertation 
the resources concerning Toulmin are in greatest flux for he is still 
producing at an ever accelerating rate and commentary about his ideas 
continues to proliferate, though much by and about him does not concern 
argument. 
The study of ordinary language philosophy necessarily begins with 
Wittgenstein's Philosophic Investigations. 79 The works of J. L. Austin,80 
Gilbert Ryle, 81 John Wisdom, 82 and P. F. Strawson83 are also important. 
For a quick summary of the work of the natural or ordinary language 
philosophers the best work this author has seen is the section in John 
Passmore' s A Hundred Years of Philosophy on "Wittgenstein and Ordinary 
Language. 11 84 The two dissertations previously mentioned by Caton and 
77Russell Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argument and Advocacy (N. Y.: 
Random House, 1965). 
7Biiolt Spicer, 11 Stephen Toulmin' s Functional Analysis of Logic and 
Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric." (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Oklahoma, 1964), 
79wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, tras. by 
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott, Ltd., 1953). 
80J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, ed. J. o. Urmson and G. J. 
Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) and How to Do Things with Words, 
ed. J. o. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
81Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson, 1949), 
Dilenmas, and "Systematically Misleading Expressions," Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society, XXXII (1931-1932), 139-170. 
82John Wisdom, Other Minds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952). 
83P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory and, editor, 
Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); 
B4John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, pp. 424-465. 
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Steward85 are also insightful if not well written. In addition, several 
books of readings in ordinary language philosophy are now available the 
best of which are A.G. N. Flew, Logic and Language, 1st and 2nd series, 86 
87 and Charles Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language. Other than these 
sources, one interested in ordinary language philosophy, which might be 
called "philosophic, rhetorical analysis," would have to go to the 
professional philosophy journals. 
Dialectic is best represented by Adler's Dialectic previously 
mentioned. The works of Natanson and Johnstone are also of significance 
as Johnstone's argumentum ad hominem is nothing more nor less than 
technical dialectic. Steve Shiffrin's article, "Forensics, Dialectic, 
and Speech Communication, 1188 vaunting dialectic as the art of policy 
analysis is insightful and provocative. Dialectic is mentioned in Burke 
as the overarching process for "merger and division" and the making and 
breaking of verbal hierarchies. 89 Holt Spicer states that "references 
to 'dialectic' are relatively infrequent in the current literature of 
rhetoric and philosophy, 1190 however, dialectic is the indefinite referent 
85see Footnote No. 25. 
86 A.G. N. Flew, ed., Logic and Language, 1st series and 2nd series 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959). 
87charles Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 
111.: University of Illinois Press, 1963). 
88steven Shiffrin, "Forensics, Dialectic, and Speech Communication, 11 
Journal of the American Forensic Association, VII (Spring, 1972), 189-191. 
89Kenneth Burke, Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, Calif.: University 
of California Press, 1969), p. 403. 
90spicer, "Stephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of Logic and 
Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric," p. 1. 
-25-
of any number of works some of which will be referred to in the fifth 
chapter of this dissertation. 
Jackson Harrell bemoans that "the wide range of sources available 
to the student of rhetoric interested in studying symbolic interaction 
theory must surely approach infinity. 1191 While this is not entirely 
\ 
true, even those symbolic interactionist works which apply particularly 
well to argument are plentiful. Several of the works of Kenneth Burke come 
instantly to mind. 92 Two comprehensive articles giving concise statements 
regarding the basic positions and goals of the symbolic interactionists 
follow: Herbert Blumer' s "Society as Symbolic Interaction, 1193 and Arnold 
Rose's "A Systematic Suamary of Symbolic Interaction Theory. 11 94 Three 
books of collected readings are also of particular value: Social 
Psychology Through Symbolic Interaction, edited by Gregory P. Stone and 
Harvey A. Farberman, 95 Human Behavior and Social Processes, edited by 
Arnold Rose, 96 and Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology. 
edited by Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer. 97 And, as if this were 
91 Harrell, "Symbolic Interaction as the Basis for Rhetorical 
Theory," p. 9. 
92Esp. Kenneth Burke, 
of California Press, 1969), 
Symbolic Action (Berkeley: 
A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University 
A Granmar of Motives, and Language as 
University of California Press, 1966). 
93nerbert Blumer, "Society as Symbolic Interaction," in Symbolic 
Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology. eds. Jerome G. Manis and 
Bernard N. Meltzer (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967). 
94Arnold Rose, "A Systematic Summary of Symbolic Interaction 
Theory," in his Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1962). 
95Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, eds. Social Psychology 
Through Symbolic Interaction (Walthma, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970). 
96Rose, Human Behavior and Social Processes. 
97Manis and Meltzer, Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social 
Psychology. 
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not enough, many commentaries on "new rhetorics" must be considered in 
the symbo,lic interactionist vein. 98 
Several limitations have already been implied in the survey of the 
literature. The examinations of Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin will 
be rather thorough but ordinary language theory, dialectic, and symbolic 
interaction will be only highlighted as alternatives to traditional 
argumentation studies. The author cannot in this dissertation 
present a whole new comprehensive theory of argument but wishes only to 
accomplish the more modest and appropriate task of pointing to new 
directions in argument. This is more than many have accomplished, and 
the concrete suggestions will hopefully constitute a contribution to 
the field. If this dissertation can point to some of the weaknesses 
in the study of traditional logic as related to argument, point to 
Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin to highlight and account for this 
difficulty, and formulate some alternatives from these three gentlemen 
as related to one another and to ordinary language philosophy, dialectic, 
and symbolic interaction, a modest contribution should have been made. 
Organizational Schemata 
I will complete the study of the genre of rational argument 
through analysis and synthesis of the various theories of argument 
mentioned in five independent but related chapters. These chapters flow 
from the outward spiraling methodological approach previously covered, 
and their content has been hinted at already. 
98specific commentaries as to these "new rhetorics" will be 
presented in the fifth chapter. 
-27-
Chapter I, "The Genre of Rational Argument," states the problem 
for analysis, covers the methodological approach, reviews the available 
literature, states the various limitations of the study, and presents 
the organizational schemata. As with all introductory chapters, its 
attempt is to interest, state the main thesis, and preview the work of 
the dissertation. 
Chapter II, "Aristotle on Rational Argument: A Reinterpretation 
of Tradition," explores Aristotle's analysis of argument and those of his 
followers in the neo-Aristotelian tradition. Essentially, the chapter 
concludes that Aristotle has been misinterpreted by many for two 
thousand years. While it is true that his emphasis is on episteme, 
Aristotle also considered phronesis. The scientific syllogism was 
counterbalanced by the theories of dialectic and by the enthymeme. 
Though he was interested in scientific knowledge, Aristotle was also 
interested in the practical affairs of men. His view of that which is 
rational is more encompassing than the neo-Aristotelian tradition, 
narrowly considered, would grant. 
Chapter III, "Ch. Perelman on Argument: The Assault on a Narrowed 
Vision of Rationality," presents the argumentation theories of an 
innovative Belgian legal philosopher. Perelman contends that the theory 
of argument is separate and distinct from the theory of demonstration. 
Argument is probabilistic, tentative, imprecise, and weighted on its 
strength as opposed to demonstration which is necessary, final, precise, 
and correct or incorrect. An argument is advanced before an "audience" 
seeking that audience's nadherence." The advocate must through language, 
through the interaction of arguments, and through association and 
dissociation, create "presence." Argumentation functions in the realm 
of decision and values instead of in the realm of facts. An argument 
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is "just," relevant and forceful, weighty, rather than right or wrong, 
and it is just for a particular time, audience, and situation. Perelman, 
and his companion, L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, create a theory of argument that 
is open and flexible and, though they backslide toward the analytic ideal 
upon occasion, they tend toward a dynamic new view of what constitutes 
argument and towards different methods for the evaluation of what they 
consider to be rational argument. 
Chapter IV, "Stephen Toulmin and his Quest for the Foundations of 
Substantive Argument," analyzes the "logic fallacy" through the subtle 
connnentaries of the most provocative argumentation theorist of our time. 
Toulmin attacks the "analytic ideal" with vigor attempting to separate 
''substantive argument" from the warrant-using, formally valid, analytic 
syllogism model of the past. He contributes a more sophisticated and 
clear "layout of arguments 11 model of his own and the ideas of field-
dependency and intellectual ecology. This chapter also analyzes and 
critiques some of Toulmin 1 s interpreters and evaluators. Following the 
lead of Albert Lewis, Toulmin 1 s commentators are divided into the camp 
of the logicians and the camp of the rhetoricians. The logicians 
criticize Toulmin but admit there is a need for some method for 
interpreting "informal argument." The rhetoricians extrapolate from 
Toulmin to create innovations that sometimes add to the theory of rhetoric 
and argument but which do not always represent Toulmin's thought. 
Chapter V, "Visions for a New Argument," concludes the dissertation. 
Abstracting from the analyses of Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin, the 
author finds a problem in the analytic ideal of argument. Aristotle, 
Perelman, and Toulmin suggest that the analytic vision of rationality is 
too narrow, too confined, for an adequate theory of argument. They 
themselves suggest some alternative options, but, more importantly, 
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their suggestions constitute leads into ordinary language theory, 
dialectic, and symbolic interaction. The theories of Aristotle, 
Perelman, and Toulmin as buttressed and extended by ordinary language 
theory, dialectic, and symbolic interaction theory suggest the basis 
for a more complex theory of argument and for a different sort of 
evaluation of argument. They suggest that the student of argument must 
be a student of language. They suggest that the student must know his 
culture and mileu. And they suggest that argument is "context-variant" 
and that rhetorical argument, the argument of values and of decision 
and action, must be related to people, times, and places. Rhetorical 
argumen~ must be evaluated as strong or weak not as right or wrong, 
and such evaluation must take place within the proper jurisdictions or 
fields and according to intellectually ecological criteria. All this 
makes an adequate theory of argumentation far more complex, but it also 
makes such a theory more worthwhile as applicable to "ordinary every day 
argumentation." 
CHAPTER II 
ARISTOTLE ON RATIONAL ARGUMENT: A REINTERPRETATION OF TRADITION 
Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic (that is, the art of 
public speaking and the art of logical discussion are coordinate, 
but contrasted, processes); for both have to do with such things 
as fall, in a way, within the realm of common knowledge, things 
that do not belong to any one science. 1 
An Introduction of Purpose 
To those seeking new rhetorics and the requisite new logics it 
might seem ridiculous, even counterproductive, to go back to Aristotle. 
After all, to these persons, the Stagirite is part of the problem not 
part of the solution as regards a substantive view of rational argument. 
However, a return to the thought of Aristotle seems warranted on the 
basis of three considerations: (1) Despite two thousand years of 
supposed progress, his logic is still the basic assessment mechanism 
for "reasoned discourse"; 2 (2) Aristote Han appraisal criteria for 
reasoned discourse often have been seriously mistranslated, misanalyzed, 
and misapplied; and (3) Consequently, students of argument have received 
a false impression as to what constitutes reasoned discourse according 
to Aristotle and have been left to their own devices or, if you will, 
to connnon sense and intuition, in evaluating rhetorical artifacts. 
1Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by Lane Cooper (N. Y.: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1932), 1354a. 
2Aristotle's logic is here taken to include all writings commenting 
upon the syllogism, the enthymeme, the example, induction, reductio ad 
impossible, and ethos, pathos, and logos. 
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Any cursary examination of recent texts on persuasion and argument 
reveals that Aristotelian evaluative criteria for reasoning are stili 
pre-eminent in the field of rhetoric. The discussions of Freeley, 3 
Capp,4 Minnick, 5 and Kruger6 all make the syllogism central to their 
analysis of reasoned discourse. Thompson7 and Brockriede and Ehninger,8 
despite following a basically Toulminesque pattern of logic, still 
employ the basic principles of induction and deduction, the idea of 
logos, and the concept of the enthymeme. Leaving aside temporarily 
those couments which make reference to the contributions of Toulmin 
on patterns of argument, and of Bacon and contemporary science on 
induction, texts on argument and debate today treat formal logic as 
Aristotelian logic, just as they did ten years ago when William Smith9 
examined the field, and just as they have, basically, for two thousand 
years. 
3Austin J. Freeley, Argumentation and Debate: Rational Decision 
Making, 3rd ed. (Belmont Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1971). 
4Glenn R. Capp and Thelma Robuck Capp, Principles of Argumentation 
and Debate (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965). 
Swayne c. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1957). 
6Arthur N. Kruger, Modern Debate: Its Logic and Strategy (N. Y.: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1960). 
7wayne N. Thompson, Modern Argumentation and Debate: Principles 
and Practices (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971). 
8Dougias Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by Debate- (N. Y.: 
Dodd, Mead, & Company, 1967). 
9william S. Smith, "Formal Logic in Debate," Southern State Speech 
Journal, XXVII (Summer, 1962), 330-338. 
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Regrettably for the sharp, probing analysis so essential to a 
healthy criticism, the logical apparatus which rhetoricians have borrowed 
from what they supposed to be the Aristotelian methodology have often 
proven to be but blunt instruments. 10 The blame for this condition, 
however, may not lie so much with Aristotle as with those whom J. A. K. 
Thomson calls "the logical martinets"11 who for twenty centuries have 
mistranslated, misanalyzed, and misapplied the words of the Master. 12 
These scholastics13 have turned what was meant to be a humanistic, 
multivariate, flexible approach to rhetoric and criticism into a 
supposedly scientific but actually simplistic, cliche-ridden, bankrupt 
methodology. 14 In encapsulated fashion, they have turned Aristotle from ,, 
the Master of Them Who Know into the caricature "of that syllogistic 
gentleman with a category for every emergency. 015 Stressing science, 
lOThe best analysis of this problem may be found in Edwin Black's 
Rhetorical Criticism: A Study in Method (N. Y.: The Macmillan 
Company, 1965). 
11Aristotle's Ethics (Baltimore, Md.: Penquin Books, 1953), p. 17. 
12For references to the mangling of the Aristotelian corpus see 
especially John Herman Randall, Jr. Aristotle (N. Y. : Columbia 
University Press, 1960), Vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation 
in Contemporary Philosophy," Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (Fall, 1970), 
193-223, Jesse G. Delia, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the 
Enthymeme: A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," Q.J.S., 
LVI (April, 1970), 140-148, and Smith, "Formal Logic and Debate," 
330-338. 
13scholastics is used here in a loose sense to refer not only to 
formal Scholastics but also to those of the neo-Aristotelian tradition 
who have attempted to make Aristotle a formal logician and supposedly 
systematic philosopher. 
14see Black, Rhetorical Criticism, esp. pp. 91-132. 
15Lawrence Rosenfield, Aristotle and Information Theory (The Hague, 
Netherlands: Mouten & Co., Printers, 1971), p. 23. 
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formal logic, the syllogism, and demonstration as well as thoughtlessly 
trying to apply the mechanisms for episteme and apocleixsis across the 
board to any type of discourse, the scholastics have given a lastingly 
false impression of the methodology of Aristotelian scholarship. 
The false interpretation of Aristotelian methodology is, in the 
main, the reason why, "although much time is devoted to teaching formal 
logic in classes of argumentation and debate, students often seem to 
gain little that they can use •• 1116 • It is probably also the reason 
why Edwin Black and a coterie of new critics are trying so very hard to 
break away from a neo-Aristotelian framework of rhetorical criticism. 17 
Finally, the same false impression provides the justification for this 
chapter in which the author will attempt to: (1) Explain the 
deficiencies in the traditional interpretations of Aristotle on rational 
' argument, (2) Provide a broad general framework for the Aristotelian 
multiple systems of rational argument, and (3) Conment in detail upon 
scientific demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric as separate rational 
systems of argumentation. 
Deficiencies in Traditional Interpretation of 
Aristotle on Argument 
Vasile Florescu in his insightful essay, "Rhetoric and Its 
Rehabilitation in Contemporary Philosophy," states the main problem 
regarding the many misinterpretations of Aristotle: "As opposed to the 
theory of demonstration, which is concerned oal7 with correct proofs, 
16wiUiam Smith, ''Formal Logic in Debate," 330. 
17In addition to Black one might mention Lawrence Rosenfield, 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, and some Burkeans, though not necessarily Burke 
himself, as members of this "escaping" group. 
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that is, conforming to universally accepted rules, and with incorrect 
proofs which do not fulfill these conditions, things are much more 
complicated in the theory of argumentation. nlS One is reminded of 
Burke's "Prologue in Heaven" in The Rhetoric of Religion where "The 
Lord" must 'constantly explain to "Satan" "there is more to it than that. 11 19 
Briefly, the problem is that for two thousand years many of Aristotle's 
translators and commentators have tried to transform his theory of 
argument (which is very complex and not particularly clear) into a 
simple, easily understood, theory of demonstration. To the extent these 
false disciples have succeeded in their quest is the extent to which the 
real Aristotelian corpus has been dismembered through "scholastic logic 
chopping."20 
While the attempt to make Aristotle's theory of argument a theory 
of demonstration involves considerable twisting of the Aristotelian 
corpus, four distortions stand out as most crucial. First, because 
natural language inherently involves the risk of, ambiguity and, further, 
because many insidiously take advantage of the potential for verbal 
slippage to purposefully manipulate concepts, many commentators chose to 
18vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Rhetoric," p. 218. 
19Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1970), p. 282. 
20r1orescu comments in "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in 
Contemporary Philosophy," 207 that "we ought to recognize that, for the 
contemporary philosophers, traditional Aristotelian logic is arbitrarily 
reduced to the theory of syllogistic reasoning which is found in the 
Analytics. But, in the conception of the Stagirite, the syllogism is 
only a perfect instrument in the case of a perfect science, of which the 
principles have no longer a history, since they are admitted no matter 
where and no matter when. Enormous areas escape the jurisdiction of this 
method. The discovery of the first principles of a science is not govern-
ed by the syllogism, nor are the many aspects of practical life. How could 
one justify the presence of the Topics, and especially of the Rhetoric, 
other than as ways of exploring the gaps of the syllogistic method?" 
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emphasize Aristotle's artificial symbol system for logic which was but 
cursorily developed in The Prior Analytics. 21 Second, because Aristotle 
himself stressed its significance and because the other forms of proof 
tended toward intricacy if not outright ambiguity, various Aristotelian 
interpreters embraced the syllogism almost to the exclusion of any other 
type of proof. Third, because material validity, necessitated in 
Aristotle's theory of science, 22 tends to be extremely hard to verify, 
many chose to make the new pre-eminent syllogism totally formalistic. 
There were factors in Aristotle's writings which partially justified 
such a reformation, but the key fact seemed to be that "the traditional 
logic was a logic for clarifying and organizing that which was already 
known. 1123 It was not a logic of inquiry but a logic of proof, 24 
so many of Aristotle's interpreters merely went one step beyond Aristotle 
to systems of complete formal validity. Fourth, and finally, soae 
Aristotelian analysts, having strayed this far, decided to go still 
further and conflated formal validity with logic and rationality. 25 By 
emphasizing these four distortions, these scholastics (philosophers, 
logicians, and rhetoricians alike) managed to obtain what they thought 
21Jan Lukaseiwicz, Aritotle's Syllogistic (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1957), pp. 7-10. Lukasiewicz argues that a symbolic logic is 
implicit in Aristotle even though it was the Stoics who explicitly 
developed most of the variables. 
22 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, 71b. 
23King Broadrick, "The Relationship of Argument to Syllogistic and 
Experimental Logic," Q.J.s •• XXXVI (Dec., 1950) 480. 
24James Duerlinger, "Proof in Aristotle's Organon," American 
Journal of Philology. XC (July, 1969) 320-328. 
25This is what Delia calls the logic fallacy. It appears in many 
disguised forms, but its essence always mistakes validity for truth and 
formal logic for rationality. 
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to be a timeless, non-contextual, axiological system supposedly 
applicable to all human knowledge. 
There are many reasons why Aristotle's theories of rational 
discourse cannot be legitimately generalized and simplified into an 
axiological theory of scientific demonstration. Among the more 
prominent of these reasons is the simple fact that the condition of the 
Aristotelian corpus simply decently won't allow for it. As Randall states: 
The Aristotelian documents are fragmentary, and frequently 
break off; they are repetitious, and often display little 
clear order in their parts. Still more, they exhibit manifest 
contradictions, of approach, of mood, of theory, and even of 
fundamental position and 'doctrine.' The obvious reason for 
this somewhat chaotic character is that our present text is 
not as Aristotle left it.26 
What we have of Aristotle is more in the form of a compilation of 
relatively disjointed student notes than it is a series of systematic 
monographs. It is simply unfair to try to make these "notes," which 
Aristotle developed contingently over a prolonged period of time, 27 serve 
as a methodical exegesis for a mythical Aristotelian supers~ience. 
Another reason why Aristotle's theories cannot be extrapolated 
into a universal, timeless, master formulation is that Aristotle was 
very much time bound and situationally oriented. Many have pointed out 
that various Aristotelian rules best fit or only fit Athenian society 
in 300 B.c. 28 Edward Steele, especially, has quite lucidly noted that 
the very essence of the theory of the enthymeme is dependent upon the 
ideas that "any delineation of the premises in a value orientation can 
26aandall, Aristotle, p. 23. 
27see esp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History 
of His Developnt, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948). 
28see esp. w. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968 and John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle. 
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be appropriate only for the group studied."29 and that "furthermore, the 
basic premises of the desirable may not prevail from one period of time 
to another."30 Only by ignoring the many many Aristotelian references 
to time and circumstance could a critic possibly view Aristotle as a 
formalist rather than as "the outstanding functionalist in the Western 
tradition. 1131 
Finally, and most critically, Aristotle ought not be categorized 
solely as a scientific exponent of formal demonstration because he 
himself states that he ought not to be so characterized. Admittedly, 
Aristotle stresses the scientific approach but this is because "on the 
subject of Rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, 
whereas on the subject of reasoning we had nothing else of an earlier 
date to speak of at all. n 32 Actually, the Stagirite: 
••• distinguishes three separate but related methodologies 
for knowing and persuading, scientific demonstration, dialectic, 
and rhetoric. Scientific demonstration is developed in the 
Prior and Posterior Analytics as the method of discovering and 
demonstrating truth; dialectic is explained in the Topics as a 
method of discovering what is probable truth through special 
forms of dialogue; and rhetoric is understood as the method of 
discovering the available means of persuasion.33 
Only demonstration is theoretical, a science, the subject of episteme. 34 
29Edward Steele, "Social Values, the Enthvmeme, and Speech 
Criticism," Western Speech, XXVI (Spring, 1962), 72. 
JO!J?.!.g. 
31Randall, Aristotle, p. 31. 
32Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, 184b, 1-5. 
33James McBurney, "The Place of the Enthvmeme in Rhetorical 
Theory," Speech Monographs, III (1936) 52. 
34Randall, Aristotle, pp. 32-35. 
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Dialectic and rhetoric are arts concerned with phronesis or practical 
wisdom. 35 Furthermore, the way to distinguish between the three is not 
through any artificial reduction to symbols or through form but sub-
stantively! through "the character of the premises from which they 
proceed. u36 A. E. Taylor makes so much of this fact that he proclaims 
that the mistaking of demonstration for argumen~ or of the theoretical 
sciences for the practical arts is "a proof of a philosopher's lack of 
grounding in logic n37 . . . 
Nonetheless, most, not just a few, expositers of Aristotle have 
through the years fallen into the "logic fallacy," or formalism trap. 38 
Possibly this is because they are unfamiliar with the whole of Aristotle's 
works having merely read the Rhetoric or the Organon or the Ethics or 
Politics without relating the analyses contained therein as demanded 
by Aristotle. 39 
35Randall, Aristotle, pp. 32-35. 
36Ibid -· 
37Aristotle (N. Y.: Dodge Publishing Co., 1908), p. 16. 
38Besides those previously mentioned one might add Lloyd Bitzer, 
King Broadrick, and Delton Thomas Howard. 
39Aristotle cross-references his own works. Perhaps the most 
significant reference is Rhetoric 1355a where Aristotle hints that no 
one can really understand the rhetoric without a thorough knowledge of 
his logical works. "New Proof (persuasion) is a kind of demonstration; 
for we entertain the strongest conviction of a thing if we believe that 
it has been 'demonstrated.' Rhetorical proof, however, (is not scientific 
demonstration); it takes the form of an enthymeme, this being in general, 
the most effective among the various forms of persuasion. The enthymeme, 
again, is a kind of syllogism; now every kind of syllogism falls within 
the province of Dialectic, and must be examined under Dialectic as a 
whole, or under some branch of it. Consequently the person with the 
clearest insight into the nature of syllogisms, who knows from what 
premises and in what modes they may be constructed, will also be the most 
expert in regard to enthymemes, once he has mastered their special 
province (of things contingent and uncertain such as human actions and 
their consequences), and has learnt the difference between enth;xmemes and 
logical syllogism. (The latter are complete and yield an absolute demon-
stration.) 
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Perhaps many analysts were merely Platonists trying to force Aristotle 
into a preconceived theory of forms as suggested by Vasile Florescu. 40 
Maybe it simply became impossible to separate what Aristotle had actually 
said from the hundreds of commentaries arising from and inundating his 
works. Or, just possibly, A. E. Taylor might be correct in his analysis 
that the misinterpretations of Aristotle are caused by a distinctive 
lack of grounding in logic' and philosophy by many, who despite their 
inabilities, have nonetheless insisted in commenting upon the works of 
the Master. Whatever the case, however, it is best to pass over past 
mistakes, leaving it to the.pundits and those who excel in philological 
exercises to expose error, while passing on ourselves to the attempt to 
obtain a more correct explanation of Aristotle on rational argument. 
The Aristotelian Framework for the Study of 
the Three Types of Discourse 
As previously noted, one cannot derive a proper framework for the 
study of Aristotle on rational discourse without a basic knowledge of 
the Organon, the Rhetoric, and the Ethics.41 In addition, for a truly 
thorough perspective, it would be helpful to have a knowledge of Ih!, 
Politics, the Metaphysics, the Poetics, and even some familiarity with 
40vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Philosophy," 193. 
41The most easily accessible translation of the Organon is probably 
contained in Richard McKeen, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle (N. Y.: 
Random House, 1941). Many translations of the Rhetoric are readily 
available, but two stand out, The Rhetoric, translated by w. Rhys Roberts 
(N. Y.: The Modern Library, 1954) and The Rhetoric of Aristotle, 
translated by Lane Cooper (N. Y.: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932). 
The least expensive quality translation of the Ethics is by J. A. K. 
Thomson and was printed by Penquin Books in 1953. 
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On the Soul. 42 Several secondary commentators are also particularly 
perspicuous and deserve some consideration, namely John Herman Randall, 
Jr.,43 Richard McKeon, 44 Arthur Miller and John D. Bee,45 and w. F. R. 
Hardie.46 The Stagirite's seeming straightforwardness and simplicity 
covers a multitude of complexities and vagaries, and, on occasion, even 
a contradiction or two. One needs some overall foundations in the 
theories of the man and some basic strategy for approach before turning 
to the subject of reasoned discourse. Thus, this section is included 
as a necessary introduction to a more detailed account of the three modes 
of sausory discourse. 
42.nie Politics summarizes man's activities in the polis. With the 
Ethics, which summarizes the activities of men in smaller groups, The 
Politics constitutes Aristotle's substantive comments on the nature of 
man, one of the two great areas of knowledge. The Metaphysics provides 
basic analysis on how one can come to know the nature of things and of 
the modes of science. The Poetics provides additional insights into the 
functioning of language. On the Soul is an inquiry into the nature of 
mind and the acquisition of knowledge. 
43aandall has several interesting articles out but his most 
significant contribution has to be his 1960 publication, Aristotle. 
This book is probably the single finest easily understood commentary 
on the works of Aristotle, 
4~cKeon must be noted for his several introductions to various 
works of Aristotle and for his many articles about Aristotle and his 
works, particularly "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of 
Language," Classical Philology. XLI (Oct., 1946) 193-206 and XLII (Jan., 
1947) 21-50. 
45Mn1er and Bee's article, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," is one of 
the most scholarly in existence on the nature of the enthymeme. Also, 
unlike many other articles on the enthymeme, their analysis tends toward 
a correct interpretation by treating the enthymeme in the context of the 
various reasoning processes. 
46N'oted for his fine interpretation of Aristotle's Ethical 
Theory. 
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A careful reading of Aristotle and a few of the more knowledge-
able of his conmentators reveals that the Stagirite considered man to 
be a rational and political animal. In contradiction to Gorgias, 
Aristotle thought that man lived in an ordered universe, that he could 
know this universe, and that he could conmunicate his knowledge to his 
fellow man. 47 As Joseph Schwartz states, for Aristotle, "the truth 
exists, man can acquire it, and acquiring it will lead to a fuller and 
better life."48 In fact, the fulfillment of the rational impulse 
through knowledge of self and society and of the nature of the universe 
constitutes the entelechy of man. "The world is intelligible, and Man's 
intelligence is a kind of flowering of the world's intelligibility. u49 
The philosopher, man writ large or the quintessence of man, strives 
throughout his lifetime to know the world through™ and logos or 
reason which reveals the way of things, and to know man through a 
slightly different type of™ and logos which reveals the way of men.SO 
Man's instrument in the pursuit of knowledge both of himself and 
of his world is "analytics." "An,alytics," for Aristotle, is not a 
science but a d;ynamis, a 'power'; a teche, an 'art'; an organon, a 
'tool'. 1151 Analytics functions through language or logos which is both 
47Randall, Aristotle, pp. 6-7. 
48Joseph Schwartz, "Kenneth Burke, Aristotle, and the Future of 
Rhetoric," College Composition and Communication, XVII (Dec., 1966), 214. 
l•9aandall, Aristotle, P• S. 
SORichard McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the 
Arts of Language," 194 states that the word logos, since it signified 
both linguistic and rational processes, may be extended in one direction 
to the forms which are signified in things and in another direction to 
the regulative principles which guide actions in men. 
51Randall, Aristotle, p. 30. 
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a way of knowing and of expressing knowledge. 52 By describing things 
and acts in words, by making statements about those things and acts, 
and by reasoning from one statement to another, by employing discourse, 
man has the ability to structure his world or to reason. "Analytics" is 
a rule bound system for the correct processes of merger and division, 
but, to an even greater extent, it is the power behind the rules which 
accounts for a knowable cosmos and a rational mankind. 53 
When man ''knows" or utilizes his reason, he can employ his mind 
in one of two ways to get one of two types of knowledge. Aristotle 
divided the "rational,into two faculties; one which enables us to 
speculate about those things whose first principles admit of no 
variation, the other whereby we deliberate about those things which do 
admit of change •• n54 . He called "these faculties the "scientific" 
(or theoretical, or sophia, or the subject of episteme S.B.H.) and the 
r•calculative" (or practical, the subject of phronesis S.B.B.) 
respectively, using the later term because we may identify calculation 
55 with deliberation, which is never exercised upon invariable things." 
Mind speculative functions as pure intellect. It is mind speculative 
that grasps forms and universals. It is mind speculative that 
perceives relationships and functions in a purely logical fashion. It 
is mind speculative that operates in scientific demonstration. But it is 
52aandall, Aristotle, p. 6-7. 
53Ibid -· 
54Aristotle, Ethics, 1139b. 
55Ibid -· 
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mind calculative that is operant in determining human conduct. 56 The 
logic of decision and action which is applied to human affairs is 
practical. Its end is not merely to know, but to know and then to act. 
Scientific demonstration applies to things but practical wisdom applies 
to the affairs of man. Both are "rational states. n 57 
These two types of rationality function through three modes of 
arguments: demonstration, dialectics, and rhetoric. Actually, 
"dialectics is the mother science of probable reasoning which handles 
every question; and rhetoric, which argues practical questions of 
politics and ethics a subordinate branch or departure, or offshoot or 
scion,"58 however, for practical purposes it is convenient to separate 
arguments into the three types. Demonstration functions as a tool of 
each science proceeding from first principles or archai through cause 
to universal timeless truth. Dialectics functions as a tool in the realm 
of the contingent, particularly in social science, proceeding from accept-
ed social wisdom through probable arguments to practical decisions for 
values and action. Rhetoric functions as the tool of persuasion 
proceeding from the beliefs ~fits audience through verbal manipulation 
to values and actions applicable in human affairs. E. M. Cope 
sununarized many of the differences between demonstration, dialectic, 
and rhetoric with the statement that: 
56Miller and Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," 203-204. 
57Raphael Demos, "Some Remarks on Aristotle's Doctrine of 
Practical Reason," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXII 
(Dec., 1961), 153. 
58E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with 
Analysis and Notes (London: Macmillan and Co., 1867), p. 91. 
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••• whilst science from universal and necessary principles» 
some of them always special and peculiar to each science, the 
latter of which it assumes a priori and will not suffer to be 
called in question or submit to the caprice of an opponent, 
deduces universal and necessary conclusions, and all the 
materials that it employs are impressed with the same character 
of universality and necessity, which alone constitute exact 
knowledge and truth, the sole object and aim of science; ••• 
dialectic on the other hand ••• has for its sphere the probable, 
its principles current popular opinions; it is universal in its 
application, and may deal even with the principles and propositions 
of science, only in that case they are not to be treated as 
necessary, but regarded like all the rest as only probable and 
open to question; it is-indifferent to truth, and aims only at 
proving its point, and thereby refuting an adversary, whose 
existence is always assumed in every dialectical discussion, even 
when it is carried on in a man's own brain and in his own study; 
it therefore regards every thing as an open question, takes either 
side of an alternative indifferently, concludes as readily the 
neg~tive as the affirmative; it depends absolutely for its 
arguments upon the concessions of the opponent, real or imaginary; 
to it the form or method is everything, the truth of the 
conclusion nothing, except so far as it follows legitimately 
from the exact observance of the rules of the syllogism, which 
is its instrwnent.59 
Cope's statement includes many of the differentiae between science 
and dialectic and, by implication, between science and rhetoric. A more 
explicit differentiation, however, seems essential as this is the critical 
key to an understanding and appreciation of the subtlety of the 
Aristotelian schemata which has so often been lacking. The differences 
between demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric are not matters of form, 
rather they are differences of substance, of purpose, and of audience, 
in sum, differences of generic type. 
John Herman Randall notes that the "three kinds of reasoning do not 
differ in their form; the difference between them lies in the character 
59cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis and 
Notes, p~ 88. 
-45-
of the premises from which they proceed. 1160 Richard McKeo n agrees, 
arguing that "the differentiation of the theoretic sciences 
depends on differences found in the things which constitutes their 
subject matter."61 The unchanging things, largely things of the 
physical universe, 62 are the matter of science. The realm of the 
contingent, particularly human action, "ethics, law, and politics belong 
to the domain of rhetoric and of dialectics."63 Dialectic, in turn, 
is distinct from rhetoric in that it can handle first principles or 
archai even if contingently. 64 But in all cases it is substance or 
subject matter that is the primary criterion dissociati,ng demonstration, 
dialectic and rhetoric. 
Substance is not the only differentia with regards to demonstration, 
dialectic, and rhetoric. The three differ in purpose as well. As 
Lloyd Bitzer states: "(1) Demonstrative syllogisms are those in which 
premises are laid down in order to establish scientific conclusions; 
(2) Dialectical syllogisms are those in which premises are asked for in 
60Aristotle, p. 37. 
61McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of 
Language , " 40. ' 
6~e sciences are physics, metaphysics, and theology. Aristotle 
is not completely consistent in leaving human affairs out of the sciences 
but the emphasis is in that direction. 
63AUessandre Giuliani, "The Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical 
Definition," Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Summer, 1972), 129. 
64Randall, Aristotle, pp. 43-44. Dialectic is formally separated 
only in part from rhetoric through the mechanisms of the syllogism. The 
real distinction lies in the expanded parameters for dialectic which 
allows it to handle archai, or first principles, whereas rhetoric should 
never deal with such subjects. 
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order to achieve criticism; (3) Rhetorical syllogisms, or enthymemes, 
are those in which premises are asked for in order to achieve persuasion. n65 
The purpose of demonstration is to establish scientific laws, reasonable 
expectations for the predicted functioning of things. The purpose of 
dialectic is social or self-criticism. In its ways it is very much like 
the true, philosophic, ad hominem argwnentation of Henry w. Johnstone, 
Jr. 66 The purpose of rhetoric is persuasion, a legitimate art in its 
own right, but a sort of tertiary substitute for science and dialectic 
when there isn't time for proper instruction or extended criticism or 
when the subject matter or audience just aren't appropriate for demon-
stration or dialectic, 
Aristotle also distinguishes between the proper types of audience 
to respectively view demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric. The 
complicated chains of syllogisms necessitated by a complete 
demonstration, on the model of geometry, demand a scientist, a special 
kind of man separate from the human community, yet still a part of it. 67 
Dialectic, in its more technical sense, requires a philosopher as its 
proper audience. 68 Rhetoric, however, applies to the connnon mass of 
6511Aristotle's Enthymeme R.evisited," Q.J.s., XLV (Dec., 1959) 405. 
661n fact, the similarity between Johnstone's argumentum ad hominem 
developed in Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Pa.: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959) and Aristotle's technical 
dialectic is so striking that one wonders why Johnstone never gave 
Aristotle any credit for the idea. He does mention the word dialectic 
in reference to argwnent that is open, clear, bilateral, and morally 
compelling on the basis of the logical consequences of the respective 
interlocutors own basic presuppositions but doesn't credit the idea to 
Aristotle. 
67This idea is nowhere clearly developed in Aristotle but is hinted 
at throughout the Posterior and Pridr Analytics and in the brief pre-
fatory warning, already cited, at the beginning of The Rhetoric; footnote 
IF39. 
68Aristotle, Topics, 101a. 
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h ·t 69 uman1 y. In some respects this differentiation in audience seems 
merely a matter of degree of intellectual ability, but it is a quantita-
tive separation so significant that it might well almost be qualitatively 
considered. 
-Demonstration, dialectic, and rhetoric differ one from another 
also in degree of probability, in linguistic format, and in contextual 
applicability. "Scientific demonstration must be expressed in univocal 
70 terms," through strict genus et dif:irentia, but the definitions "in 
the practical sciences are not strict definitions by genus and differ-
entia.1171 Science must be sure whereas the practical arts are delibera-
tive, "concerned with things which, while in general following certain 
definite lines, have no predictable issues, or the results of which 
cannot be clearly stated ••• 1172 Science is true for all time for all 
men while dialectic and rhetoric apply only to specifically defined 
groups of men on particular occasions. 73 In sum, in substance, purpose, 
and audience, and through an interlacing of other criteria, science or 
demonstration, episteme, is not to be confused with dialectic, the art 
of philosophic debate, or with rhetoric, the art of finding the available 
means of persuasion. 
69Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1355a. 
70Richard McKean, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts 
of Language," 44. 
7llli!!·, 41. 
72Aristotle, Ethics, 1112a. 
73Aristotle, Ethics, 1112b. 
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The Three Modes of Discourse 
Aristotle, of course, not only provides a theoretic framework 
for demonstration, dialectic., and rhetoric, he is thorough enough to 
furnish the necessary details and/or practical criteria for the functional 
use of each of the three modes of discourse. Scientific demonstration is 
his paradigm and the subject upon which he concentrates most of his 
attention, 74 an emphasis which might well account for the confusion 
between demonstration and argument manifested by some writers. But 
science applies only to unchanging things, is strictly formal, and can 
be thoroughly understood by only an enlightened few. Therefore, for the 
mass of subjects and of people, dialectic and rhetoric are concomitant 
studies focusing upon cultural wisdom and philosophic debate and upon 
"adjusting ideas to people and people to ideas. 1175 
(A) The Paradigm of Science 
Science, demonstration, apodeixsis, or episteme functions through 
the syllogism or complete induction. Aristotle also discusses reductio 
ad impossible as a technical measure which makes possible the semi-
understandable procedures of reduction and conversion, but since it is 
merely a technical concept it will be perfunctorily dismissed from this 
analysis. 76 The concept of the syllogism was loosely originally employed 
74.rhat is most of his attention with regards to the technical 
procedures of reasoning. The Categories, On Interpretation, and the 
Posterior and Prior Analytics are all concerned with scientific 
demonstration. The Rhetoric and Ethics are, of course, longer works 
but the comments on reasoning per se contained within them are scattered. 
750onald G. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Functions and Its Scope, 11 o.J.s., XXXIX (Dec., 1953), 413. 
7~ose interested can look up these procedures in Prior Analytics. 
The coument about semi-understandability is not made without cause as 
this is one of the most confusing and contradictory of all of Aristotle's 
concepts. 
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by the Greeks to refer to the process "of putting facts together by 
argument."77 Aristotle defined the syllogism "as discourse in which, 
certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows 
of necessity from their being so. 1178 Lukasiewicz, in his technical 
exposition of Aristotle's Syllogistic, argues quite persuasively that 
Aristotle's idea of the syllogism is closer to the non-technical sense 
of the original Greek than it is to the modern conceptualization which 
is anmeehed in a plethora of technical rules. 79 Lukasiewicz's 
cormnents, notwithstanding, however, it is clear that the syllogism is 
the fascinating if not facile tool of science since complete induction 
only applies to those relatively few sets all of whose members can be 
known, so this short subdivision of the chapter will deal with the rule 
bound criteria of syllogistics. 
The basic building block of the syllogism is the word. "Words are 
like verbal icons in that they set our minds off on patterns of thought 
which parallel the patterns of reality we have experienced in connection 
with those words, 1180 writes Rosenfield in interpretation of the Stagirite. 
Aristotle himself proclaims that: 
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written 
words are the symbols of spoken words. Just as all men have 
not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech 
sounds, but the mental experiences, which these directly 
symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of 
which our experiences are the images.Bl 
77Aristotle, Rhetoric, translated by w. Rhys Roberts, p. xvi. 
78Aristotle, Prior Analytics, 24b. 
79Lukaseiwicz, Aristotle's Syllogistics, pp. 34-38. 
80Aristotle and Information Theory. p. 79. 
81Aristotle, De Interpretatione, 16a. 
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For knowledge through words reality must be translucently expressed by 
the symbols of argument. "The achievement of truth ••• depends not 
only on knowledge of the form in things but also on awareness of the 
properties of language which make it possible to reproduce its form in 
argument. 1182 This, in turn, requires an emphasis on terms which are 
uni vocal, that is, on words which retain the same meaning each time they 
are used. 
For a word or category to be univocal it must reflect something 
which itself is both clear and unchanging, that is, universal and time-
less. The first principles or archai of the theoretical sciences, alone, 
fit these criteria. These archai are ideas in the mind which directly 
reflect the patterns of ,_reality. They are a priori, and, as such, 
unchallengeable and non-demonstrable. They can probably best be 
compared to the assumed hypotheses of geometry. 
Whence are these archai derived? How do we arrive at them? 
Aristotle's answer to this question, obviously fundamental for 
his whole conception of science, is that we learn them from 
observation of facts, of particular instances, by epagoge, which 
is usually translated into Latin as 'induction.' We have the 
power of perceiving particular "thats" by our senses. These 
perceivings remain as a 'memory,' and generate a logos, a meaning. 
'Many like memories make one experience, one empoiria. That is, 
by 'experience' of facts, by repeated observations, we become 
aware of the arche, the universal, that is implicit in them.83 
82McKeon, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts of 
Language,'' 195. 
83John Randall, Aristotle, p. 42. 
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Not everyone has the intuitive ability or insight necessary to see 
universals in particular experiences, but those who do have an ability 
to grasp basic, a priori truths or archai which may then be translated 
into the univocal words so necessary to the propositions of the 
syllogism. 
The next building block for the syllogism is the premise or 
proposition so laboriously described by Aristotle in On Interpretation. 
The premise of an apodeictic syllogism must, of course, be expressed 
through the a priori universal terms necessary to the scientific view 
of language. Meeting this fundamental criterion, however, is but the 
first task of the premise. Its labors, like Hercules', continue many 
fold before it can find rest. Aristotle advanced the notion that "a 
premise is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another. 1184 A 
premise must be propositional, that is, composed of a sentence which is 
true or false "and all other sentences, such as prayers, coumands, 
threats, or all statements considered in any function other than their 
expression of truth or falsity, are relegated to the study of rhetoric 
or poetic.1185 This is the reason why material validity is just as 
fundamental to the scientific demonstration as is formal validity. 
Aristotle knew that the construction of the apodeictic syllogism called 
for sound materials as well as for exact planning concerning the use of 
those materials. 
84Prior Analytics, 24a. 
85Richard McKean, "Aristotle's Conception of Language and the Arts 
of Language," 39. 
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Because "Aristotle's gaze is fixed entirely on what a completed 
and perfected science is like, 1186 and because the apodeictic syllogism 
concerns proof rather than inference or inquiry,87 the premises of such 
syllogisms must demonstrate cause. "As in geometry, 41>odiexsis, demon-
strates the reasons why, ta dioti, things are as they are observed to 
be, and why they must be so.n88 Episteme demands that we know not only 
what things are, h.Qs!, but why they are as they are, dioti. 89 We possess 
science only when we can prove and demonstrate statements about things 
by relating those statements to others of which they are the necessary 
consequences.90 This is what McBurney was attempting to describe when 
he differentiated between mere rationes cognoscendi or reasons for 
acknowledging the being of things and rationes essendi which includes 
also a knowledge of the reason for the being of some fact. 91 The 
syllogism does not provide any real new knowledge but neither is it a 
petitio principii, a begging of the question. The syllogism provides, 
not new facts, but the connection between facts, the demonstration, the 
proof, the reason why the facts fit together convertibly. Thus, the 
significance of causation in demonstration. 92 
86John Herman Randall, Aristotle, p. 33. 
87This conclusion is independently reached by Duerlinger, "Proof 
in Aristotle's Organon," 320-328, McKean, "Aristotle's Conception of 
Language and the Arts of Language," 19-23, and Randall, Aristotle, 41. 
88aandall, Aristotle, p. 35. 
89!E.!,g., pp. 33-34. 
9oibid -· 
91a. McBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," 53. 
92Randall, Aristotle, p. 40. 
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Looking back over the totality of the criteria concerned with the 
paradigm of science, one notes that the apodeictic syllogism is hardly 
the simplest functional instrument ever created. Perhaps this is the 
reason why most beginning logic and argumentation classes omit the facts 
that: (1) The scientific syllogism must be related to the real world; 
(2) The scientific syllogism must be universal and timeless; (3) The 
scientific syllogism is concerned only with archai or first principles; 
(4) The scientific syllogism must be expressed in univocal terms; (5) 
The scientific syllogism must be propositionally constructed; (6) The 
scientific syllogism must be a priori; (7) The scientific syllogism 
must be causally connected; and, last and probably, least, (8) The 
form of the scientific syllogism counts too; Aristotle prefers it in the 
first figure. 93 
(B) Dialectics: Cultural Wisdom and Philosophic Debate 
Aristotle used dialectic to refer to at least two major ideas. In 
one case, dialectic referred to a social potpourri or mass discussion 
through which cultural wisdom was derived. In another instance, dialectic 
94 bore upon the meticulous technical debating of philosophers. Aristotle 
was not overly careful to separate those two senses of dialectic, and 
the two meanings constantly shade into one another. The tool of 
dialectic in either case is still the syllogism, but it is a different 
type of syllogism than the apodeictic. Thus, this segment of the paper 
will concentrate upon the distinctions between the two types of dialectic 
and upon the so-called dialecti~al or practical syllogism. 
93Posterior Analytics, 79a. 
94william Kneale and Martha Kneale, The Developtqent of Logic 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 7. 
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In its broad cultural usage dialectic functions from premises based 
"on opinions that are generally accepted, which are accepted by every 
one or by the majority, or by the philosophers--i.e., by all, or by the 
the majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. 1195 
Moreover, dialectic functions in the realm of "ordinary language. 11 96 
The carefully contrived essences of the sciences are not for humanistic 
subjects nor for the mass of men. As opposed to precise demonstration, 
dialectic functions as a kind of intellectual agon in which meanings 
are created, live, wither and die, or are transformed to be born again 
as something similar but new.97 Dialectic, however, is not untrammeled 
conversation nor the random social discourse of ordinary fellows. 
Dialectic seeks the correct naming of things. Through the arts of 
,,, 
definition, ,analysis, and synthesis, dialectic attempts the creation 
of verbal hierarchical order. 98 The opinions and values that bind men 
together are created jurisprudentially in the vast open court of 
dialectical inquiry. Giuliani describes the dialectical process as "a 
field which, in a certain sense, is intermediate between that which is 
certainly true (apodeictic reasoning) and that which is certainly false 
(sophistic reasoning). 1199 The truths of dialectic are intuitively 
95Aristotle, Topics, 100a. 
96Mortimer Adler, Dialectic (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 
Inc., 1927), p. 142; and Alessandre Giuliani, "The Aristotelian Theory 
of the Dialectical Definition," Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Summer, 
1972), 134. 
97Elbert Harrington, "Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of 
Inquiry," University of Colorado Studies, Series in Language and 
Literature, No. 1, ,1948, p. 13. 
9~ortimer Adler, Dialectic, p. 142. 
99 Alessandre Giuliani, "The Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical 
Definition," 134. 
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acquired after much verbal conflict concerning those matters about 
which men deliberate and about which they must make decisions and take 
action, namely, ethics, politics, and the law. Neither totally true 
nor necessarily false, the conclusions of dialectic must be taken on 
faith for they constitute the mortar which holds together the fragile 
edifice of society. 
In its more technical usage dialectic functions in a manner roughly 
comparable to a school or college "debate only practiced on a much 
larger scale and in more casual encounters. 11100 As Kneale and Kneale 
point out, The Topics, that treatise in which Aristotle takes the most 
time to comment about dialectic, "is avowedly a handbook for the 
guidance of those taking part in public debating contests.11101 In such 
contests, through an alternating pattern of question and answer, the 
questioner and his interlocutor mutually created the subst·ance of 
dialectical syllogisms. Aristotle thought such exercises were valuable: 
1. for exercise, as an aid in the practice of disputation, 
to cultivate the faculty 2 •••• in conducting arguments 
which necessarily arise in common conversation. In dealing 
with ordinary people who are incapable of following a scientific 
demonstration, and comprehending scientific definitions, we must 
have recourse to probable principles and to arguments upon 
probable grounds ••• 3. The use of the dialectical method, and 
the habit of arguing upon either alternative of a question will 
quicken our discernment of the truth or falsehood of scientific 
demonstrations and conclusions ••• 4. The first principles of 
any special science cannot be demonstrated by the science itself 
as they are absolute and independent, and must be taken for granted 
without proof ••• these, if they are to be investigated, at all, 
must be' investigated through the megium of the all sifting, all 
questioning, method of dialectics. 1 2 
lOOElbert Harrington, "Rhetoric and the Scientific Method of 
Inquiry," p. 13. 
101 Kneale and Kneale, The Development of Logic, p. 33. 
102 Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric with Analysis and 
Notes, pp. 79~80. 
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In its technical sense then, "dialectic constituted the art of 
discussion by question and answer, of attacking and defending a given 
thesis from principles of probability, such as the opinions of men in 
general, or of the majority, or of certain eminent authorities."103 
As previously mentioned, in its technical guise the process of 
dialectic is ,quite similar to Henry w. Johnstone, Jr.'s valid 
philosophic argumentum ad hominem. 104 Such arguments, between those 
trained in philosophy and/or merely in dialectical techniques are (1) 
open, (2) systematic, (3) self-reflective, and (4) impose some moral 
obligation upon the respondent to accept the logical conclusions of 
his own presuppositions. 105 Aristotle's theory is not to be completely 
equated with that of Johnstone, however, for the old Master couldn't 
quite bring himself to a total I and Thou stance. One of the purposes 
of dialectic in its debate stance remains the joy of reducing "the 
opponent in the discussion to babbling ••• nl06 Whether considered 
in its technical guise or in its general cultural wisdom format, though, 
dialectic is concerned with open, natural language, inquiry into the 
affairs of men. It provides probable grounds for its conclusions based 
on a formal procedural process which begins with socially accepted 
opinions and values and proceeds through the syllogism to decisions and 
lO~cBurney, "The Place of the Enth:ymeme in Rhetorical Theory," 53. 
104see Footnote No. 66. 
lOSHenry w. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument, or see Johnstone, 
"Persuasion and Validity in Philosophy," in Philosophy. Rhetoric. and 
Argumentation (University Park, Pa: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1965), pp. 138-148. 
l06Aristotle, On Sophistictical Refutations, 181b, 15. 
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actions. Its model is more the law court than the laws of nature. 107 
And, finally, its purpose is criticism, whether of self, antagonist, 
society, or even, rarely, of first principles themselves. 
(C) Rhetoric: Adjusting People to Ideas and Ideas to People 
When rhetoricians complain about going back to Aristotle, they are 
usually bemoaning the spate of articles concerned with the enthymeme 
published since 1952.l08 The plethora of contradictory interpretations 
is almost enough to make any rhetoricians bewail his fate and lament the 
state of the art. Some interpretation of the enthymeme is certainly 
necessary, however, since "for Aristotle the enthymem.e was the focal 
concept or element of all reasoned discourse,"109 and since "the 
arguments good speakers actually use in persuasion are enthymemes. "110 
And the confusion about the enthymeme, while regrettable, is somewhat 
understandable for though "the enthymeme is discussed in many passages 
l07Randall, Aristotle, p. 38, Allessandre Giuliani, "The 
Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical Definition," 133, and Vasile 
Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Philosophy," 207-208. 
108:Edward H. Madden, "The Enthymeme: Crossroads of Logic, Rhetoric, 
and Metaphysics," The Philosophical Review, LXI (July, 1952), 368-376, 
Earl w. Wiley, "The Enthymeme: Idiom of Persuasion," O.J.s,, XLII (Feb., 
1956), 19-24. William Grimaldi, "A Note on the Enthymem.e in Aristotle's 
Rhetoric, 1354-1356," American Journal of Philology. LXXXIII (April, 
1957), 188-192, Lloyd Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," 399-408, 
Charles s. Mudd, "The Enthymeme and Logical Validity," o.J.s., XLV (Dec., 
1959), 409-414, Edward D. Steele, "Social Values, The Enthymeme, and 
Speech Criticism," 70-75, Gary Cronkhite, "The Enthymeme as Deductive 
Rhetorical Argument," Western Speech, XXX (Spring, 1966) 129-134, Jesse 
Delia, "The Logical Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: A 
Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 140-148, and Arthur B. 
Miller and John D. Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," 201-214. 
l09KcBurney, "The Place of the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory," 50. 
llOAristotle, Rhetoric, translated by Lane Cooper, p. xxvii. 
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in the Rhetoric, it is impossible to extract from them a completely 
consistent theory of its nature. nlll Aristotle states that "whenever 
men in speaking effect persuasion through proofs, they do so either with 
examples or enthymemes; they use nothing else. 11 112 His pronunciamentos 
are clear with regards to examples, but a kind of enigma surrounds and 
obscures the enthymeme. 
Lloyd Bitzer has done much to unravel this riddle which hides the 
essence of the enthymem.e. 113 Gary Chronkhite has taken up the banner to 
complete an expostulation of the enthymeme in its technical context. 114 
Adding to the technical work of Bitzer and Chronkhite, Jesse Delia has 
given the enthymeme a strikingly new psychological interpretation which 
probably comes closer to the true Aristotelian meaning of the term than 
scholars have been for some tim.e. 115 There is little need to repeat these 
111w. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: 
Cambridge University Press, 1949), p. 409. 
112Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356b. 
11311Aristotle' s Enthymeme Revisited," Bitzer accurately points out 
that Aristotle is confused, that the enthymeme cannot be distinguished 
on the basis of probability alone, nor on the basis of formal deficiency 
alone, nor by completeness alone, nor by concreteness alone, and that the 
key differentia is that the premises of the enthymeme are taken from the 
audience. In his delight at cutting through past misinterpretations, 
however, he is unfair and claims far too much credit for himself as at 
least Ross and McBurney before him had deciphered the key to the enthymeme. 
114After what Bitzer has done to others it is poetic justice that 
he should be hoisted upon his own petard noting the unfairness and credit-
seeking of Chronkhite in his article, rrThe Enthymeme as Deductive 
Rhetorical Argument. 11 
115oelia, "Tbe Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: 
A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 146. 
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gentlemen's explanations, so the author will keep this section short, 
summarizing only those points critical to a clear expostulation of the 
functioning of the enthymeme with regards to the genre of rational 
argument. 
In this regard it must first be remembered that everything which 
applies to dialectic, except the technical parameters which apply only 
to philosophical argument as explored by the complete dialectical 
syllogism, applies also to the enthymeme or rhetorical syllogism.116 
This is because the enthymeme is a subcategory of dialectic. 117 This 
means that the enthymeme is oriented chiefly towards human opinions and 
actions, is composed in ordinary language with the mixed consequences 
such construction implies, that it takes its premises from its audience, 
a~d that it has probabilistic rather than certain conclusions. 
The fact that the enthymeme takes its premises from the beliefs 
of the audience, 118 the unique way in which it assimilates those beliefs, 
and the consequences of this action are critical to an understanding of 
the distinctiveness of the enthymeme. Basically, what it all amounts to 
is that the enthymeme is rational but not strictly logical. 119 Such a 
conclusion may be abhorrent to formal logicians and demonstrative 
116Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354a. 
117rbid -· 
118!.E!!•, 1394a, 26-28; 1395b, 1-4. 
ll~iller and Bee, "Enthymemes: Body and Soul," 212, Delia, "The 
Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: A Search for the 
Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 146-147, and Edward Steele, "Social 
Values, the Enthymeme, and Speech Criticism," 70. 
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rhetoricians, "but a careful reading of all Aristotle's passages 
regarding the enthymeme reveals that its persuasive power comes not from 
its following of abstract, external rules of structure, but from the 
operation of the deductive form within the psychological field of the 
listener. 11120 The enthymeme, in essence, uniquely combines the effects 
of logos, ethos, and pathos rather than separating these effects as has 
been traditiona1.121 The rhetor "asks for" the premises :i>r the enthymeme 
by considering, the nature of the audience and selecting those attitudes 
and general opinions which he knows are characteristic of that audience.122 
He then uses these premises in such a manner that the audience, emotion-
ally as well as logically•-in other words, psycho-logically--help build 
the arguments which point toward the conclusions the orator wishes to 
reach. 
Such a psychological interpretation might seem to many to border 
on subjectivism. These persons could accuse Aristotle of having created 
a kind of sophisticated sophistic showing a disdain for the abilities of 
the common man. Such interpreters, however, would be incorrect in their 
conclusions. Aristotle believed that "things that are true and things 
that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove 
and easier to believe ••• "123 than that which is false or less good. The 
120oeua, "The Logic Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the Enthymeme: 
A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Discourse," 146. 
121Ibid., 147. 
122smith, "Logic for the New Rhetoric," 307. 
123Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1354b, 37-38. 
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enthymeme, functioning in a dialectical environment in which oppoaents 
would ever be ready to sift for the fallacy or the lie, was protected 
from subjectivism by the open forum and the truth. 
Aristotle on Rational Argument: 
Retrospect and Prospect 
In sunnnary, Aristotle's theories concerned with the genre of 
rational argument are central to anyone claiming a knowledge of reasoned 
discourse but not for the reasons traditionally invoked. The Master 
does !!.2.S, provide a simple, timeless, non-contextual, axiological theory 
of demonstration. Instead, he provides something far more significant 
and relevant, a vast complex and ambiguous theory of argumento Within 
this theory, Aristotle recognizes two kinds of rationality and three 
types of reasoning instrumentalities. Science is his paradigm. It is, 
indeed, timeless, universal, and even univocal. It maintains both 
material and formal validity. And, for the logicians, it is a priori. 
Dialectic and rhetorib, however, are calculativw as opposed to theoretic. 
They concentrate their methodologies on probable events and on human 
affairs. Theirs is the logic of opinion and value, of decision and 
action, rather than the causal logic -associated with material phenomena. 
Dialectic depends on the connuon fund of cultural wisdom or upon the 
concessions of highly skilled debaters for its syllogistic premises. 
Rhetoric depends on psychologic through the enthymsme. Totally, 
Aristotle's theory of argumentation is a non-precision theory, but per-
haps it is a theory which could be productive of positive criticism as 
opposed to the relative sterility of the more precise but inaccurate 
traditional theory of demonstration.' 
CHAPTER III 
CH. PERE IMAN ON ARGUMENT: 
THE ASSAULT ON A NARROWED VISION OF RATIONALITY 
Besides demonstrative and calculating reason, there exists a 
reason that deliberates and argues. Without a broadened 
vision of reason, which would enable us to understand what is 
meant by deciding and making an enlightened choice, a rational 
concept of liberty and human responsibility remains impossible. 
Besides the Cartesian conception of liberty, adherence to 
evidence, there is room for a concept of liberty-responsibility 
where, being face to face with arguments pro and con, neither of 
which is compelling, we decide that one side has more weight ••• 
This broadening of our concept of reason, which no longer limits 
the rational to the analytical, opens a new field of study to 
the investigations of the logicians; it is a field of those 
reasons which, acc~rding to Pascfl and according to contemporary 
logicians, reason does not know. 
An Introduction of Purpose 
Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., editor of Philosophy and Rhetoric, 
recently proclaimed that "there is no doubt that the main stimuli to 
the development of the theory of argumentation in the period 1956-1966 
have been the writings of Perelman and the analysis provided by Toulmin. 112 
1ch. Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values?," Journal of 
Philosophy. LII (Dec., 22, 1955), 802. 
2Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Theory of Argument," in Contemporary 
Philosophy. ed. by Raymond Klibansky, (Firenze, 1968), p. 177. 
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Johnstone's recognition of Toulmin is expected. After all, the former 
English philosopher and historian of science, now resident at Michigan 
State, has been prominent in academia since the early 1950's. Toulmin's 
schemata for the "layout of arguments" has even filtered down to the 
beginning courses in speech conununication. 3 Johnstone's recognition of 
Ch. Perelman, however, may come as somewhat of a surprise to many 
Americans as only recently have many of the works of this Belgian legal 
philosopher been translated into English. 4 In fact, it is only in the 
1970's, really, that Perelman has received significant attention in 
America. 5 
3James Mccroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic Course," Speech Teacher, 
XIV (March, 1965), 91-100. 
4Perelman's article,, "Rhetoric and Philosophy," translated by Henry 
w. Johnstone, Jr. for Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (Jan., 1968), 15-24 
serves as one example. Even more importantly, Perelman's major books 
were not translated in readily accessible form until the 1960's: The 
Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, translated by John Petrie, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), Justice, translated by Susan 
Rubin, (N. Y.: Random House, 1967), and with the collaboration of L. 
Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, trans-
lated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver, (Notre Dame, ~ndiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969). 
5In 1970 Ray D. Dearin completed his dissertation, "Chaim Perelman's 
Theory of Rhetoric," at the University of Illinois. In that same year 
the s.c.A. held a symposiwn concerned with Perelman at its annual 
meeting in New Orleans. Perelman was known to a few American scholars 
before 1970 through scattered, expensive translations and through his 
visits to Pennsylvania State University, but his rise to prominence 
seems to coincide with the interest shown to him and his works in 1970. 
As an aside, America's lack of attention to Perelman has been reciprocated 
by Perelman's lack of knowledge of American rhetorical scholarship. 
Carroll Arnold chastises Perelman as "parochial" in his review of 
New Rhetoric for his ignorance concerning fifty years of work on rhetoric 
and argument in American departments of speech. Q .J, S,. LVI (Feb. , 
1970), 87-92. ' 
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Johnstone's selection of Perelman as one of the two pre-eminent 
contemporary philosophers of argument, however, is probably justified. 
Despite a lack of consideration in America until the late 1960 1 s or 
early 1970's, Perelman has been writing about rhetoric "or the study of 
the means of argumentation which allow us to obtain and to increase the 
assent of people to specific theses presented to them"6 for more than 
three decades.7 A bibliography of his published works in the December, 
1963 issue of Logigue et Analyse, an issue totally dedicated to articles 
about Perelman and his scholastic contributions to argumentation, listed 
nearly one hundred titles by one Charles Perelman.a The author's own 
survey in 1973 indicated that over thirty books and articles by Perelman 
had been translated into English, most in the past ten years. 9 In 
1970, The Speech Connnunication Association of America chose to honor 
Perelman by dedicating an entire conference session to an examination of 
his thoughts on rhetoric, argument, and philosophy.IO And Perelman was 
6ch. Perelman, "Proof in Philosophy," Hibbert Journal, LII (July, 
1954), 356. 
7Perelman began writing about argument and justice in the late 
1930 1 s. His career was interrupted by World War II at which time he 
joined the Resistance'. The peak of his writing career seems to have 
come in the late 1950's and during the 1960's. His more recent articles 
tend to be mainly popularizations and clarifications of his already 
extent ideas. 
811Bibliographie de Ch. Perelman," VI, 606-611. 
9Besides those books and articles already mentioned, one might esp. 
point to: "On Self-Evidence in Metaphysics," International Philosophical 
Quarterly. IV (Feb., 1964), 5-19, "Theoretical Relations of Thought and 
Action," Philosophy Today, IV (Spring, 1960), 138-143, and "Value Judg-
ments, Justifications, and Argumentation, 11 Philosophy Today, V (Spring, 
1962), 45-50. 
10.Xhis is the same New Orleans Conference referred to in Footnote 
No. 5. 
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again honored by The Speech Communication Association when he was 
chosen as one of but a half dozen scholars to critically comment on !b!, 
11 Prospect of Rhetoric. As Perelman's reputation has advanced, it has 
become increasingly obvious that a more thorough examination is needed 
concerning his assault on a narrowed vision of rationality through an 
expansion of the concerns of argument. 12 
Perelman's greatest contribution to the theory of argument may well 
be his assault on a narrowed vision of rationality which he attributes to 
Descartes and to modern, formal, analytic logicians. In a negative 
sense, this assault encompasses a continuing attack on Descartes, Pascal, 
Locke, and a long line of logical positivists who reduce the realm of 
reason to the realm of self-evident truths and those conclusions which 
can be deductively derived from those self-evident truths. 13 In a more 
positive vein, the assault calls for a return to the sources of rational 
discourse recognized by the Ancients, and particularly by Aristotle, in 
dialectical reasoning. 14 Perelman asks: 
11This is the s.c.A.'s officially sponsored prospectus for rhetoric 
in the 1970's. Lloyd F. Bitzer and Edwin Black, editors, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971). Perelman's review does not 
show him at his best, but it is the thought that the s.c.A. would have 
him do it that counts. 
12This chapter will specifically relate Perelman's contributions 
to rhetoric to the genre of rational argument. Dearin, in his previously 
noted dissertation, aµd in his article, "The Philosophical Basis of 
Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," Q.J.S., LV (Oct., 1969), 213-224 
has done good work but has not concentrated specifically on Perelman's 
conceptualization of rational discourse but rather has taken a more 
general approach. In addition, so far, Dearin has been the only major 
American commentator on Perelman. 
13Perelman, "Self-Evidence and Proof," Philosophy, XXXIII (Oct., 
1958), 289-302. 
14Perelman, Justice, pp" 58-59. 
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Must we draw from the evolution of logic, and from the very 
real advances it has made, the conclusion that reason is 
entirely incompetent in those areas which elude calculation 
and that, where neither experiment nor logical deduction is 
in a position to furnish the solution of a problem, we can 
but abandon ourselves to irrational forces, instincts, suggestion, 
or even violence? 5 
In all his works from the mid-1940's to the present, the Belgian answers 
his own question with an emphatic negative: 
••• if essential problems involving questions of a moral, 
social, political, philosophical, or religious order by their 
very nature elude the methods of the mathematical and natural 
sciences, it does not seem reasonable to scorn and reject all 
the techniques of reasoning characteristi~ of deliberation and 
discussion--in a word, of argumentation. 16 
To the contrary, it is worthwhile to study more clearly those argumenta-
tive procedures which are of such social and philosophic importance. 
Perelman writes: 
We have given the name 'rhetoric' to the discipline which we 
thus propose to revive, in recognition of the fact that, at 
least in Greek antiquity and particularly for Aristotle, the 
object of rhetoric was precisely the study of those techniques 
of nondemonstrative argument, its end being to support ¾udgments 
and thereby win or reinforce the assent of other minds. 7 
Max Lareau declares that Perelman's ambition is nto produce an 
instrument capable of achieving in the realm of values results exactly 
analogous to those pursued by analytical reasoning in the domain of the 
exact sciences. 1118 Perelman himself states that: 
••• logicians owe it to themselves to complete the theory 
of demonstration obtained in this way by a theory of argumenta-
tion. We seek here to construct such a theory by analyzing the 
methods of proof used in the human sciences, law, and philosophy. 
15Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric, p. 3. 
16 !.!2!g,. , p. 512. 
17Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, 
PP• 168-169. 
1~ax Lareau, "Rhetoric as the Logic of the Behavioral Sciences," 
Q.J.s,. LI (Dec., 1965), 456. 
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We shall examine arguments put forward by advertisers in 
newspapers, politicians in speeches, lawyers in pleadings, 
judges in decisions, and philosophers in treatises.19 
In distinguishing between formal logic, which he thinks is applicable, 
only to those fields in which artificial languages neatly fit, and 
argument, which applies to the reasoning processes more commonly utilized, 
Perelman creates many problems for himself such as distinguishing 
conviction from persuasion and rhetoric from philosophy which are 
discussed later. 20 If the demarcation line between demonstration and 
argument is not clear, however, Perelman's goal is; "If a narrow conception 
of proof and logic has led to a constricted view of reason, the broaden-
ing of the concept of proof and the resulting enrichment of logic must 
likewise react on the way in which our reasoning faculty is conceived. 11 21 
Perelman and his longtime collaborator Madame L. Olbrechts-Tyteca 
make many specific recommendations regarding rational discourse. Their 
analyses of value, audience, adherence, dialectic, presence, association 
and dissociation, interaction, philosophy, and justice deserve intensive 
scrutiny. As John Kozy points out, however, others have written more 
thoroughly·about these specific concepts before and, in many cases, 
19The New Rhetoric, p. 10. 
20tbid., pp. 13-14. See specifically the discussions in section 
three of this chapter concerning the contradictions in Perelman's 
thoughts vis-a-vis conviction/persuasion, rhetoric/philosophy, and 
various sorts of audiences. 
21Ibid., p. 510. 
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Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's ideas concerning these concepts seem 
vague and/or sketchy, as we shall see, and do not seem wholly to fit 
together. 22 It is the thrust of their analysis against an unwarranted 
diminution of the realm of rationality that deserves primary credit. 
Therefore, this analysis will proceed first to a macrocosmic analysis of 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's overall perspective on argument then 
to an attempt to fit their specific notions to that perspective. 
The Scope of the New Rhetoric 
The key to understanding the scope of the new rhetoric lies in 
the realization that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's attacks on formal 
' logicians, analytic philosophers, and those with a narrowed conceptual-, 
ization of what constitutes the sciences are necessary concomitants 
to their theory of argument. They comment: 
The evolution of rhetoric and of' the theory of argumentation 
follows the fate of the epistemological status of opinion as 
opposed to truth. According as it is claimed that all truth 
presents itself as the most defensible opinion or that opinion 
is' nothing but mock truth, the position allotted to rhetoric 
and argumentation will be more or less important.23 
Rhetoric and argument gain in scope as faith in a singular truth and a 
pure logic or method wavers. For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, demon-
stration and necessity are opposed to dialectic and deliberation. Self-
evidence is counterbalanced by social agreement. Mathematics, formal 
logic, and the physical sciences with their tendencies towards closure 
22John Kozy, "Essay Review of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 
New Rhetoric, in Philosophy and Rhetoric, III (Fall, 1970), 252-254. 
23Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, 
pp. 158-159. 
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are opposed by philosophy and the social sciences with their 
proclivity for openness. When science, conceived as a necessary, 
axiological system deduced from a few self-evident truths, prevails, 
rhetoric becomes mere sophistry. 24 Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 
purpose is not to denigrate demonstration and science but "to deny the 
exclusiveness of rationality to demonstration •1125 To some this may 
seem like- an attack on a long dead straw man, but the two students of 
Dupreel argue, rather convincingly, that such attacks are essential for 
an expansion of the concept of reason and for argument and rhetoric to 
regain some of their ancient illustrious station and scope. 26 
What Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are arguing is that science, 
mathematics, reason, logic, deduction, and form have all been over-
emphasized and that the pendulum ought to swing back a little in the 
direction of dialectic, substance, philosophy, deliberation, and humanism. 
Even as they make this point, however, they realize that they will have 
extreme difficulty with the argument for when taken out of simplified 
form and amplified and clarified, the argument becomes quite complex. 
In addition, the terms of the argument are inherently confusing as 
rationality, logic, reason, science, method, etc., already highly 
24Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, 
p. 159. 
25Nathan Rotenstreich, "Argument and Philosophic Clarification," 
Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Winter, 1972), 15. 
26tt is important to understand that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 
are not attacking logic and science per!!, but only a narrow conceptual-
ization which maintains that logic and science are all encompassing and 
singularly fitted for the finding of truth, and'which, therefore, preclude 
any role for what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see as argument. 
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abstract concepts, have all become positively valued god terms. 
~erelm~ and Olbrechts-Tyteca realize that they are dealing with an 
intricate, sensitive proposition at a rather high level of abstraction, 
but they consider the point critical. It is, in fact, the central 
theme of most of Perelman's books and articles, and he tries to make his 
poi~t clear through elaboration and repitition at a general level and 
through scientific exploration of: (1) the jurisprudential model versus 
an axiological system; (2) the realm of facts versus the realm of opinion 
and values; (3) the contrast between dialectic and rhetoric conducted 
in natural language and logic and science conducted in artificial 
language; and, (4) general form versus individualized disciplinary 
criteria. The rest of this section of the chapter will follow that 
same order proceeding first to further generalities and definitions 
and then on to the four aforementioned areas of differentiation. 
At the macrocosmic level, Perelman battles against what Scott has 
called "the dream that has haunted rationalists since Plato, 1127 that is, 
the dream of discovering a finite set of propositions that can be 
accepted without proof and on the basis of which theorems can be derived 
with pure logic to explain all things. 
Our own position is quite different. Instead of basing our 
philosophy on definitive, unquestionable truths, our starting 
point is that men and groups of men adhere to opinions of all 
sorts with a variable intensity, which we can only know by 
27Robert L. Scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," Speech 
Teacher, XVII (March, 1'968), 136. 
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putting it to the test. These beliefs are not always self-
evident, and they rarely deal with clear and distinct ideas. 
The most generally accepted beliefs remain implicit and 
unformulated for a long time, for more often than not it is 
only on the occasion of a disagreement as to the consequences 
resulting from them that the problem of their formulation or 
more precise definition arises.28 
Perelman lashes out at self-evident truths and at univocal arguments 
supposedly true for all times and all contexts. "Every demonstration 
requires that the elements on which it is based should be univocal . . . 
Things are different in argumentation. 1129 An argumentative speech will 
nearly always be more complex.30 "It is because of the possibility of 
argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling reasons, that it 
is possible to escape the dilemma of adherence to an objectively and 
universally valid truth, or recourse to suggestion and violence to 
secure acceptance for our opinions and decisions. 1131 
Perelman and his adherents, Dearin, Stone, Florescu, and Loreau 
believe that argument constitutes a middle path between "a universally 
accepted objectivity and an incommunicable subjectivity, of a reality 
binding on everybody and values that are purely individual. 1132 Rhetoric 
is the methodology of the sociology of knowledge. 33 It functions in those 
28Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 511. 
29Ibid., p. 120. 
30Ibid., p. 495. 
31Ibid., p. 514. 
32Ibid,, p. 510. 
33oearin, "The Philosophical Basis of Ch. Perelman's Theory of 
Rhetoric," Q • .J.s,. LV (Oct., 1969), 217. 
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areas where the facts are unknown or unclear and where things are merely 
probable rather than sure. Rhetoric or argumentation functions in 
politics, ethics, religion, philosophy, the social sciences, and the law, 
in those areas where truth is uncertain or less certain and where "a 
reasoned decision" is necessitated as opposed to a "right decision." 
Argument functions to combat uncompromising and irreducible philosophical 
oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism: "dualism of reason and 
imagination, of knowledge and opinion, of irrefutable self-evidence and 
deceptive will • • • 1134 In sum, as Max Lore au puts it: 
Behold then the theory of argumentation, the enterprise which 
shatters the traditional connection of the rational with the 
necessary, of the unnecessary with the irrational, and which 
moves forward toward a wiser conception of reason integrating 
argumentation in league with demonstration. Reason serves not 
only to discover truth and error, but also to justify and to 
argue, to organize the free play of preferences, not only to 
decree and to compel, but also to work out and to generalize 
the destruction of hierarchies, to order structures which, far 
from pretending to be eternal and absolute, are responsible 
for the entire system of extant practical signification.JS 
Perelman and his collaborator, Olbrechts-Tyteca, try tp make their 
argument for the scope of rhetoric even clearer by comparing and 
contrasting a jurisprudential model of argument with an axiological 
model. In Justice, which is a philosophical sunmary of thirty years of 
work, Perelman states that "the traditional role of law is to organize 
effectively and in various ways the dialectic of imperfect human will 
34Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 510. 
3~ax Loreau, "Rhetoric as the Logic of the Behavioral Sciences," 
O.J.s., LI (Dec., 1965), 457. 
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and human reason. It contrasts with the divine model of the 
rationalists which is inadequate precisely where it admits of the room 
for the idea of rational decision.-1136 The jurisprudential mode,l applies 
to human opinions and values and takes note of varying degrees of 
preference or adherence. It allows for a degree of "loose reasoning" 
within a system of rules. 37 The legal system is not closed but open, 
ever changing and expanding as some values fall and others rise and as the 
degree of force behind various preferences alters. Finally, in the 
law or jurisprudence, despite various rationalizations and deceptions 
to the contrary,38 the goal is justice, a kind of unique blending of 
rights and powers in conflict, which never really even claims perfection 
nor complete equitability but which does claim palatability and fairness. 
Perelman attempts to clarify further just wh~t it is he is dealing 
with by distinguishing the realm of opinion and values, the realm of 
argument, from the realm of facts, truths, and given presuppositions, 
the realm of demonstration, of science, or of formal logic, Loreau says 
"as opposed to logic, the procedure and ends c,f which are imperative, 
36Perelman, Justice, p. 98. 
37Quasi-arguments, dile11111as, and even emotional appeals are 
allowed by the law to the degree that they are relevant to the case or, 
at the very least, acceptable to the presiding judge. 
38Julius Stone stresses that legal claims to precedent or to 
logic are mere window dressing and rather non-substantive in many cases. 
The law is arbitrary only to the extent that judges wish to make it so. 
Judges can justify departures from precedent or even from the law itself 
on grounds of equity or justice. They then must "justify" their 
decision, but this is quite a different matter from "proving" their 
decision. Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings (Palo Alto, Calif.: 
Stanford u. Press, 1964), pp. 331-335. 
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rhetoric examines the pragmatic portion of reason. 1139 This pragmatic 
portion of reason explores the domain of choice, of human belief and 
action, as opposed to the domains of facts and universals. Perelman 
forwards the idea that: 
The most general principles of such a system, instead of 
assorting what is, establish what has value. They lay down 
a value, the most general value, whence are deduced standards, 
norms, commandments. Now this value has no basis either in 
logic or in reality. Since its affirmation results neither 
from a logical necessity nor from an experiential universality, 
value is neither universal nor necessary. It is logically 
and experientially, arbitrary.40 
Since values or opinions are arbitrary, they are, by their very nature, 
controversial, and this is exactly the point. Professor Perelman states 
quite clearly that "argumentation, an activity of human beings, is 
normally opposed only to what is not considered objectively valid. The 
opinions it deals with are not beyond all discussion, the authorities 
who offer them or combat them are not beyond all attack, and the 
solutions which finally will be accepted are not known beforehand.1141 
Quite to the contrary, presuppositions of value are always open to 
argument and are never sure. This is precisely the differentia which 
Perelman wishes to make clear. 
The third series of attacks by which Perelman hopes to refine the 
distinction between his view of argument and other perspectives concerns 
natural as opposed to artificial language systems. He is adamantly 
opposed to the view that language reflects reality and that through 
39Loreau, "Rhetoric as the Logic of the Behavioral Sciences," 457. 
40Perelman; The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 52. 
41Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 209. 
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proper, that is to say uninflected, manipulation of linguistic terms 
truth can be demonstrated once and for all. As he states of this view: 
The first requirement presupposes both an atomic conception 
of reality, and the existence of a language the structure of 
which conforms to that of reality. It assumes, further, that 
this reality is perfectly known. It also presupposes that 
immediate knowledge of it is possessed by all rational users 
of this language, which, to satisfy the requirement I have just 
given, must be logically prior to all human usage. In fact, I 
need hardly say that the very enumeration of these preconditions 
is enough, nowadays, to give pause to the most fanatical 
defenders of the establishment of criteria for self-evidence. 42 
Perelman instead opts for a natural, inflected, ambiguous conception of 
language. Perelman realizes that such language may lead to misunder-
standings but thinks the retention of power in language is well worth 
the cost. Also, he argues that: 
Although language is a human artifact, it is not produced by 
any irrational decision of a single" individual. It develops 
normally, in the midst of a community, the members of which 
can modify it by the use they make of it as soon as they4 
consider there are any reasons for promoting any change. 3 
Language is a social creation and, in the realm of opinion and values at 
least, reflects a social view of rationality which is neither individual-
istic nor universal but rather intermediary between the two reflecting 
the ideals of a particular culture and mileu or of selected group and 
set of circumstances within that culture and mileu. 44 
42Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 113. 
43Ibid., p. 123. 
44vasile Florescu, "Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary 
Philosophy," 211-215 or Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of 
Argument, p. 166. 
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Still a fourth set of oppositions is established by Perelman. This 
last set of opposing stances is concerned with a general formal criterion 
for all argument versus individualistic substantive criteria established 
in various broad areas of knowledge which Perelman calls disciplines. He 
does not believe that one set of criteria can suffice for all argumenta-
tion. Certain types of argument are general enough to cross cultures, 
groups, and times but most argumentation is fitted only for a particular 
J 
group and time. Perelman believes that, 
What we usually call common sense consists of a series of 
beliefs which are accepted within a particular society and 
which the members of that society suppose to be shared by 
every reasonable being. But beside beliefs of this kind, 
there are agreements that are peculiar to the members of 
a particular discipline, whether it be of scientific or 
technical, juridical, or theological nature. Such agreements 
constitute the body of a science or technique. They may be 
the result of certain conventions or of adherence to certain 
texts, and they characterize certain audiences ••• usually 
distinguishable by their use of a technical language of their 
own.45 
He further believes that "initiation into a given discipline consists of 
communicating rules, techniques, specific ideas, and presuppositions, as 
well as the method of criticizing its results in terms of the discipline's 
own requirements. 46 A universal form as the critical tool for examining 
argument simply won't do. Perelman insists that the more worthy critic 
will examine the substance of the arguments too, in some fashion 
considering the rubrics that the advocate in a discipline must himself 
employ in establishing the argument. 
45Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 99. 
46Ibid., pp. 99~100. 
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The differentia between Perelman's view of argument and what he 
calls logic or demonstration is not perfectly clear-cut. Rather, it 
is partly attitudinal, partly in the method of approach, and partly in 
the substance of criticism. The general attacks on self-evidence, 
closed systems, and form, and the forwarding of the distinctions of the 
jurisprudential model versus in axiological model, .the attempt to 
separate the realm of opinion and values from that of facts and universals, 
the emphasis on natural language, and the concentration on disciplinary 
criteria in opposition to more generalized formal criteria for 
criticism all interact upon one another to form the basis of Perelman's 
11 new rhetoric.'' No one factor clearly divides "the new argument" from 
the "old logic," but the Belgian legal philosopher argues that the 
total effect of the sum of all the variances is to establish a new realm 
for argument and an expansion of the concepts of reason, reasoned, and 
reasonable. Perelman, like anyone arguing from wha~ they consider to 
be a minority position, is probably too strident in the stating of his 
case, but his appeals are always to temperance and moderatiqn and for 
a co~sideration of argumentation rather than for a throwing over of 
formal logic, mathematics, or science. 47 
Perelman's Specific Contributions to 
the Theory of Argument 
Perelman's main contribution to rhetoric in his own estimation 
is as a synthetic philosopher reviving dialectic as the ideal of social 
rationality. 48 He chooses to call his revival of justified opinions and 
47Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 510. 
48Perelman, Justice, pp. 58-62. 
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values, or choices based on culture or disciplinary norms, the new 
rhetoric because of the "changed meaning of dialectic since the time of 
Hegel 1149 . . . It is this addition to logic and demonstration for 
which Perelman wishes to be remembered. However, in amplification of 
his theories, he does discuss several specific ideas which contribute 
greatly to the theory of argument and, at the same time, clarify yet 
further the distinction he thinks exists between demonstration and 
argument. The rest of this section will be concerned with Perelman's 
specific contributions to the theory of argument: the idea of the new 
rhetoric, the relationship of dialectic to rhetoric, the relationship 
between rhetoric and philosophy, the concept of adherence, distinctions 
between various sorts of audiences, Perelman's theories concerning 
language and values and norms, the idea of presence, the concepts of 
association, dissociation, and interaction, and the effect of argument 
on the relationship between act and person, and, finally, the idea of 
justice as the overarching judgmental criterion by which argument is 
evaluated. Most of this section will be e~plicatory as the author 
feels that much of whatllsrelman has to say is beneficial for a new theory 
of argument. In certain instances, however, especially as regards a 
certain confusion between rhetoric and philosophy manifested in a 
conviction-persuasion duality, with some remarks concerning the 
universal audience, and with some ambiguities with regards to the 
concept of justice the tone and tenor of the section will switch to 
criticism. 
49Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. s. 
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The New Rhetoric 
By way of summary, Perelman equates the new rhetoric with a revived 
theory of argument. P~relman believes that "all argument is rhetorica11150 
and that "rhetoric is the study of the means of argumentation which allow 
us to obtain and to increase the assent of people to specific theses 
presented to them. uSl The new rhetoric functions in the realm of values 
and is concerned with the reasons why people maintain certain opinions 
with various degrees of force and with why they take the various actions 
they do. Argument functions through language not through force or by 
other nonartistic means and "any action designed to obtain adherence 
falls outside the range of argumentation to the degree that the use of 
language is lacking in its support or interpretation. 1152 • • 
Argument or dialectic, the new rhetoric, is the means whereby the 
individual is socialized to the norms of his community or discipline 
and whereby the individual checks the rationality of his social 
judgments. As Perelman states: 
It would seem that we are never sure of the rationality of 
our theses as long as we have not submitted them to the proof 
of communication and criticism, a proof that cannot be 
dissociated from rhetoric'in the expanded and non-pejorative 
sense of this word.53 
As with Aristotle's dialectical arguments, Perelman's rhetorical 
arguments are checked out with the majority of men or, at the very 
least, with the most illustrious of men, the philosophers, for social 
credibility. 
50Perelman, "Replay to Mr. Zaner," Philosophy and Rhetoric, I 
(Summer, 1968), 168. 
51Perelman, "Proof in Philosophy," 356. 
52Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 8. , 
53Perelman, "Reply to Mr. Zaner," 170. 
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Rhetoric and Dialectic 
This checking out of ideas with one's fellow beings for accept-
ability or rationality ties the new rhetoric closely to dialectic in its 
Aristotelian conceptualization. As previously mentioned, Perelman states 
that he would have used the term dialectic instead of rhetoric had 
dialectic not accrued additional connotations since the time of 
Aristotle and had he not thought the title of rhetoric potentially 
illustrious enough for his supposedly revived subject matter. 54 Perelman 
thinks that "dialectical reasoning is considered as running parallel 
with analytic reasoning, but treating of that which is probable instead 
of dealing with propositions which are necessary. 1155 In effect, he 
claims that dialectical knowledge or socially conditioned knowledge 
"concerns the beliefs, the agreements, the adhesions of men ••• 1156 
Dialectic is both a process and an end product. Perelman states that 
"dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which 
the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective 
views, but rather a discussion, in which the interlocutors search 
honestly and without bias for the best solution to a controversial 
I 
problem. 1157 The result of this honest, mutual searching for a solution 
is a dialectic which consists of a series of value hierarchies which 
together constitute the norms and values of a given group or society. 58 
54see Footnote No. 49. See also Perelman, Justice, pp. 58-59 and 
Dear in, "Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," pp. 17-18. 
55Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 5. 
56 Perelman, "Sociologie de la connaissance et Philosophie de la 
connaissance," Revue Internationale de Philosophie, IV (July, 1950), 315. 
57Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 37. 
58Ray Dearin, "Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric, 11 p. 127. 
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Rhetoric and Philosophy 
The new rhetoric is also peculiarly related to philosophy, though 
here the equation does not work out so well. Just as Perelman equates 
the new rhetoric with dialectic, so also does he amalgamate rhetoric 
and philosophy. In An Historical Introduction to Philosophical 
Thinking. Perelman claims that the "goal of philosophy is to influence 
the mind and win its agreement, rather than to perform purely formal 
transformations of propositions. n 59 This definition is quite close to 
if not exactly the same as Perelman's definition of the goal of rhetoric.60 
Perelman also claims that" ••• the proper object of philosophy is the 
systematic study of confused ideas. 11 61 Since the realm of rhetoric is the 
realm of probability and of the contingent as opposed to the realm of 
the necessary, the universal, or of fact or truth, it is evident that 
here too Perelman blends philosophy and rhetoric. And the Belgian 
theorist conjoins rhetoric and philosophy in yet a third fashion. 
Rhetoric is always situationally contingent and time bound for Perelman, 
and so is philosophy. Nathan Rotenstreich states that "The New Rhetoric 
is predicated on the proposition that in philosophy there are only 
59ch. Perelman, An Historical Introduction to Philosophical 
Thinking. trans. by Kenneth A. Brown (N. Y.: Random House, 1965), p. 101. 
60Perelman's goal for rhetoric as stated in The New Rhetoric, 
p. 14 is "gaining the adherence of minds ••• " 
61Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, 
p. 4. 
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arguments and no ultimate propositions. Philosophy is always under 
way. 1162 Rotenstreich's statement neatly fits with Dearin's explanation 
that Perelman believes in "regressive" as opposed to "primary" 
philosophy. 63 Regressive philosophy is always open, always contingent, 
with automatic provisions for reformation whereas primary philosophy is 
closed and immutable and must be destroyed before any reformation or 
reformulation is possible. 64 
Though he intertwines rhetoric and philosophy to a great extent, 
Perelman wishes to leave himself an out and clouds the issue somewhat 
with one caveat. Rhetoric is the tool of the philosopher. It is also 
the tool of every man. Perelman does not wish all rhetoric to be 
considered philosophic nor all men philosophers at all times. He wants 
to restrict the title of philosophy to the product of the most thoughtful 
of men or to some minor percentage of the thoughts of all men, so he 
states that philosophy is systematic rhetoric or ar~ment which 
convinces rather than merely persuades. 65 He ties this idea to the 
concept of the universal audience, and has been deservedly attacked at 
this very point in his analysis for a tendency to regress towards the 
I 
very analyticity which has borne the brunt of his opposition. 
62Nathan Rotenstreich, "Argumentation and Philosophical Clarif ica-
tion.," 12. 
63oearin, "The Philosophical Basis of Ch. Perelman's Theory of 
Rhetoric," 216. 
64Ibid -· 
65perelman, The New Rhetoric., p. 27. Perelman previously labeled 
the conviction-persuasion duality a false dichotomy but contradicts 
himself when it comes to philosophic argumentation or argument for a 
universal audience. 
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Basically, Perelman's claims for the nobility of philosophy catch 
him in a kind,of back door introduction of analyticity. 66 Perelman 
simply cannot simultaneously maintain that the persuasion/conviction 
dichotomy is false and that philosophy convinces as opposed to the 
67 mere persuasion of most argumentation. This contradicts his whole 
basic thesis that argumentation parallels demonstration and ought to be 
considered just as noble and rational a process. It also contradicts 
his own inmediately prior parallels between rhetoric and philosophy. It 
seems that when it comes to the crunch and the ship is endangered, the 
Belgian philosopher reneges on his position that everyone ought to try 
the murky waters of argument and reaches fior the lifebuoy and theoretic 
solidity of demonstration. 
Adherence 
The purpose of the new rhetoric or of argument even of philosophy 
in Perelman's treatises is to gain adherence. "Every argumentation in 
fact aims at a change in the mind of the auditors/' claims Perelman, 
I 
"whether it be to modify the theses themselves to which the auditors 
adhere or simply the intensity of that adherence as measured by the 
eventual consequences it tends to produce in action. 1168 Dearin argues 
that this idea "sharpens a traditional concept of rhetoric" by exploiting 
the concept "that beliefs are highly unstable, fluid phenomena, which 
are adhered to with varying degrees of intensity. 11 69 As opposed to the 
66 See Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., "Discussion: A New Theory of 
Philosophical Argumentation," Philosophy and Phenomenologic Research, 
XV (Dec., 1954), 244-252 and Richard Zaner, "Philosophy and Rhetoric: A 
Critical Discussion," Philosophy and Rhetoric, I (Spring, 1968), 61-77. 
67Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 27 versus p. 28. 
6BPerelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 155. 
69nearin, "Chaim Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," p. 213. 
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traditional concept of conviction associated with demonstration, the 
adherence of argument can just as easily be the product of emotion as 
the consequent of logic. In addition, instead of representing a black 
or white choice, adherence can vary in degree and offer an interlocuter 
a choice of more acceptable grays.70 Perelman insists that the 
inclusion of the emotional factor and the allowance for variation in 
degree of intensity are important "because the theses to which we adhere 
may be in conflict in concrete situations 1171 In such situations, 
we don't have to dichotomize,falsely, but can instead, with the concept 
of adherence, merely readjust our hierarchies of values in such a fashion 
as to account for the temporary dissonance and avoid ultimate conflict 
altogether. 72 
The idea of adherence is also important to Perelman as it helps to 
account for the importance of epichictic addresses. He forwards the 
notion that the links of society are forged by the intensification of 
the fires of belief and faith. Knowledge alone cannot suffice to anneal 
the social contract. There must also be faith, f~ith in leadership, 
faith in the law, faith in common values, and faith even in the idea that 
man can endure and conquer. Perelman believes that the idea of 
adherence, unlike confiction or demonstration, combines knowledge and 
belief. And this is essential for knowledge of commonly held community 
values and faith in these values are both necessary for the community to 
survive. Thus, an understanding of adherence is critical to an ability 
70Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 45. 
71Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values?," 799. 
72Ibid. 
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to analyze epideictic addresses and an understanding of epideictic 
addresses is critical to an understanding of the functioning of the 
community or society. In the creation of this connection, Perelman has, 
indeed, made a real contribution to our knowledge of the functioning of 
rhetoric. 73 
Various Types of Audience 
Because Perelman's analysis depends upon the changing of minds, he 
is very much dependent upon the idea of rhetoric as addressed to various 
types of audience. As he and Olbrechts-Tyteca analyze the rhetorical 
situation in The New Rhetoric, they proclaim: 
The unfolding as well as the starting point of the argumentation 
presupposes indeed the agreement of the audience. This agreement 
is sometimes on explicit premises, sometimes on the particular 
connecting links used in the argument or on the manner of using 
these links; but from start to finish, analysis of argumentation 
is concerned with what is supposed to be accepted by the hearers. 74 
All argument assumes the existence of intellectual contact between 
people. The key to arg1,ltllent is not to meet some arbitrary form but to 
win over people, audiences. Perelman never loses sight of this basic 
truth and reiterates it frequently in opposition to those who he argues 
have taken the social and psychological conditions out of argument 
thereby gaining precision but losing relevance. 75 He seems almost to be 
73Perelman, The New Rhetoric, pp. 47-51. Perelman declares that 
the defense of traditional and accepted values through the arguments 
of education is as worthy if not a more worthy process than stirring 
up controversy through polemics. He is very probably quite correct, 
and his analysis does make a point not previously recognized or, at the 
very least, emphasized much. 
74Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 165. 
75 !ill-, p. 14. 
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saying that you can take the feeling out of argument but you can't 
take argument out of the realm of human feelings and emotions. 
Perelman defines an audience "as the ensemble of those whom the 
speaker wishes to influence by his argumentation. 1176 He believes that 
three types of audience are of particular importance for the gleaning 
of adherence: 
Three kinds of audience are apparently regarded as enjoying 
special perogatives as regards this function, both in current 
practice and in the view of philosophies. The fi~st such audience 
consists of the whole of mankind, or at least, of all normal, 
adult persons; we shall refer to it as the Universal audience. 
The second consists of the single interlocuter whom a speaker 
addresses in a dialogue. The third is the subject himself when 
he deliberates or gives himself reasons for his actions.77 
Of these three types of audiences the most interesting creation by far 
is that of the universal audience. Perelman does not regard the universal 
audience as "a concrete social reality but a construction of the speaker 
based on elements of his experience. n78 This is as clear as Perelman 
wishes to be on this point. When the advocate constructs an argument 
for the universal audience, he creates a philosophic argument, a system-
atic, nearly objective, valid argument, one which Perelman believes, 
quoting Plato, might be capable of "convincing the gods themselves. 1179 
76Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 19. 
77 !k!!!·, p. 30. 
78Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 155. 
79Perelman, "How Do We Apply Reason to Values?," 800 or The New 
Rhetoric, p. 7. 
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Of course, this type of argument smacks of the sort of timeless, 
universal construction to which Perelman has previously so vehemently 
denied efficacy. However, in conjunction with his ideas about philosophy 
and the possibilities in certain remote circumstances for complete 
adherence or conviction, Perelman insists on this Platonic trace. He 
never resolves the contradiction between this ideal and the essence of 
' 
the bulk of his writings. He does make a brief foray when he declares 
that the coupling of the obligation of "the orator to adapt himself to 
his audience with limitation of the audience to an incompetent mob"ao 
has discredited rhetoric, but he is never desirous of open battle 
concerning t~e subject whi~h is entirely understandable. 
As for the two other types of audience, Perelman swiftly dispenses 
with them with the brief comments that a man must convince himself 
before he can argue with others and that argumentation with a single 
interlocutor many times provides moments of especially penetrating 
insight as t~e quintessence of the dialectical process. The traditional 
rhetorical situation, the situation in which one speaker argues before 
an audience of indeterminant composition and size, is neglected by 
Perelman except to the extent that he cotmnents that particular audiences 
will accept only certain "values, hierarchies, and loci1181 peculiar to 
their time and circumstance. This omission, which might be caused by 
80Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 25. 
Blibid., p. 179. 
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the previously mentioned lack of familiarity of American rhetorical 
scholarship, 82 is particularly regrettable for the particular audience 
has got to correspond in some degree with Perelman's "disciplines." If 
he will not get any more particular than this, and especially if he won't 
give any concrete examples of the functioning of various criteria 
relative to at least one discipline, then his ,concept of ,rdisciplines" 
diminishes markedly in value. 
Language 
When one is arguing, seeking to obtain adherence from an audience, 
one uses language. For Perelman, as previously mentioned, natural 
language is critical to the general argumentative process in 
opposition to what he calls artificial language for: 
When an author does not express himself after the fashion of 
a mathematician, in an artificial language that he may have 
created wholesale, but instead used the natural language of 
a cultural community, he adopts, with respect to all those 
points which he has not explicitly modified, the classifications 
and evaluations that the language carries with it.83 
Perelman believes that natural language is the result of prolonged usage 
and contains within itself thousands of functional evaluations, 
presumptions, and implied or applied connections. It reflects the 
argumentative middle path which is "neither the reflection of an 
objective reality nor the manifestation of individual arbitrariness. 84 
Indeed, natural language is the ultimate dialectic, for natural language 
82see Footnote Ito. 5. 
83Perelman, · "Rhetoric and Philosophy," 18. 
84Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p.,513. 
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is not only the tool of the new rhetoric but reflects the product of 
that rhetoric, that which is deemed socially rational. 
The Realm of Values 
As previously noted, the most important portion of social 
rationality reflected by language concerns the realm of values. This is 
true as Perelman argues that all agreements can be divided into two 
classes: nthe first concerning the~' comprising faets, truths, and 
presumptions, the other concerning the preferable, comprising values, 
hierarchies, and lines of argument relating to the preferable. 11 85 The 
first class of agreements is the subject matter of logic and deroonstra-
tion while the second comprises the substance of argument. Perelman 
is not altogether didactic about this point and, in fact, shifts a bit 
to say: 
Values enter, at some stage or other, into every argument. In 
reasoning of a scientific nature, they are generally confined 
to the beginning of the formulation of the concepts and rules 
that constitute the system concerned, and insofar as the reasoning 
aims at the truth value, to the conclusions ••• But in the 
fields of law, politics, and philosophy, values intervene as a 
basis for argument at all stages of the development.86 
Like Kenneth Burke, with whose works he is slightly acquainted, Perelman 
establishes a somewhat ambiguous hierarchy of arguments dependent upon 
the types of language or agreements employed.87 At the bottom of the 
as Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 66. 
86Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 75. Here is yet another example 
of where Perelman is self-contradictory on the specifics of his system. 
At some points he states that values are not involved in logic or 
demonstration. At other points, he tries to argue that there is merely 
a substantial degree of difference as to how values ente~ the picture. 
87For a more detailed comparison one might 
Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, Calif.: 
Press, 1969), pp. 183-189. 
want to see Kenneth 
University of California 
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hierarchy are facts and truths supposedly expressed univocally and 
proceeding upward in generality, emotionality, and ambiguity, there 
are presumption, values, and finally, 12.£!. 88 In this shift upward in 
the hierarchy, according to Perelman, the potential degree of adherence 
by all men diminishes, 89 however, particular audiences can be character-
ized precisely "by the way they grade values. 1190 What Perelman is 
stating is that as meaningfulness and precision increase evaluation 
decreases. In the abstract, complete agreement is obtained only on 
those matters that are clear but valueless on the one hand or nearly 
totally ambiguous but quite highly valued on the other. In the middle 
realm, the realm of dialectic as opposed to the realms of fact or the 
realm of bodiless abstractions such as love, patriotism, etc., 
advocates must forever argue. Argument concerns only those matters 
which are valued but unclear. 
Presence 
The purpose of various linguistic and value choices is to create 
presence. "By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting 
them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion 
are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a presence, 
88Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, pp. 
169-171 or The New Rhetoric, pp. 67-85. See also Dearin, "Chaim 
Perelman's Theory of Rhetoric," p. 127. 
89Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 81. 
goibid -· 
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which is an essential factor in argumentation. 1191 Perelman writes that 
those arguments brought to the forefront by repetition, emphasis, or by 
the disproportionate amount of time spent on their construction will have 
presence. Presence ''has a negative as well as positive aspect," in that, 
"deliberate suppression of presence is an equally noteworthy 
phenomenon • • • n9Z Mader claims that presence is important to the theory 
of argunentation as it is the factor which "focuses the hearer's attention 
on the attitude to be adopted or the action to be performed, while on 
the other hand it distracts the hearer from taking into account other 
matters that might impede the adoption of the attitude or the performance 
of the action. 1193 Others have considered the idea of presence or of 
emphasis or choice before, but by naming it and amplifying its manifesta-
tions in convenient form, Perelman makes yet another contribution to 
argumentation theory. 
Association/Dissociation 
Perelman states that: 
By processes of association we understand schemes which bring 
separate elements together and allow us to establish a unity 
among them, which aims either at o~ganizing them or at eval-
uating them, positively or negatively by means of one another. 
91Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 116. 
92.1!?.!,g,., p. 118. 
93Mader, "The Divine Persuasion: Presence, Transcendence, 
Freedom and God," (paper presented at the 1970 S .c .A. convention at 
New Orleans), p. 2. 
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By processes of disassociation, we mean techniques of separa-
tion which have the purpose of dissociating, separating, dis-
uniting elements which are regarded as forming a whole or 
at least a unified group within some system of thought; 
dissociation modifies such a system by modifying certain 
concepts which make up its essential parts.94 
These processes might well be compared to Burke's ideas of merger and 
division. 95 Association and dissociation, or merger and division, are 
complementary processes and are always at work at the same time, one 
always dependent on the existence of the other. In any particular argu-
ment, the advocate will usually emphasize one process while suppressing 
the other. However, both procedures are dependent on the making and 
breaking of linkages between parts of various contentions which must 
then be fitted together to form a complete piece of argumentation or 
discourse. The act of creation always implies the possibility of 
destruction and vice versa. 
Interaction 
Association and dissociation lead inevitably toward the idea of 
interaction. Perelman claims that: 
••• the meaning and the scope of an isolated argument can 
rarely be understood without ambiguity; the analysis of one 
link of an argument out of its context and Jndependently of 
the situation to which it belongs involves undeniable dangers. 
These are due not only to the equivocal character of language, 
but also to the fact that the springs supporting the9grsumenta-
tion are almost never entirely explicitly described. 
94Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 190. 
95Por a further comparison see Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of 
Motives, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969), 
pp. 403-406. 
96Perelman, The,New Rhetoric, p. 187. 
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The answer to this problem is the valuable concept of interaction. 
He uses a metaphor concerning "the threads of cloth" to make his point. 97 
Unlike proofs by deduction which function within closed systems of 
premises with singular force, rhetorical proofs depend upon a cumulative 
building process. That is, rhetorical arguments are dependent upon the 
mutually reinforcing subarguments which, only when added together, give 
a piece of discourse weight. As with a chair, all the legs have to be 
there for the argument to really hold up. As Perelman puts it 11 • 
the elements of arguments are in constant interaction at more than one 
level: interaction between various arguments, put forward, interaction 
between the arguments and the overall argumentative situation, between 
the arguments and their conclusions, and finally, between the arguments 
occurring in the discourse and those that are about the discourse. 1198 
Interaction fits well with Perelman's entire conceptualization of 
argumentation as opposed to demonstration. It is a requisite concept 
for a theory where the total weight of argument is to be considered rather 
than a singU;lar pro?£. 
Justice 
Perelman summarizes his theory of argumentation under the aegis of 
the idea of justice. In opposition to demonstration, argumentation 
requires justification. This is because the strong argument is not 
necessarily a correct argument but rather an argument "which has survived 
97Julius Stone, The Legal System and Lawyers' Reasonings, p. 331. 
98Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p·. 460. 
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all objections and criticism and with regard to which we have a 
certain confidence, though no certainty, that it will resist all such 
future attacks.n99 Basically, Perelman states that an argument ought 
not even be considered correct or incorrect as with demonstration, but 
rather justified or unjustified, strong or weak, weighty or ephemeral. 
It is useless to try to define rational argumentation the way 
we define a demonstrative technique, namely by its conformity 
to certain prescribed rules. Unlike demonstrative reasoning, 
arguments are never correct or incorrect; they are either 
strong or weak, relevant or irrelevant. The strength or weakness 
is judged according to the Rule of Justice, which requires that 
essentially similar situations be treated in the same manner.100 
Under the rule of justice, "we are the judges of the force, value, and 
relevance of arguments. nlOl The individual or group must weigh the 
arguments and declare a decision • 
• • • in default of an impersonal and absolute criterion of 
validity furnis~ed by self-evidence and providing, method of 
proof founded on self-evidence, we can still justify our 
decisions in the fields of thought and actions by forms of 
argument which are neither constraining nor mechanical. The 
guarantee of these, in the last analysis, is supplied by 
the solidarity which their use and their evaluation establishes 
between the person who constructs them and the person who 
adopts them. The responsibility of the man who thys engages 
himself, is as even, a corrollary of his freedom. 102 
An argument is just rather than correct and justified by its social 
relevance rather than by its ability to meet a set of arbitrarily 
constraining rules or some abstract form.' Perelman believes that function-
ality is the only ultimate criterion for argumentation. 
99Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 117. 
lOOPerelman, Justice, p. 83. 
lOlPerelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. 124. 
102tbid. 
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Of course, when the arbitrary absolutist point of view is rejected 
"the problem of knowing who is qualified or competent to criticize and 
judge and the problem of determining the modalities of criticism and 
of justification, then become essential problems."103 Perelman solves 
this difficulty by turning to the juridical model and to the idea of 
disciplines. For him, the definition of justice is constant, but 
there are "vaz:ying eriteria for its application in different situations 
or to different subject matters. 11104 These criteria are the subject 
matter of various fields or disciplines: 
Our hypothesis is that this strength is appraised by application 
of the rule of justice; that which was capable of convincing 
in a specific situation will appear to be convincing in a 
similar or analogous situation. The comparison of situations will 
be the subject of constant study and refinement in each particular 
discipline. Initiation into a rationally systematized field 
will not merely furnish knowledge of the facts, truths, and 
special terminology of the branch of learning involved and of 
the method of using the available tools, it will also provide 
instruction in assessing the strength of the arguments used in 
these connections.105 
Like Stephen Toulmin, Perelman believes that the force of argument 
remains constant through the Rule of Justice but that the criteria for 
the argument changes from discipline to discipline. 106 Like Kenneth 
Burke, he believes that analogous situations are constantly repeated 
and can be interpreted through argument or criticism by the finding of 
l03Perelman, Justice, pp. 64-65. 
104Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the 'Problem of Argument, p. viii. 
105 Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 464. 
106ror further information on this comparison see later information 
on Toulmin in Chapter IV or H.L.A. Hart's introduction to Perelman, I!!!, 
Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, p. viii. 
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patterns to which to apply the rule of justice as regards human opinions 
and actions. 107 
Unfortunately, as with his conceptualizations of the universal 
,audience, conviction as opposed to persuasion, and of philosophy as 
opposed to rhetoric, Perelman is vague and unnecessarily brief 
concerning justice. In the abstract, the idea is intriguing. When it 
comes down to the concrete reality of giving an example of the criteria 
for justice for but a single discipline or of mentioning a single 
pattern repeated in social life, however, Perelman fails to complete his 
task. It is almost as if when he comes to the most critical concepts, 
Perelman alights like a bee but fails to pollinate the flower. He 
contributes some solid work on adherence, presence, interaction, etc. 
and is very good at the macrocosmic theoretical level. Regrettably, 
Perelman is weak with regards to examples and applicability. For a 
clearer picture on the questions of fields, substantive argument, and 
disciplinary criteria, it is necessary to proceed to the works of 
Stephen Toulmin. 
Ch. Perelman on Rational Argument: A SuDDD.ary 
Perelman attacks a narrowed vision of rationality. He argues for 
argumentation as a rational process paralleling logic and demonstration. 
He in the two thousand years since Aristotle, particularly in 
the last three hundred years, the Stagirite's dialectical and rhetorical 
methods of argument have been theoretically neglected in preference for 
his methodology concerning apodeixis. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's 
l07For further possible detail on the potential of this comparison 
see Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (N. Y.: Random House, 
1957), p. s. 
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concern is for a revival of Aristotle's theories on rhetoric and dialectic, 
and they call this revival the new rhetoric. 
Though their main contribution to the theory of argument may well 
be in the area of clearing out some of the remaining subtle psychological 
attachments to demonstration, formal logic, and the idea of a possible, 
all encompassing, axiological, primary philosophy, Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca also make specific contributions to argumentation theory. Save in 
those few areas where there is a tendency towards backsliding towards 
analyticity, namely the universal audience, the confusion of philosophy 
and rhetoric,,the contradiction concerning conviction, and a few of the 
connnents concerning a theoretically perfect justice, the two authors 
make some significant contributions to a more complicated but more refined 
theory of argument. Their ideas concerning adherence, interaction, 
presence, association and dissociation, value, and language are 
particularly illuminating. Also important is their carrying through 
of some of the old Aristotelian concepts regarding dialectical argu-
mentation. Their theory is tentative, however, and some concepts are 
still vague. Further detail is necessary before a new theory of argu-
ment can be clearly presented. Some of this detail is found in Stephen 
Toulmin, some in other modern authors, but Perelman sets the stage at 
least for a new argument by blasting at the barrier in its path, namely 
} 
the remains of logical positivism, and by hinting at its constituents: 
a concern for dialectic, the importance of natural language, the addition 
of substantive disciplinary criteria to formal criteria for evaluating 
argument, the social determination of some types of rationality, and 
the idea of cumulative strength in the weighing of argument. 
CHAPTER IV 
STEPHEN TOUIMIN AND HIS QUEST FOR THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENT 
••• how far logic can hope to be a formal science, and yet 
retain the possibility of being applied in the critical 
assessmint of actual arguments will be a central question 
for us. 
If a theory of human understanding is to follow the rest of 
twentieth-century science and history then it must be based 
not on unchanging principles and guarantees but on the 
developing interactions between Man, his concepts and the 
world in which he lives ••. Instead of Fixed Mind gaining 
command over Fixed Nature by applying Fixed Principles, we 
should expect to find variable epistemic relationships 
between a variable Man and a variable Nature. 2 
An Introduction of Purpose 
Stephen Toulmin, former King's College don, philosopher of 
science, and sometimes argumentation theoretician, has probably had a 
greater impact among rhetoricians with regards to argument than any 
other man in the twentieth century. Despite the fact that most of his 
time has been spent in more popular and profitable, and some would argue, 3 
1stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1958), p. 3. 
2stephen Toulmin, Human Understanding. Vol. I (Oxford, Eng.: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 21. 
3Toulmin has received much praise and little criticism for his 
work in the philosophy of science. See, for example, J.C. Cooley, 
"On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," Journal of Philosophy. LVI 
(March 26, 1959), 297-319. 
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felicitous excursions into the philosophy of science, 4 Toulmin's few 
encroachments upon argument have had stunning effects. The Uses of 
Argument has been the most controversial work about argument in the last 
5 dozen years. Human Understanding, the first volume only, of a projected 
three, to be published, seems destined to extend upon the polemical 
issues raised in The Uses of Argument. It may well turn out to be the 
I 
most controversial argumentation text of the next dozen years. 
Toulmin comes from a background of English logical positivism, but 
he is anything but a logical positivist himself. His heroes were not 
Russell and Whitehead with their Principia but rather John Wisdon, G. E. 
6 Moore, and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. Holt Spicer, in his doctoral 
J 
dissertation at the University of Oklahoma, carefully explains that 
Toulmin is a functional analyst tending to deal with ordinary language 
difficulties in reaction to analytic philosophy. 7 In this type of 
4By far the majority of Toulmin's work has been as a philosopher 
of science. See, for example, Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of 
Science (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1953), Stephen Toulmin, 
Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry Into the Aims of Science, 
)Foreword by Jacques Barzun (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University 
Press, 1961), and note that the bulk of Human Understanding seeks to 
explain science and uses examples from predominantly scientific 
disciplines. 
5Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., "Theory of Argument," in Contemporary 
Philosophy, ed. by Raymond Klibansky, (Firenze, 1968), p. 177. 
6see the acknowledgements in The Uses of Argument and in Stephen 
Toulmin, An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1958). 
7Holt Vandercook Spicer, 11 Stephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of 
Logic and Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric," (unpublished Ph.D. 
disser~ation, University of Oklahoma, 1964), p. 66. 
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analysis he joins Wittgenstein and Ryle in opposition to Carnap, Kneale, and 
Quine. 8 As a functional analyst of ordinary language, Toulmin's problem 
9 area is "everyday argument." He wants to deal with "practical questions 
about the manner in which we have occasion to handle and criticize 
argument in different fields ••• ulO His basic theme in all this is 
that "the rational assessment of arguments requires experience, insight, 
and judgment. In such an appraisal, a mathematically based model can 
never be more than one tool among many. 1111 In opposition to the logical 
positivists and analytic philosophers, Toulmin has argued for twenty 
years for a substantive, audience centered, situational logic with 
which to criticize ordinary, everyday arguments. 
Like Perelman, there are two aspects to Toulmin's thesis, the 
offensive, destructive aspect and the positive, constructive aspect. 
Stephen Toulmin may very well be at his best in the attack. This is 
because he thoroughly believes that one must remove the false beliefs 
in analyticity, the equating of form with logic, and mathematical 
paradigms before one can really get to an analysis of argument. He states: 
8 Holt Vandercook Spicer, "Stephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of 
Logic and Ethics and Its Relation to Rhetoric," (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1964), p. 54. 
9Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 2. 
lOibid -· 
11Albert L. Lewis, "Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal, 11 Central 
States Speech Journal~ XXIII (Spring, 1972), 52. 
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The first step is to reject the commitment to logical system-
aticity which makes absolutism and relativism appear the only 
alternatives available. This decision brings us to the heart 
of the matter. For it was, in fact, always a mistake to 
identify rationality and, logicality--to suppose, that is, 
that the rational ambitions of any historically developing 
intellectual activity can be understood entirely in terms of 
the propositional or conceptual systems in which its intell-
ectual content may be expressed at one or another time. 
Questions of 'rationality' are concerned, precisely, not with 
the particular intellectual doctrines that a man--or a 
professional group--adopts at any given time, but rather 
with the conditions on which. and the manner in which. he is 
prepared to criticize and change those doctrines as time 
goes on. The rationality of a science (for instance) is 
embodied, not in the theoretical systems current in it at 
a particular time, but in its procedures for discovery and 
conceptual change through time. 12 
Toulmin argues that, by ,now, "mathematical logic has become a frozen 
calculus, having no functional connection with the canons for assessing 
the strength and cogency of arguments·.1113 But he does also provide an 
alternative. Using a jurisprudential model, like Aristotle and Perelman, 
Toulmin champions the view that a sound argument is "one which will stand 
up to criticism, one for which a case can be presented coming up to the 
standard required ••• 1114 for its audience and the situation. His idea 
of rationality for substantive argument "is concerned far more directly 
with the matter'of function and adaptation--with the substantive needs 
and demands of the problem-situations that men's collective concepts and 
methods of thought are designed to handle--than it is with formal 
considerations . . 1115 • He presents a system for the layout of arguments, 
12Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 84. 
13Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 186. 
14.roulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 8. 
15Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 1vii. 
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for differentiating between substantive and analytical argument, and 
for establishing the criteria of field dependency in opposition to 
universal, timeless, forms. And, though he may be at his best in the 
attack, Toulmin is certainly provocative in his argumentative constructions. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to explore some of the 
provocative aspects of Toulmin's ideas. The first major section will 
be focused upon his major contributions to argument based largely on 
The Uses of Argument and Human Understanding. Like the previous expli-
cation and analysis of Perelman, this section will begin with an analysis 
of Toulmin's assaults against traditional, formal logic, and then 
proceed to his more positive contributions including: the idea of 
substantial versus analytical argument, the idea of warrant-establishing 
versus warrant-using argument, the idea of field dependency, including 
the concepts of discipline, profession, and field dependent criteria 
versus the force of field independency, the layout of arguments, and 
Toulmin's comments on intellectual ecology and rationality. The second 
major section will encompass.some C01111\entary on Toulmin's friends and 
foes. As Albert Lewis has pointed out in his fine article, "Stephen 
Toulmin: A Reappraisal, 11 logicians have tended to respond quite 
unfavorably to Mr. Toulmin while rhetoricians, with admittedly 
selective interpretations, 16 have reacted quite favorably to his 
16Rhetoricians have typically taken only a portion of Toulmin's 
system and incorporated it into their own systems or have extended upon 
Toulmin in such a manner as to make him seem an advocate of their own 
particular visions of rhetorical criticism. See, for example, the 
psychological, audience analysis based version of James Mccroskey, 
"Toulmin and the Basic Course," Speech Teacher, XIV (March, 1965) or 
An Introduction to Rhetorical Communication (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1968) or the extension of the Toulmin system into 
traditional categories by Wayne Brockriede and Douglas Ehninger, 
"Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application," O .J .s,. XLVI 
(Feb., 1960), 44-53 and Decision by Debate (N. Y.: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1967). 
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ideas, 17 and this varied reaction needs to be noted and explained. The 
final segment of this chapter will be a review in retrospect with a 
tentative judgment concerning the usefulness of Toulmin's theoretical 
contributions to argument in full realization that his potential 
contribution has not yet been completed for he is still very much alive 
and writing now more than ever. 
The Decline of the Analytic Ideal and the Search 
for an Alternative in Substantive Argument 
(A) Attacks on the Ideal of the Analytic Syllogism 
Toulmin claims that all his ideas are "ballons d 'essai, trial 
ballons designed to draw the fire of others." 18 This reasonable, 
scholarly qualifier might well apply to his tentative, constructive 
ideas but seems inapplicable to his attacks on the analytic syllogism, 
the paradigm of formal logic. Toulmin is vehement in his assaults on 
the claim that an axiomatic, singular, scientific model can ultimately 
represent reality for all men for all time. Perhaps typical of his 
comments is the following remark from Human Understanding: 
Perhaps the idea of timeless, eternal standards, applicable 
to arguments-in-general in abstraction from their practical 
contexts, was always a Cartesian delusion. Over-reliance on 
the model of Euclidean geometry has led philosophy into dead 
ends before new; since the mathematicians themselves have 
reappraised the status of their knowledge, philosophers too 
should reconsider their own standards of certainty. 19 
17 Albert L. Lewis, "Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal," 48. 
18stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 1. 
19Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 23. 
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Toulmin, like Perelman, whose attacks he amazingly parallels, thinks 
that the analytic ideal of Plato and Descartes has for too long caught 
the imaginations of men and sent them in false quests for a perfect 
logic patterned after geometry, supposedly applicable to the real world, 
universal, and timeless. He is utterly unrelenting in his criticism of 
this sort of formal logic and its modern advocates: Fte ge, Russell, 
20 Whitehead, the early Wittgenstein, Carnap, et al. 
The former Cambridge don makes two basic points. First, everyday, 
practical, substantive arguments tend to be far more complex than the 
analytic syllogism would lead one to believe. Second, evaluating 
argument is a more difficult task than simply checking to see if the 
propositions of the case meet some arbitrarily established rules of 
form. As he puts it: 
••• the categories of formal logic were built up from a study 
of the analytic syllogism, ••• this is an unrepresentative 
and misleadingly simple sort of argument, and ••• many of 
the paradoxical commonplaces of formal logic and epistemology 
spring from the misapplication of these categories to arguments 
of other sorts.21 ' 
Basically, Toulmin doesn I t believe that "rational demonstration is a 
suitable subject for 'a timeless, axiomatic science. 1122 Many arguments 
have their field-invariant aspects that can best be assessed with analytic 
apparatus, but "a total argument is a much more complex process than the 
20Toulmin's attacks encompass all those who have been called 
logical positivists but he especially picks out the individuals named 
for both rapier thrusts and sledgehammer blows. 
21T 1 · Th U f Ar t 146 ou min, e ses o gumen, p. • 
22 Ibid., p. 147. 
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stating of propositions that necessarily lead to a conclusion. n 23 For 
one thing, "certainly language as we know it consists, not of timeless 
propositions, but of utteraaces1dependent in all sorts of ways on the 
contexts or occasion on which they are uttered. 1124 For another, the 
analytic syllogism can't encompass that which is relative nor 
predictions about the future. Aristotle himself recognized this weakness 
but was unable to resolve it even for himself. 25 Then, too, substantial 
arguments, at least, demand leaps of faith and do not necessarily 
follow at all. Finally, the judgmental criteria for the evaluation of 
arguments, especially as concerns material validity, are always dependent 
upon a current knowledge of the standards of the field involved. For all 
these reasons Toulmin argues that it is simply not possible for an 
idealized, mathematical logic to remain relevant to the evaluation of 
actual arguments. 26 
In 'fhe Uses of Argument, Toulmin provides what he calls five 
crucial distinctions between everyday arguments and the analytic syllogism, 
distinctions which he claims formal logicians miss: 
(i) The distinction between necessary arguments and probable 
arguments ••• 
(ii) The distinction between arguments which are formally valid 
and those which cannot hope to be formally valid ••• 
(iii) The distinction between those arguments, including ordinary 
syllogisms, in which a warrant is relied on whose adequacy and 
applicability have previously been established, and those arguments 
which are the~selves intended to establish the adequacy·of a 
warrant. 
23 Lewis, "Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal," 52. 
2~oulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 180. 
25Aristotle, On Interpretation, 13, 22b. 
26Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 147. 
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(iv) The distinction between arguments expressed in terms of 
'logical connectives' or quantifiers and those not so expressed. 
( v) The fundamental distinction between analytic arguments 
and substantial ones ••• 27 
He claims that the typical argument of the formal logician is deductive, 
analytic, "formally valid, warrant-using, unequivocal in its consequences, 
and expressed in terms of 'logical words.' 1128 By contrast, most real 
arguments are "far less tractable, less trustworthy and more tentative, 
involve substantial leaps 
unlogical words ••• 1129 
. . . II and are "expressed in terms of vague, 
With regards to the first distinction, Toulmin believes that most 
real world arguments must be merely probable. They cannot be necessary 
except in an idealized abstracted sense. This is because: 
Whether we turn to social or intellectual history, evolutionary 
zoology, historical geology or astronomy--whether we consider 
explanatory theories or star-clusters, societies~ or cultures, 
languages or disciplines, organic species or the Earth itself--
the verdicJ; is not Parmenidean but Heraclitean. As we now 
understand it, nothing in the empirical world possesses the 
permanent unchanging identity which all Greek natural philosophers 
(the Ep!5ureans apart) presupposed in the ultimate elements of 
nature. 
The world is in flux, teal things change and change constantly. There is 
no entelechy, no essence, that can be captured and fixed for argument. 
There are no universal and necessary forms. The abstractions of math 
and of formal logic alone remain fixed and innnutable. The particulars 
of the empirical world and the actions and decisions of men are variable. 
Arguments about variable propositions can only be probable. They can 
never be necessary. Only arguments about forms can be necessary. 
27Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 148-149. 
28tbid., p. 149. 
29Ibid -· 
30roulmin, Human Understanding, pp. 355-356. 
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As for the second distinction, "Toulmin's basic objection to the 
syllogism is that it is inappropriate to real life situations because 
the conclusion presents no new information. 1131 The valid syllogism, 
according to Sir Stephen, "cannot in its conclusion tell us anything 
not already included in the data and warrant-backing ••• 1132 _ It is, 
by its very nature, a tautology. An analytic syllogism, by necessity, 
involves a mere shifting of the terms of the premises to reach its 
conclusion. This is ba:ause the categories for the terms must have been 
previously established and which term fits within which must already be 
known. While it may be true that the information in the conclusion was 
only implicit in the premises and may even be psychologically novel, 
those who know the premises by logical implication know the conclusion. 
Toulmin goes on to state: 
If the purpose of an argument is to establish conclusions about 
which we are not entirely confident by relating them back 
to other information about which we have greater assurance, it 
begins to be a little doubtful whether any genuine, practical 
argument could~ be properly analytic. 33 
In other words, a substantial argument or practical argument, in 
opposition to an analytic argument, cannot hope to be formally valid 
precisely for the reason that it makes an argument. It is not a 
demonstration. It is not one-hundred percent sure or necessary. A 
31 Jiunnie Trent, "Toulmin, Model of Argument: An Examination and 
Extens'ion," Q.J.s •• LIV (Oct., 1968), 152. 
32Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 150. 
33.!l21!!., pp. 126-127. 
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substantial argument, by its very nature, will involve more than a mere 
"shuffling of terms. 1134 
Toulmin's third distinction introduces a differentiation between 
warrant-using and warrant-establishing arguments. This will be discussed 
more thoroughly later so for now a preliminary examination will have to 
suffice. A warrant-using, analytic argument is one in which "a single 
datum is relied on to establish a conclusion by appeal to some warrant 
whose acceptability is being taken for granted. 1135 A warrant-establishing 
argument, on the other hand, is one "in which the acceptability of a novel 
warrant is made clear by applying it successivel~ in a number of cases 
in which both 'data' and 'conclusion' have been independently verified. 1136 
Since warrants are ,"bridges or inference licenses1137 allowing one to go 
from data to a conclusion, warrant-using arguments proceed from accepted 
data through accepted inference to a supposedly previously questionable 
conclusion. Warrant-establishing arguments proceed from accepted data 
through a previously unaccepted link to an accepted conclusion. 
The fourth "crucial distinction" is concerned with the difference 
between accepted logical modalities and the "non-logical goats, i.e. 
the generality of nouns, adjectives and the like, and unruly, 
connectives and quantifiers such as 'most,' 'few,' 'but. 11138 Toulmin 
is not so much concerned that logicians use such words as necessary, 
impossible, probable, and improbable as he is that they use these words 
34.roulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 148. 
35tbid., p. 120. 
36l!tl,g. 
37l!tl,g., p. 98. 
38Ibid., p. 149. 
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in a highly artifical, technical sense then attempt to apply them in 
their ordinary senses thus hiding the real complexity of arguments. He 
thinks this is unfair as: 
Somewhere in the minds of logicians--even if often at the back 
of them--it has always been assumed that, in sufficiently 
devious ways, the results of their labours could be used in 
judging the cogency and strength of actual, everyday arguments. 39 
He gives one example using the word "impossible." Impossible, for a 
logician, means absolutely impossible; by logical rules something is 
precluded; it cannot occur without contradicting some given in the 
argument. However, in its ordinary language contexts impossible can 
have many meanings. Something can be physically impossible, theoretically 
impossible, terminologically impossible or inconsistent, morally 
impossible or reprehensible, etc.40 Toulmin is concerned that the force 
of the word remains the same while the criteria for its application 
changes from field to field. Later it will be noted that this 
distinction is at the very heart of the division Toulmin makes between 
field-dependent arguments and field-independent arguments. 
The fundamental distinction between analytic arguments and 
substantial ones includes the various previous distinctions and 
summarizes Toulmin's position vis-a-vis the analytic ideal versus the 
majority of arguments. Briefly, Sir Stephen states: 
39Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 187. 
40ibid., pp. 23-30. 
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An argument from D to C will be called analytic if and only if 
the backing for the warrant authorising it includes, 
explicitly or implicitly, the information conveyed in the 
conclusion itself. Where this is so, the statement 'D, B, 
and also C' will, as a rule, be tautological. Where the 
backing for the warrant does not contain the information 
conveyed in the conclusion, the statement 'D, Band also 
C' will never be4a tautology, and the argument will be-a substantial one~ 1 
In other words, the analytic ideal encompasses a narrow range of 
arguments which are simultaneously deductive, universal, formal, univocal, 
timeless, and tautological. Substantial argument, by way of contrast, 
circumscribes all other kinds of argument. 
Toulmin's attacks are finely honed precision, instruments, but 
his constructive substitutes for that which he has demolished tend to 
be vague, hazy apparitions. They are as colorful as a rainbow, but it 
is just as difficult to find the pots of gold at the end. Toulmin 
camouflages his theories within his attacks. One often' finds very 
little concrete detail for such ideas as warrant-establishing arguments 
or for substantive argument even though these ideas seemingly have great 
potential. 
Toulmin has goo4 reason for his peculiarities, He knows that his 
/ 
attacks on the analytic syllogism are reasonable and that his distinctions 
between analytic and substantive argument represent some penetrating 
work, but he also knows that: 
Failing an impartial forum and procedures, rationality would 
end by going the same way as justice. Truth would yield to the 
belief of the loudest-mouthed, soundness to the ideas of the most 
respectable, validity to the intellectual methods of the most 
persuasive. In the theoretical as in the practical realm 
41 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 125. 
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disagreements would be decided by the balance of power rather 
than by principles; and the pursuit of well-founded intellectual 
positions would be replaced by a verbal clobbering-match ••• 42 
Avoiding the abstraction of the analytic syllogism may make arguments 
relevant but runs smack into the problem of historical relativism. 43 
If practical arguments aren't susceptible to the critical apparatus of 
the analytic syllogism, what standards can be applied? Toulmin 
successfully destroys the applicability of the analytic ideal to 
argument, furthering distinctions that others have missed, but the key 
becomes the substitute. What is it? How can one avoid subjectivity 
and have good reasons for maintaining a position?44 
Toulmin answers these questions with several contributions to 
argumentation theory. First, he presents a more complex pattern for 
the conceptualization of an argument which he calls the "jurisprudential 
model. 11 45 This model encompasses the macrocosm of argument or the or-
ganism in toto while the "layout of arguments" covers the finer 
physiological structure; the argument in microcosm. 46 Next, he attempts 
to explain how this pattern fits warrant-establishing, substantive 
arguments. With these two steps completed, he feels he has answered 
42Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 43. 
43Ibid., p. 59. 
44the Key question of Toulmin in Reason In Ethics, p. 3. 
45Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 94-96. 
46This critical distinction between. the jurisprudential model as 
the representation for the whole of an argument versus the layout of 
arguments as the representation of the finer parts of an argument has 
been missed by all too maJ&y critics. The distinction perhaps helps to 
explain a little better why the model is not necessarily entirely 
cont~adictory to the rest of Toulmin's interpretation. Only the finer 
parts of an argument are time bound and uni vocal. The argument, !!!. 
~, is an on-going, flexible, construction. 
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the question what is an argument and can get on to the question of how 
one evaluates an argument. At this stage Toulmin introduces the idea of 
field-dependence as an evaluative methodological substitute for the rules 
of the analytic syllogism. The subdivisions of this section will follow 
this same outline. 
(B) The Layout of Arguments 
Despite its prominence in argumentation texts, 47 Toulmin's layout 
of arguments appears but once in all his writing. It is sketchily 
presented in The Uses of Argument. 48 There Toulmin warns that the 
layout schemata's "form may not be fina1 1149 and that he is introducing 
it only for the purposes of the particular discussion of The Uses of 
Argument. 50 Nonetheless, this pattern has proven to be fascinatingly 
fruitful. Because of this and because the pattern has been picked up 
and interpreted, reinterpreted, misinterpreted, extended, and alternately 
praised and damned, some exegesis and analysis concerning the layout 
of arguments seems mandatory. 
Sir Stephen claims that syllogistic reasoning is too simplistic 
for the multitude of reasons already presented. 51 The syllogism patterns 
47Argumentation texts that utilize Toulmin's model for analysis of 
arguments include: Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede, Decision by 
Debate; Russell Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy 
(New York: Random House, 1965), and Gerald R. Miller and Thomas R. 
Nilsen, editors, Perspectives on Argumentation, (Chicago: Scott, 
Foresman and Co., 1966). 
4~oulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 94-115. 
49Ibid., p. 104. 
SOibid -· 
51see the five reasons referred to in pages 105-110. 
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itself after geometry. Toulmin prefers a "jurisprudential model. 1152 
This is because the law is sophisticated enough to deal with many types 
of claims in varying categories and because the law deals with relatively 
loose terminology in time bound and situationally bound contexts. 53 
"Surely," claims Toulmin, "we shall need to employ a pattern of argument 
no less sophisticated than is required by law. 1154 His preference for a 
juridical model might also be traced to his concern for functional 
analyses. The law continuously questions both jurisdiction and substance. 
It demands to know who should judge, then seeks reasons for a particular 
judgment. Each part of a forensic argument has some peculiar function 
which applies either to the question of jurisdiction or to the question 
of substance. Toulmin argues that a model for general argument ought 
really to do the same. 55 
Toulmin begins his system through defining a primary triad for 
argument consisting of data, warrants, and claims. Data are "facts we 
appeal to as foundations 1156 for a claim. Just exactly what facts are is 
never made clear, but T~ulmin implies that they are agreed upon 
statements of some sort between an advocate and his audience. 57 Claims 
52Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 7. 
53Ibid., pp. 95-96. 
54Ibid., p. 96. 
551 can find no explicit statement of this exact judgment. 
However, the statement is implicit in Toulmin's entire functional approach 
to argument and meshes neatly with Spicer's categorization of Toulmin as 
a 'functional linguistic analyst.' 
56 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 97. 
571!?.!,g. Toulmin discusses the idea of a 'lemma' at this point. 
This is a preliminary agreement about at least something concerning the 
point at issue. Without such an agreement argument cannot proceed. 
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are conclusions "we are seeking to establish. 1158 They are the 
controversial points of the argu~nt. Warrants are justifications for 
taking the step from the data to the claim. They are "the rules, 
principles, inference-licenses or what you wi111159 that allow for 
proceeding from that which is agreed upon to the point the advocate 
wishes to make. Thus, in its simplest, pristine form an argument flows 
from data through warrant to claim. 
All this seems simple enough, but the Michigan State philosopher 
warns of impending difficulties. It is not easy to tell the difference 
between data, warrants, and claims. 
By grmmnatical tests alone, the distinction may appear far 
from absolute, and the same English sentence may serve a 
double function; it may be uttered, that is, in one situation 
to convey a piece of information, in another to authorise a 
step in an argument, and even ;erhaps in some contexts to 
do both those things at once.6 
What is in one instance data may be a warrant in another instance and a 
claim in yet a third. Toulmin tries various linguistic manipulations to 
try to make the distinction clear such as stating "data are appealed to 
61 explicitly, warrants implicitly." He himself, however, knows that this 
sort of verbal smoke screen won't do and ultimately differentiates between 
the three members of the primary triad simply according to the functions 
they perform. 62 As in so many cases, function is the key to differentia-
tion. 
58Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 97. 
59!!2,!g,.' p. 98. 
GOibid., p. 99. 
61rbid., p. 100. 
62Ibid., p. 105 and Peter T. Manicas, "On Toulmin's Contribution to 
Logic and Argumentation," in Arthur Kruger, Counterpoint (Meuchen, N. J.: 
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 159. 
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If the primary triad were the sole constituents of Toulmin's 
layout of argument, he would have contributed little to the theory of 
argument save for the renaming of various parts of the syllogism with an 
interpretation of their functionality. But he goes on to add three 
secondary elements to his layout which he feels add clarity and 
sophistication to the analysis of argument. The first element so added 
is the qualifier, "some explicit reference to the degree of force which 
our data confer on our claim ••• 063 This allows for an argument to be 
explicitly' probabilistic and to be weighed on its strength rather than 
according to its supposed correctness or incorrectness. Next, he adds 
"conditions of exception or rebuttal. 1164 This allows for the explicit 
statement of those rare circumstances when the warrant will not apply. 
Finally, feeling that there may be some need for a general reinforcement 
for the warrant, Toulmin adds the backing. The backing is the most 
significant addition of all for it leads directly to the idea of field-
65 dependency. The standards for the backing, Toulmin claims, are 
uniquely derivative of the particular criteria of the field which 
encompasses the argument. He does not explain how a particular 
argument necessarily belongs to a particular field for judgment, and 
he is quite vague at this point about giving any examples of field-
dependent arguments. 66 However, he does explain this later in 
63 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 101. 
64Ibid -· 
65Ibid., p. 104. 
661nstead of explicit examples of field-dependent arguments, 
Toulmin insists on repetitive discussions of Peterson and Catholicism, 
Harry and Bermuda, and Anne and red hair. This shortcoming has been 
pointed out by all of Toulmin's and is, 'indeed, devilishing 
inconvenient of him. 
-116-
Human Understanding to some extent, at least, and the concept of backing 
will be picked up again under the overall analysis of field-dependency. 67 
Looking at Toulmin's layout of argument in toto, one might claim 
that it has the potential for greater clarity and sophistication in the 
analysis of argument. Unlike the syllogism which tends to be a 
prescriptive, organizational pattern, Toulmin's pattern tends to be a 
descriptive, functional approach. The attempt, at least, is for the 
explicit analysis of the functionality of each portion of an argument. 
Furthermore, Toulmin may have gained some sophistication and clarity by' 
the addition of the rebuttal, qualifier, and backing. These elements 
make manifest ideas that are submerged within the analytic syllogism. 
However, due to the ambiguity of the primary triad which is only further 
exacerbated by the addition of the s~condary triad, Toulmin's layout 
of argument also has some problems. These will be taken up as we analyze 
substantive, warrant-establishing arguments and under the discussion of 
the whole critical idea of field-dependency. 
(C) Substantive Argument 
Toulmin's couanents about substantive, warrant-establishing argument 
are even briefer but still more tantalizing than his couments concerning 
the layout of arguments. Largely his criteria for such arguments must be 
derived by contrast to the criteria for analytic, warrant-using arguments. 
67There is some analysis of backing and field-dependency in~ 
Uses of Argument but it is too sketchy to do more than intrigue the 
reader. This is why I refer to Human Understanding for these criteria 
later on. 
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This criterion would lead one to expect that substantial arguments are 
probable, informal, warrant-establishing, propositions expressed in 
non-technical vocabulary. To some extent this is indeed the case, but 
Toulmin demurs. "To begin with, the division into analytic and substantial 
arguments does not correspond at all exactly to the division into formally 
valid arguments and others. n 68 "Nor does the distinction between !m•J.Itic 
and substantial arguments correspond, either, to that between warrant• 
69 using and warrant-establishing arguments." Nor, claims the confusing 
Toulmin, can "the task of identifying analytic argument ••• be performed 
by looking for key (logical) words ••• 1170 And, "the division of 
arguments into analytic and substantial is ••• entirely distinct from 
that into conclusive (necessary) and tentative (probable) arguments. 1171 
Toulmin's one example of a substantive argument in The Uses of 
Argument concerns a scientific case of induction. 72 Other examples of 
the same sort appear in Human Understanding. 73 And, Toulmin does state 
that "induction can be used to refer to warrant-establishing arguments." 74 
However, he also claims that the difference between induction and 
68.roulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 135. 
69!1t!g. 
70Ibid., p. 136. 
71Ibid., p. 141. 
72Ibid., p. 120. 
73see any example from any of the so-called scientific disciplines 
scattered throughout Human Understanding. e.g. pp. 145-147, 232-233, etc. 
74 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 121, and Holt Spicer, "Stephen 
Toulmin's Functional Analysis of Logic and Ethics and Its Relation to 
Rhetoric," p. 149. 
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deduction is so hopelessly muddled in philosophical and logical 
75 jargon, that this distinction has become meaningless. Therefore, he 
provides a test, called the verification test, which he argues will 
supposedly separate analytic from substantive arguments every time. 
We shall therefore class an argument as analytic if, and only 
if, it satisfies that criterion--if, that is, checking the 
backing of the warrant involves ipso facto checking the truth 
or falsity of the conclusion--and we shall do this whether 
a knowledge of the full backing would in fact verify the 
conclusion or falsify it. 76 
All this terminological obsfucation is utilized to demonstrate that 
substantive, warrant-establishing arguments are those about which there 
can be some doubt. Since all arguments concerned with empirical data or 
with the decisions and actions of men are always subject to some doubt, 
all such arguments will always be substantive. The technical pyrotechnics 
are but a tour de force by Toulmin to demonstrate his logical refinement 
and the extreme paucity of those arguments that simultaneously meet all 
the tests of analyticity. 77 Almost all arguments are substantive, warrant-
establishing arguments or based upon lemmas which are substantive, warrant-
establishing arguments. This particular subject will be left at that 
to get on to Toulmin's key contribution to argumentation theory, field-
dependency, which concerns the critical method for interpreting and 
criticizing substantive, warrant-establishing arguments. 
75Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 122. 
76Ibid., p. 133. 
77.!.2.!,Q,., p. 149. 
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(D) Evaluating Argument: Fields and Intellectual Ecology 
Toulmin's key contribution to the field of argument is the idea of 
iield-dependency and its associated concepts, particularly intellectual 
ecology. This idea of a field is his middle way between subjectivity 
and a universal, timeless logic. Like most of Toulmin's conceptualiza-
tions, field-dependency is a fascinating notion. However, like the ideas 
of substantive argument and warrant-establishing argument with which it 
is so inextricably interwoven, the idea of field-dependency proves to be 
an illusive concept. When it comes to the particulars, Toulmin fails to 
develop it with much thoroughness. The basic idea is there, but detail 
is missing. 
This is particularly the case in The Uses of Argument. In this 
work, though field-dependency is probably the most critical idea 
presented, only a few lines can be found giving the reader any impression 
whatsoever as to what a field is and how it functions. Near the 
beginning Toulmin states: 
Two arguments will be said to belong to the same field when 
the data and conclusions in each of the two arguments are, 
respectively, of the same logical type; they will be said 
to come from different fields when the backing or the 
conclusions in each of the two arguments are not of the 
same logical type.78 
Toulmin then leaves it at that. He never explains how arguments are 
categorized as of "the same logical type" nor does he explain how they 
are categorized as "not of the same logical type." He does give some 
little hint later when he implies that science, ethics, law, art-
78toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 14. 
-120-
criticism, and character-judging might all be considered as fields. 79 
And he gives another hint when he states that the "force of 
conclusions ••• is the same regardless of fields; the criteria or sorts 
of ground required to justify such a conclusion vary from field to 
field."BO From this one might get the idea that fields are more-or-less 
well defined problem areas with their own standards of judgment, but how 
a problem fits into a field and how the criteria of a field uniquely 
fit the criticism of a problem is never covered by Toulmin in The Uses 
of Argument. 
Toulmin's explanation of field-dependency is somewhat better in 
Human Understanding. Here he is a bit more specific both about what a 
field is and how the criteria of a field function as a standard for 
criticism. 
Within any particular culture and epoch, men's intellectual 
enterprises do not form an unordered continuum. Instead, they 
fall into more-or-less separate and well-defined disciplines, 
each characterized by its own body of concepts, methods, and 
fundamental aims.Bl 
Like Kenneth Burke,82 Toulmin argues that these fields, disciplines, 
rational enterprises, forums of judgment, or intellectual endeavors83 
rise out of the fact that "men living in different milieus have faced 
79Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 176. 
BOibid., p. 36. 
81Toulmin, Human Understanding, p. 359. 
82Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (N. Y.: Random 
House, 1957), p. S. See also, Kenneth Burke, A Granmar of Motives 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 3-21. 
83Exactly why Toulmin keeps switching his terminology is unclear 
to the author. As far as I can discern, all these terms are synonyms. 
Field is the most prominent term in The Uses of Argument but discipline 
becomes the most prominent term in Human Understanding. 
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similar collective problems. n 84 They have organized to face these 
problems, and these collective attempts at problem-solving are called 
disciplines by Toulmin. 
A collective human enterprise takes the form of a rationally 
developing 'discipline,' in those cases where men's shared 
conunitment to a sufficiently agreed set of ideals leads to 
the development of an isolable and self-defining repertory 
of procedures; and where those procedures are open to further 
modification, so as to deal with problems arising from 
the incomplete fulfillment of those disciplinary ideals.BS 
At one time or another Toulmin mentions as examples of such disciplines: 
law, atomic physics, molecular biology, chemistry, ethics, and even a few 
86 of the more sophisticated technologies. 
This is clearer but Toulmin is not wholly candid. He leaves himself 
several outs at cruciaf points. First, as concerns the problem of intel-
lectual change of the transformation of a discipline over time, he relies 
on the idea of a discipline as a set of procedures rather than as a 
particular set of ideas. 
The intellectual content of any rational activity forms 
neither a single logical system, nor a temporal sequence 
of such systems, Rather, it is an intellectual enterprise 
whose rationality lies in the procedures governing its 
historical development and evolution.87 
84-roulmin, Human Understanding, p. 492. 
8Sibid., p. 359. 
8~ost of these examples 'come from Human Understanding. There is 
some question as to whether ethics ought to be considered a discipline 
for at one point Toulmin includes it as a "non-disciplinable field" in 
Human Understanding. p. 396. Perhaps there is a slight change of per-
spective between The Uses of Argument and Human Understanding. and this 
might account somewhat for the switch from field to discipline. 
87Toulmin, Human Understanding~ p. 85. 
I 
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It is the questions asked and the methods of approach rather than the 
particular current paradigms that define a field. A discipline does not 
consist of "a logically-structured propositional system, 1188 but of a 
developing, self-critical, set of explanatory procedures and a theoretical 
set of attitudes. 
Second, as concerns the problem of boundaries, Toulmin begs the 
question. He considers that "disciplineness" is a matter of degree. 
There are "compact" disciplines, "diffuse'' disciplines, "would-be" 
disciplines, and even some activities, including ethics and philosophy, 
which might not be disciplines at ali. 89 The compact disciplines include 
"the better-established physical and biological sciences, the more 
mature technologies, and the better-conducted judicial systems. 1190 The 
diffuse disciplines include the less well developed sciences and tech-
nologies. The would-be disciplines encompass the behavioural sciences. 
Toulmin leaves no, pl~ce at all for the humanities lest the bemuddled 
quasi-syllogism includes them in its realm. 91 Toulmin implies at some 
points that there are cultural norms or common experiences that over-
bound connnon fields, but this subject is quite unclear. 92 Generally, 
88.roulmin, Human Understanding, p. 165. 
89~., pp. 378-394. Note again that this constitutes somewhat 
of a retreat from some of the ideas of fields in The Uses of Argument. 
90ibid., p. 380. 
91Toulmin, The Uses of Arg11ltllent, pp. 131-134. 
92rbid., pp. 139-141. 
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when the subject of a field is unclear or when the methodology is murky, 
Toulmin places the field beyond the pale of rationality. Field-dependency 
seemingly applies mainly to those subject matters whose research 
problems and methodologies are rather well defined and structured, and 
Toulmin leaves the impression that it's rather inappropriate to be too 
concerned about the rest. 93 
When a field does exist, however, Toulmin does give some idea about 
how it functions to determine rationalness, and he calls this idea intel-
lectual ecology. Intellectual ecology presupposes consistency and 
coherence in an argument and proceeds from there. 
Consistency and coherence are prerequisites for rational 
assessment. A man who purports to make an assertion, but 
contradicts himself in doing so, will fail even to make 
himself understood; the question whether what he says is 
true cannot even be reached. So also, a man who puts 
forward a series of statements as an argument, but whose 
final conclusion contradicts certain of his data, fails 
to make himself understood; until his case is stated1in 
consistent, coherent form, questions about merits of the 
argument or conclusion cannot yet be asked.94 
Once an idea is stated in consistent, coherent form it enters the intel-
lectual jungle. Because men "demonstrate their rationality, not by 
ordering their concepts and beliefs in tidy formal structures, but by 
their preparedness to respond to novel situations with open minds, 1195 
93 Toulmin, Human Understanding. pp. 390-394. 
94 Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 171-172. 
95Toulmin, Human Understanding. p. vii. 
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an idea is weighted as it adapts to the demands of its environment. 
It fits an ecological, intellectual niche and if it proves fit, it 
survives. 
Fitness is determined through variation and selection just as in 
biology. 
It will count in favor of a conceptual variant, for instance 
if its adoption extends the scope of an established explanatory 
procedure to cover hitherto anomalous phenomena, if it makes 
possible the unification of explanatory tecqniques from 
hitherto separate sciences, or if it resolves inconsistencies 
between the concepts of a special science and related extra-
scientific concepts.96 
If some new idea or argument better fits the problem demands of a dis-
cipline than its predecessors, by reason of intellectual ecology, it 
ought to replace those predecessors eventually. This isn't a matter of 
one argument being right while another is wrong, but of one argument 
better fitting a problem or problems than another. Nor is this a 
permanent solution for one idea replaces another endlessly as problems 
and explanations change through time. 
Such evaluations are always a matter of comparison. The 
operative questions are never of the form, 'Is this'concept 
uniquely 'valid' or 'invalid'?, nor of the form 'Is this 
concept 'true' or 'false'? Instead, the operative form is: 
'Given the current repertory of concepts a~d available 
variants, would this particular conceptual variant improve 
our explanatory power more than its rivals? 1 97 
96Toulmin, Human Understanding.,p. 225. 
97 ' 2 !ill·, p. 2 s. 
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As can be seen, this idea applies best to the sciences, but as a matter 
of socially determined rationality it could be transferred in part to 
the social sciences and perhaps, Toulmin dissenting, even to the 
humanities. 
Within a single science or discipline, Toulmin argues that an idea 
will suwive only if it is enough like its predecessors to be recognized 
yet different enough to have some advantage. He always gives presumption 
to the status guo. This is because "the essential loci of conceptual 
change . . . still remain, not the opinions of individuals, but the 
collectively attested repertories of concepts that form ••• discip• 
lines.1198 Within a field, the standards of the most and the best still 
apply. The ideas that appeal to the majority of those recognized as 
competent workers in~ field and which appeal to those recognized as 
the most competent, the guiding lights of a field, will have a tendency 
to thrive and propogate. Toulmin gives some concrete manifestations of 
such criteria when he states that ideas forwarded by 'names' in a field, 
accepted by respected journals, and acceptably critiqued by others in a 
field are good ideas. 99 Like the ideas of a debate topic which develop 
over time and through practice, the ideas of a discipline develop 
through trial and error and the current ideas and procedures are con-
sidered rational as they are the collective artifacts of the successes 
and failures of the past. They have been functionally tested in the 
intellectual jungle with whose fierceness not even nature can compete. 
98.roulmin, Human Understanding, p. 289. 
99Ibid -· 
-126-
Their rationality lies in the fact that they have withstood the ultimate 
test, the test of time. 
Toulmin's Interpreters and Evaluators: 
Friends and Fees 
The analysis of this chapter would not be complete without extensive 
cotmnents on Toulmin's interpreters and critics. This is especially the 
case since what has often passed as Toulmin's "revolution in logic"lOO 
has not been anything he proposed but someone else's extended inter-
pretation of his ideas. 101 In pursuit of this subject, the organization~ 
al schemata will be borrowed from Albert L. Lewis who has divided 
Toulmin's friends and foes into the camp of the logicians and the camp 
~f the rhetoricians. Concerning the two, Lewis remarks that "logicians 
(have) either made no comment or responded unfavorably to • • • 11 Toulmin' s 
ideas in general, while "rhetoricians (have) ••• wrestled with (his) 
102 concepts, then widely accepted them." The analysis will begin with 
the angered protestations of the logicians then proceed to the open arms 
welcome of the rhetoricians. 
lOOTouimin states that his aims are 'radical' in The Uses ofi 
Argument p. vii. This has been picked up and turned into the phrase "the 
proposed revolution in logic" which is a popular cathall for all of 
Toulmin's notions. This same title applies also to the whole ordinary 
language movement. 
lOlThis especially applies to the extensions 
in the second portion of this part of the chapter. 
extensions are far more minor. 
of the rhetoricians 
The logicians' 
102Lewis, "Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal," 48. 
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A plethora of logicians have protested Toulmin' s "revolution 
in logic." Rather than reviewing all their arguments, four representative 
figures will be utilized: Joseph L. Cowan,lOJ J.C. Cooley, 104 Hector 
Castaneda, 105 and Peter T. Manicas. 106 Each approaches Toulmin's works 
from a slightly different perspective, and each picks relatively distinct 
avenues of attack. All coalesce in their general distaste for the 
Toulmin model, but they tend to give Toulmin his due as a perceptive--
if in their view, incorrect--critic. 
Joseph Cowan contends that Toulmin attacks "exactly that part of 
traditional logic which should be retained, the basic concepts and forms, 
and retains exactly that part which should be rejected, 11107 'fhe mis-
interpretations of those concepts and forms. Cowan maintains that the 
traditional concepts, the syllogism, form, validity, and necessary 
conclusions, "if properly understood and applied, are highly useful 
tools for the criticism of actual discourse and the conduct of actual 
inquiry. 11108 However, he denies this view just a few paragraphs later. 
103 Joseph L. Cowan, "The Uses of Argument••An Apology for Logic," 
~' LXXIII (Jan., 1964), 27-45. 
104 J. C. Cooley1, "On Mr. Toulmin' s Revolution in Logic," Journal 
of Philosophy, LVI (March 26, 1959), 259-319. 
105u. N. Castaneda, "On the Proposed Revolution in Logic," 
Philosophy of Science, XXVII (July, 1960), 279-292. 
106Pe ter T. Manii.cas, "On Toulmin' s Contribution to Logic and 
Argumentation," in Kruger, Counterpoint. 
l07cowan, "The Uses of Argument--An Apology for Logic," 28. 
lOSibid., 27. 
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Cowan argues the idea of an analytic, valid argument as the product of 
form. He sees argument as an "organizational structure11109 as opposed 
to a mechanism for interpretation and analysis. The purpose of an 
argument is not to justify but to organize propositions. Ultimately, 
these propositions are true in a Platonic sense on the basis of form 
or self-evidence simply because "we insist ••• that they be 
considered true come what may. 11 llO Ideas are articles of faith, and 
argument allows for the categorical organization of concepts into 
structures so that man can understand the universe. As to where the 
I 
ideas come from and how categories are formed, Cowan is remiss or 
considers that to be the subject matter of epistemology and philosophy 
and of no concern to argument and logic.Ill 
Another logician, J.C. Cooley, asserts that Toulmin's ideas are 
not new at all: 
Only a few years ago P. F. Strawson put forward a program for 
the revision of formal logic which, in effect, divided it into 
two subjects, one concerned with artificial language systems, 
the other with ordinary discourse. His own interests were 
focused on the l~ter and his thesis was that philosophers 
had been seriously misled ••• in supposing that it would 
be replaced by the more mathematically oriented discipline.112 
109cowan, nThe Uses of Argument--An Apology for Logic," 28. 
llOibid., p. 34. 
lllThis matter of the prior establishment of ideas and categories 
is one of the very problems that Toulmin attempts to get at. Cowan 
misses the point here but proceeds with his criticism nonetheless. 
112 J. C, Cooley, 0 0n Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," 297. 
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Cooley disdains Toulmin's cavalier dismissal of those whose work has 
gone before him, 113 and finds Toulmin' s perspective "interesting'· but 
discovers nothing to which conventional logic could not be accommodated. 
He argues that what Toulmin has, in fact, done is nothing more nor less 
than shifted the burden of argument into the secondary triad of his lay-
out which makes it rather like two syllogisms in a chain rather than any 
new innovation. 114 What Mr. Cooley does not understand in his arguments 
concerning the backing is that Toulmin operates from a timebound rather 
than a timeless framework. Checking the backing, involves checking a 
relative truth for the moment concept and is not equivalent to two 
hi d 11 . 115 cane sy ogisms. It is understandable that Cooley should reach 
such a conclusion, however, for he freely admits that Toulmin's idea of 
field-dependency is thoroughly ambiguous to him and that, he himself 
at least, finds great difficulty in differentiating between warrants, 
conclusions, and backing in the first place. 116 As we have earlier 
argued, Toulmin is certainly at fault here, but Cooley's extension of 
this fault to dealing with "the layout of arguments" as two chained 
syllogisms with bhe emphasis on the second in the set seems unfair. 
113J. c. Cooley, "On Mr. Toulmin's Revolution in Logic," 297. 
Most logicians are rather angered at Toulmin for claiming extensive 
credit for himself for innovations and attacks that othess before him 
have actually accomplished. 
114Ibid., 303. 
115Ibid. Refer back to the "layout of arguments" for Toulmin's 
distinction for the backing vis-aivis this interpretive error. 
116Ibid., 311. 
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Hector Neri Castenada, perhaps the sharpest critic of The Uses of 
Argument, claims that Toulmin proves noae of his two basic theses or five 
basic charges against traditional logic. 117 Castenada further argues 
that Toulmin's own new logic "is at best only vaguely hinted at and that 
his suggestions are positively obscure or mistaken. 11118 He too forwards 
the idea that the various elements of Toulmin's system are most difficult 
to differentiate from one another, and that one can't tell the 
significance of the field-dependent backing without being able to dis-
tinguish it from the other elements of an argument. He then reproves 
Toulmin for failing to take note of the enth:ymeme, of advances in the 
theory of induction, or of informal logical theory of any sort. 119 
Castenada states that logic has recognized its problems and has made 
material progress in the last one hundred years. Logicians do not 
exclusively support the ideal of the analytic syllogism. Many are 
I 
working with induction theory, deontic logic, or with other types of 
modal syllogisms. 120 ,Castenada chastises Toulmin for compounding the 
division between formal logic and philosophy and rhetoric and insists 
that for progress to be made in all fields, these subjects ought to 
"walk together11121 again. 
117 H. N. Castaneda, "On the Proposed Revolution in Logic," 279. 
Castaneda goes into detail on both theses and on each of the five 
charges, which are the five crucial distinctions between analytic and 
substantive argument which Toulmin draws and which have been previously 
discussed. 
118Ibid. 




Peter T. Manicas, a logician writing for rhetoricians, grants 
Toulmin his problem but not his solution • 
• • • I suspect that (Toulmin's distaste for formal logic) stems 
from his absolutely correct observations that the larger class 
of arguments with which we are concerned in ordinary life are 
simply not deductions subject to the standards of formal 
validity. But indeed, if this is his main objection, then the 
solution is not to rename validity to cover correct non-
deductive arguments, but to look more carefully into those 
field-dependent features of correct non-deductive arguments 
which make them correct.122 
Manicas admits that the deductive standards for analytic argument cover 
only a narrow range of all arguments, but he doesn't see Toulmin's 
model or layout as a viable substitute. In fact, he argues that the 
model seems to contradict the main thrust of Toulmin's argument as it 
hints at situational indeterminateness and permanence. The layout of 
arguments chapter seemingly contradicts the thrust of the rest of the 
argument of The Uses of Argument. 123 Manicas sununarizes with an 
appropos,statement: "Toulmin seems to me to be mistaken in the way in 
which he wishes to bring logic into practice, but he is clearly right in 
insisting that logic must be brought into practice. 11124 
To review, logicians argue that Toulmin: (1) attacks a false 
logic when he attacks the analytic syllogism forgetting the enthymeme 
and new logics of various sorts, (2) fails to clearly distinguish 





between the various elements of his own model, (3) seems extremely 
ambiguous as regards to the problem of field-dependency, (4) fails to 
recognize the function of logic as an organizational schemata rather 
than as a justifactory system, and (5) probably promotes a model which 
contradicts some of his own philosophic presuppositions concerning the 
nature of argument. It is only natural that those who see their pro-
fession assaulted with the charge of irrelevance should react with 
some vigor, relevance having the financial overtones that it does these 
days. Thus, it is little wonder that the logicians have rallied to 
battle against Toulmin. And, indeed, they have pointed to several 
legitimate problem areas in Toulmin's efforts. However, as Manicas admits, 
logicians do have a problem with regard to the majority of everyday 
arguments, and Toulmin does point to some ways out of this difficulty 
even if he has failed to come up with 11the way" out of the problem. 
Any_ number of rhetoricians have adopted some part of the Toulmin 
system or model or made some intended or unintended extension upon that 
system. The purpose of this chapter is noc to review the work of all 
these men but to present, analyze, and criticize a few of the key 
argumentative notions of Stephen Toulmin. Therefore, as with the 
logicians, a few representative rhetoricians will be noted for a 
sampling of their views. Because of their relative prominence, the 
author has chosen the work of Brockriede and Ehninger, 125 James McCroskey, 126 
125Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpre-
tation and Application," and Decision by Debate. 
126James McCroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic Course," and !B, 
Introduction to Rhetorical Communication. 
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and Windes and Hastingsl27 for summary review. In each case it will 
be argued that these gen~lemen have in some way extended Toulmin to 
their own purposes, sometimes contributing interesting ideas to rhetoric 
and to argumentation theory but sometimes distorting Toulmin's ideas. 
Brockriede and Ehninger sing Toulmin's praises, claiming that he 
"has provided a structural model which promises to be of greater use in 
laying out rhetorical argument for dissection and testing than the 
methods of traditional logic. 11128 Specifically, they claim the Toulmin 
model is superior to the traditional syllogism129 for seven reasons: 
1. Whereas traditional logic is characteristically concerned 
with warrant-using arguments (i.e. arguments in which the 
validity of the assumption underlying the inference "leap" 
is uncontested), Toulmin's model specifically provides for 
warrant-establishing arguments (i.e., arguments in which the 
validity of the assumption underlying the inference must be 
established--through backing--as part of the proof pattern 
itself). 
2. Whereas traditional logic, based as it is upon the general 
principle of implication, always treats proof more or less as 
a matter of classification or compartmentalization, Toulmin's 
analysis stresses the inferential and relational nature of 
argument, providing a context within which all factors--both 
formal and material--bearing upon a disputed claim may be 
organized into a series of discrete steps. 
3. Whereas in traditional logic arguments are specifically 
designed to produce universal propositions, Toulmin's second triad 
of backing, rebuttal, and qualifier provide, within the framework 
of his basic structural model, for the establishment of claims 
which are no more than probable. The model directs attention to 
the ways in which each of these additional elements may operate 
to limit or condition a claim. 
127Russell Windes and Arthur Hastings, Argumentation and 
Advocacy (N. Y.: Random House, 1965). 
128nrockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpreta-
tion and Application," 47. 
129Brockriede and Ehninger compare Toulmin to the traditional 
syllogism but not to the enthymeme. They mention the epicheirema but 
also fail to make a comparison there. Intentionally or unintentionally, 
they compare T'oulmin to a very narrow conceptualization of what 
constitutes logic. 
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4. Whereas traditional logic, with its governing principles 
of implication, necessarily results in an essentially static 
conception of argument, Toulmin by emphasizing movement 
from data, through warrant, to claim produces a conception 
of argument as dynamic ••• 
5. Whereas the modes based on the traditional analysis--
enthymeme, example, and the like--often suppress a step in 
proof, Toulmin's model lays an argument out in such a way 
that each step may be examined critically. 
6. Whereas in the traditional analysis the division of argu-
ments into premises and conclusions ••• often tends to 
obscure deficiencies in proof, Toulmin's model assigns each 
part of an argument, a specific geographical or spatial 
position in relation to the others, thus rendering it more 
likely that weak points will be detected. 
7. Whereas traditional logic is imperfectly equipped to deal 
with the problem of material validity, Toulmin makes such 
validity an integral part of his system, indicating clearly 
the role which factual elements play in producing acceptable 
claims.130 
Basically, these seven reasons can be reduced to the claims that 
Toulmin is clearer and more sophisticated with his model than is the 
traditional analytic syllogism. Brockriede and Ehninger may just be a 
bit effusive about the clarity of the Toulmin system but objections 
at this point in their argument would be simple nit-picking. 
However, they then present the "application" portion of their 
position and extend upon Toulmin to such a degree that he well might 
not recognize his own system at the end. Brockriede and Ehninger employ 
their cookie-cutter to force Toulmin's system into a traditional debate 
text format based on Aristotle. 131 They apply Toulmin's layout 
130Brockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpreta-
tion and Application," 46-47. 
131.!e.!!:!., 48-51. 
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successively to causal arguments, analogies, generalizations, and even 
to motivational analyses. Backing loses all semblance of field-
dependency. The layout system,becomes generalized and simplified to 
apply to all arguments for all audiences. Brockriede and Ehninger admit 
that they have attempted to reduce all types of argument "to a single 
invariant pattern. 11132 It almost seems as if they have failed to read 
the rest of Toulmin's The Uses of Argument and have concentrated their 
attention solely on chapter three. The Americanization of Toulmin via 
Brockriede and Ehninger smacks of timelessness and universality even 
in its particularity. 133 It is an interesting interpretation but as 
for its application, Toulmin would be appalled. 
Mccroskey utilizes the Toulmin model almost solely for the 
purpose of audience analysis. 134 He claims that the Toulmin system 
brings the processes of inventl.on and disposition together once again 
through auiience analysis. 
Using the approach to investion and audience analysis based on 
the Toulmin construct should certainly aid any student batattain 
increased ability to analyze and adapt to audiences. If the 
student speaker can learn to evaluate his resources by 
beginning with his claim and~ proceeding to find the data 
and warrant needed to establish that claim with his particular 
audience, he will determine what he needs to know about that 
audience. 135 
132srockriede and Ehninger, "Toulmin on Argument: An Interpreta-
tion and Application," 52. 
l33Ibid., 48-51. 
13~cCroskey applies the Toulmin model to analysis and organization 
of arguments too but his main use is for audience analysis. 
135Mccroskey, "Toulmin and the Basic Course," 96. 
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McCroskey's is a "psychological model of argument. 11136 He too "fits" 
the Toulmin schemata to traditional divisions of argument, 137 but his 
chief concern is that "the warrant • • • be believed by the audience." l38 
This, too, is a geneFaltzation and extension upon the Toulmin system 
which, while it might fit rhetoric, doesn't necessarily represent 
Toulmin's thought. Toulmin constructed his model to be emphatically 
field-dependent. He did not want his warrants universalized but 
particularized to fields through backing. Mccroskey insists on 
retreating to the more generalized form to apply to the diversified 
audience rather than the particular audience. Leaving out the second 
triad of Toulmin's system, Mccroskey makes the first triad a psychol~gical 
syllogism. 139 In taking this step, Mccroskey negates the clarification 
and sophistication of the Toulmin model and ignores the critical 
contribution of Toulmin, the idea of field-dependency. 
Windes and Hastings absorb the Toulmin model and treat it as their 
own. 140 This makes their analysis relatively uninteresting in comparison 
with the original with one exception. Windes and Hastings declare that 
warrants "will always consist of criteria11141 of various sorts. Many 
l3~cCroskey, An Introduction to Rhetorical Communication, p. 77. 
137~., 78-81. 
138tbid., p. 78. 
139!J?!g. , p. 77 • 
140windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy. 
141Ibid., p. 164. 
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times these criteria will consist of various value hierarchies "grounded 
in the immediate field of the argument. 11142 These hierarchies will 
interlock and averlap, sometimes consistently, sometimes inconsistently, 
so that any single issue may be viewed from the vantage point of more 
than one set of values or from more than one field. Windes and Hastings 
also point to some criteria which seem to be relatively independent of 
any single field which they call cultural or social values. This 
addition bo the Toulmin system simultaneously points to a potential 
strength for rhetorical analysis and to a key weakness in Toulmin's 
system as presented by Toulmin. Viewing argument from different fields 
could lead to a more sophisticated analysis than viewing argument from 
one perspective only. However, Toulmin never declares himself vis-a-vis 
arguments that cross fields. He seems to imply that such is an 
impossibility with each argument in its field and each field with its 
arguments. However, it is relatively easy to see how one subject, e.g. 
birth control, could be viewed from a medical perspective, a religious 
perspective, etc., with differing criteria for evaluation of the same 
argument in each instance. Windes and Hastings add this fascinating 
conception to the Toulmin system, pointing out its interesting 
possibilities but failing to point out the critical problem it might 
create for Toulmin's sophisticated but still more simple analysis. 143 
142windes and Hastings, Argumentation and Advocacy. p. 165. 
143others have pointed out that if Toulmin can extend the 
syllogism, as the traditional analytic pattern for argument, from three 
to six elements why can't one just go on to seven or eight elements 
or even more. Perhaps some of these elements could account for cultural 
variants above and beyond field dependent elements or for multiple 
field backing etc. 
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Rhetoricians have extended Toulmin beyond the basic ideas he 
himself presents. They have turned to him for an "audience-centered, 
situational, field-dependent" 144 rhetorical logic, and have found their 
particular variants in his works whether they exist there or not. 
Brockriede and Ehninger Americanize Toulmin by forcing him into a 
Neo-Aristotelian rather timeless and universalized model of argument. 
Mccroskey makes Toulmin generally psychological through his interpreta-
tion of Toulmin on Audience analysis. Windes and Hastings extend 
Toulmin to supra-disciplinary criteria and to cross-disciplinary 
problems. All these innovations may be helpful to rhetoric, but there 
is serious doubt as to whether or not Toulmin would sanction them. 
Toulmin: Retrospect and Prospect 
Toulmin presents an even more acute analysis of the problem with 
analytic argument than did Perelman. He shows the ultimate degree to 
which the misinterpretation of Aristotle can lead the formal logician. 
He proves, rather conclusively, that most practical, everyday arguments 
just can't be properly laid out and analyzed using the analytic syllogism. 
It is also pretty clear that arguments are more complicated than the 
syllogism would.lead one to believe and that some new standards are 
needed for the evaluation of substantive argument. 
1441.ewis, "Stephen Toulmin: A Reappraisal," 53. 
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Toulmin approaches but does not complete a solution to the problems 
he presents. His layout of argument potentially can clarify the 
functional aspects of the hidden elements of a proposition. However, 
Toulmin's lack of clarity in the differentiation between warrant, 
backing, and data make it difficult to apply his model. His ideas 
concerning field dependency and intellectual ecology potentially estab-
lish a new set of criteria for the evaluation of argument. However, 
once again, his lack of specificity makes for some difficulties in 
applying these standards. This is especially the case with those 
fields Toulmin bans from strict rationality: the behavioral sciences 
as would;be disciplines, the humanities as non-disciplines, and ethics 
and philosophy as sort of supra-disciplines. 
Toulmin has been viciously attacked by logicians as unfair and 
inflexible, as unaware of the new logics, and as inconsistent in his own 
speculations. On the other hand, he has been welcomed by rhetoricians 
seeking a situation, audience and context bound new logic. They have 
even extended Toulmin beyond his own propositions to facilitate their 
rhetorical interpretations. Perhpps something can be taken from both of 
these groups for our surmnary in the next chapter. From the logicians 
one can look for the new logics and practical applications that Toulmin 
supposedly missed. From the rhetoricians, one can take the idea of 
extending apon Toulmin's ideas to come up with an even more complex 
and sophisticated, and maybe more accurate, model of argument and tools 
for its interpretation. 
CHAPTER V 
VISIONS FOR A NEW ARGUMENT 
The argument which will follow concludes not simply that the 
ordinary sense of rationality ought to be called in1o question 
but that it ought to be discarded as unsupportable • 
• • • our common stock of words embodies all the distinctions 
men have found worth drawing and the connections they have 
found worth making in the lifetimes of many generations; 
these surely are likely to be more numerous, more sound, since 
they have stood up to the long test of the survival of the 
fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and 
reasonably practical matters, than any that you or I are likely 
to think up in our armchairs of an afternoon ••• 2 
Philosophy is not an esoteric profession. It is irmninent in 
any conversation which resorts to definitions and analysis 
instead of to experience; it is incumbent upon any mind which 
enters into discourse to understand rather than to.believe. 
Philosophy, it seems to me, is nothing more or less than 
dialectic. It is a method and an intellectual attitude, not 
special subject-matter or a system.3 
In recent years many writers have attacked the formal systems 
of argument which have been relied upon by rhetoricians in 
the past. However, no fully adequate countertheories seem 
to have emerged. Symbolic i~teraction theory would seem to 
strongly support any move against objectively imposed formal 
systems of argument. 4 
1Robert Scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," Speech 
Teacher, XVII (March, 1968), 135. 
2J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: The Clarendon 
Press, 1961), p. 130. 
3Mortimer Adler, Dialectic (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927), 
p. vi. 
4Jackson Harrell, "Symbolic Interaction as the Basis for Rhetorical 




The actual operation of the mental processes, then, seems to 
bear little relation to abstract logical form. From the stand-
point of the logic fallacy of traditional rhetoric, the only 
question that remains is whether the 'non-logical' form of 
human thought can be considered to be rational. And here, 
clearly, it would seem, the reasoning pattern employed by 
ordinary men should be called rational. 5 
An Introduction of Purpose 
Chapter one of this study posed two questions, "What constitutes 
a rational argument and therefore an argument worthy of having an effect 
on a decision?" and "How ought one to go about evaluating rational 
argument?116 Thus far we have posited a reinterpretation of the 
Aristotelian tradition and analyses of two new theories of argument--
as introduced by Chaim Perelman and Stephen Toulmin. The three previous 
chapters suggest many partial answers to the two questions posed by 
this study. This chapter suggests additional answers from tangential 
studies having a direct bearing on the theory of argumentation. 
Ordinary language philosophers, dialecticians, symbolic inter-
actionists, and psycho-logicians have been working on theories directly 
related to the study of argument for many years. Their theoretical 
contributions buttress, supplement, and, at times, extend the theories 
of Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin. This chapter will highlight the 
theories of ordinary language, dialectic, symbolic interaction, and 
psychologic as alternatives to the more traditional argumentation studies. 
Though there is bound to be some conceptual slippage involved in any 
such review, it is hoped that natural language philosophy, dialectic, 
5Jesse Delia, "The Logical Fallacy, Cognitive Theory, and the 
En thymeme : A Search for the Foundations of Reasoned Dis course," O .J. S , • 
LVI (April, 1970), 141-142. 
6see chapter one, page Is. 
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symbolic interaction, and psychologic can be directly related to the 
study of argumentation, to logic, and to the idea of the rational. This 
chapter attempts a synthesis of key theories related to argument. In a 
way, this chapter will be composed of "ballons d'essai, trial balloons 
designed to draw the fire117 but also the consideration, furtherance, 
and improvement of others. 
Structurally, this chapter will begin with a final consideration 
of the problem of logic and rationality as related to argument. Second, 
it will proceed to a synthetic focused review in turn of ordinary 
language, dialectic, symbolic interaction, and psychologic. Finally, 
there will be a summary of the various visions for a new argument as 
seen through the eyes of Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin and as 
tentatively explored in the four interrelated sets of theories concerned 
with argument. 
Toward an Expanded Vision of the Rational 
The problem in contemporary argumentation theory is that there is 
a fundamental dispute between those who maintain that the propositions 
of formal logic are the substance of reasoned discourse and, further, 
., 
that such logic can be applied as the basic evaluative rubric for 
rhetoric, and those who argue that the standards of formal logic cannot 
and should not be applied to "everyday" "marketplace" argumentation. 
This problem was the focus of considerable discussion in the intro-
7stephen Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1958), p. 1. 
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ductory remarks in chapter one and has played a fundamental role in 
each of the succeeding chapters. A reinterpretation of the Aristotelian 
tradition is not needed if Aristotle is to be viewed solely as the 
father of the analytic, "that syllogistic gentleman with a category for 
every emergency. 118 Ch. Perelman's assault on a narrowed vision of 
rationality is superflous if argument can be equated with demonstration. 
And, finally, Toulmin's quest for the foundations of substantive 
discourse is unnecessary if the foundations are to be found in the rules 
for the syllogism. 
However, the problem is so pervasive and has such ancient 
standing that one final review of its ramifications seems essential. A 
final review also seems necessary because of the incredible conceptual 
slippage manifested on both sides in the controversy and because the 
position this writer is maintaining has, until recently, been so 
obviously and distinctly the minority view. This inquiry will start 
with a synthesis of the argumentation problem as already manifested in 
the interpretations of Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin and proceed to 
a clarification of the problem through consideration of a recent running 
argument in the journals between Hugh Petrie and Glenn Mills, represent-
ing the traditionalists, and David Shepard and Mortenson and Anderson, 
directly, and Robert Scott and Jesse Delia, indirectly, representing 
various expanded visions of the rational. 
8Lawrence Rosefield, Aristotle and Information Theory (The Hague, 
Netherlands: Mouten & Co., Printers, 1971), p. 23. 
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The traditional Aristotle is the father of science, narrowly 
conceived, and the techniques of demonstration. Apodeixsis, or "real 
proof," proceeds, in this view, from univocal concepts by way of cause, 
h2..ti, and dioti, to demonstration or to Truth. Arguments are correct or 
incorrect, valid or invalid according to their form; i.e. the rules of 
syllogistic. The reinterpreted Aristotle applies this analysis only to 
pure theory or to the empirical world. In the realm of decision and 
action or of values, in the human realm, natural, informal language is 
used in dialectic and rhetoric for endoxa or phronesis. Arguments are 
strong or weak, probable or improbable, as determined by their audiences, 
the time, and the circumstances. Perelman blasts the analytic, logical 
positivists' view of rationality which proceeds from self-evident truths 
through deduction via formal logic, a priori, to Truth. He prefers a 
rhetoric or dialectic based on a jurisprudential model which is weighed 
according to its presence for various types of audience and according 
to an abstract ideal of justice. Toulmin, too, opposes logical 
positivism and analytic philosophy. He forwards the idea that the 
analytic paradigm based on· field-independent, universal, timeless, 
prescriptive forms is a false ideal. He supports an analysis of 
ordinary, everyday argument which looks for field-dependent warrants. 
He evaluates arguments functionally through the concept of intellectual 
ecology which basically maintains that those argument surviving the 
jungles of the intellectual marketplace are basically "good," that is 
to say, sound arguments. 
Of course, it has become so common to call a good argument a valid 
argument, a.bad argument irrational, an ambiguous argument illogical, 
an expedient argument a necessary argument, ad infinitum, that there is 
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considerable conceptual slippage on both sides of the argumentation 
problem and a considerable amount of seeming paradox. Delia a'dmits 
that "the logic fallacy" afflicts even those who would fight against it 
as they confuse even themselves when using rational, logical, and valid 
in senses different from the traditional. 9 Scott, in "A Fresh Attitude 
Toward Rationalism," admits to a seeming paradox in that "the degree to 
which an attempt to build a rational case against rationalism is 
successful, to that degree the case refutes itself. 1110 On the other 
side, Hugh Petrie contends that rhetorical arguments can indeed be put 
into a logical framework. To deny this, he argues, would be preposterous 
because "it would seem to be a general rule that concepts denying that 
something meets certain standards presupposes the possibility of meeting 
those standards or else one would not know what it means to fail to 
meet those standards."ll 
Rather than bogging down in further examples of conceptual 
slippage, however, it should be more productive to turn to the attacks 
on logic as applied to rhetoric from David Shepard, 12 Mortenson and 
9oelia, "The Logic Fallacy," 141-142. 
10scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," 137. 
11Hugh G. Petrie, "Does Logic Have Any Relevance to Argumentation?," 
JAFA, VI (Spring, 1969), 59. 
12oavid W. Shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," Western 
Speech, XXX (Fall, 1966), 241-247 and "The Role of Logic?," Q.J.s., 
LV (Oct., 1969), 310-312. 
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Anderson, 13 Robert Scott,14 and Jesse Delia15 and to the defense as 
16 supplied b~ Glenn Mills and Hugh Petrie. Let the reader beware as he 
reads this section that different operational interpretations of logic, 
rhetoric, argument, valid, and rational may be employed by the different 
writers. Indeed, the reader should note that these very variations are 
at the heart of the argumentation problem. 
Scott provides some of the strategic background to the argumenta-
tion problem. In two articles in 1967 and 1968, he concentrates on the 
difficulties implicit in the theory of man considered as a "rational" 
animal as related to "logic" as the key persuasive or argumentative 
I 
device. Scott argues that the stress on rationality and upon logic 
which supposedly appeals to that rationality has been a false speech 
communication idol. 17 First, man is not totally "rational" in an 
objective, automatonic fashion. This has always been known, but the 
assaults of the Freudians and the behaviorists should make it even more 
manifestly clear. 18 Second, Godel's Therem in mathematics has proven 
that a self-consistent and inclusive system of axioms is a logical 
impossibility. 19 Therefore, if "rationality" were to be defined as 
13 . Ray Lynn Anderson and C. David Mortenson, "The Limits of Logic," 
J.M.!, VII (Spring, 1970), 71-78 and "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation," 
Q.J.S., LIII (April, 1967), 143-151. 
14aobert Scott, "A Fresh Attitude Toward Rationalism," 134-139 and 
"On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," Central States Speech Journal, XVIII 
(Feb., 1967), 9-17. 
15 Delia, "The Logic Fallacy," 140-148. 
16Glen E. Mills and Hugh G. Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," 
O.J.S., LIV (Octo., 1968), 260-267 and Hugh G. Petrie, "Does Logic Have 
Any Relevance to Argumentation?," 55-60. 




self-consistent and inclusive human action modeled after say, geometry, 
that idol has now been attacked and crushed. Besides, Scott contends 
the consequences of clinging to the rational man theory were never as 
pleasant as they were made out to be. First, "accepting the notion that 
truth exists, may be known, and communicated leads logically to the 
position that there should be only two modes of discourse; a neutral 
presenting of data among equals and a persuasive leading of inferiors by 
the capable. 1120 Second, argument has no epistemological implications 
if, in analytic fashion, it merely ties something known to something 
else which is also known. No conclusions which "are somehow fresh, new, 
unknown or unaccepted1121 can be derived from such a system. The inevit-
able consequence of equating rationality with formal logic, according to 
Scott, is a diminution of choice, the consequent rise of determinism, 
and the decline of democracy. Thus, Scott prefers the relative 
ambiguity of argument to the dull surety of logic. 22 
Delia also chooses to assault the intimate link between 
rationality, logic, and argument, at least as he thinks it has been 
traditionally defined and interpreted. Delia calls the assumption that 
the laws of logical form correspond to the operation of the thinking or 
20scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," 10. 
21Ibid., 11. 
22Ibid This fits Scott's view that argument must do something 
substant'Iw":" 0 An analytic argument, by definition, doesn't do anything 
substantive but merely connects one known to another. Scott states 
that such verbal shifting may not be argument at all. 
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or reasoning processes "the logic fallacy, 1123 which he describes thus: 
Now if the rules of logical form correspond with the operation 
of the mental processes and if the form of the discourse 
corresponds with the rules of logical form, 'reasoned discourse' 
results and 'reason' is conveyed directly to the mind of the 
listener. Since form conveys reason directly to the mind of 
the receiver, an argument cogently laid down according to the 
rules of logical form inherently has the power to direct the 
human cognitive process, i.e., to persuade. The effectiveness 
of the reasoned argument is thus dependent on the form in 
which it is expressed--the nearer it comes to meeting the 
rules of logic, the more persuasive it will be. 24 
Delia himself refused to equate "rational" with "logical. n 25 The very 
existence of fallacies would seem to deny this equation. Contemporary 
philosophers will not accept that deductive logic is the essence of 
rationality. More importantly, to Delia's mind, contemporary empirical 
investigations by psychologists also refute the point. ''Much of human 
reasoning is supported by a kind of thematic process rather than by an 
abstract logic. 1126 Thus, Delia suggests further examination of human 
- . 
cognitive organization in relation to argumentation in substitution for 
I 
learning about the abstraction of formal logic. 
While Scott and Delia remain more on a strategic, philosophic 
plane, Shepard to some extent, and Mortenson and Anderson, to an even 
greater extent, make actual tactical attacks on the "logical-positivistic-
rationalistic-traditional argumentation theory. 11 Their objections' are 
23Delia, "The Logic Fallacy," 141. 
24Ibid., 140-141. 
25Ibid., 141. 
26Jerome s. Bruner, Jacqueline J. Goodnow, and George A. Austin, 
A Study of Thinking (New York, 1956), p~ 104. Quoted in Delia, "The 
Logic Fallacy," 141. 
-149-
very similar to those of Toulmin already reviewed, 27 and, in fact, to 
some extent were inspired by The Uses of Argument. Their objections 
are also quite similar to one another but for practical purposes we 
will proceed first to Shepard's earlier forays,.then to the more 
detailed thrusts of Scott's students, Mortenson and Anderson. 28 
Shepard notes two gaps between formal philosophers and rhetoricians. 
The first concerns the nature of a proposition. Shepard contends that 
for the logically inclined philosopher: 
A logical proposition has these characteristics; it is a 
declarative sentence; the verb is tenseless; the pattern is 
noun+ linking verb+ predicate nominative; it is true or 
false by virtue of its form; the truth or falsity is independent 
of any state of affairs; it is true or false for all possible 
worlds; it is trivial, tautological, and imparts no factual 
information; and the relation between the subject and the 
predicate is definitiona1.29 
Obviously, propositions of value and policy are precluded from this 
definition. Also precluded is the concern of the college debater for 
material as well as for formal validity. As Shepard puts it " ••• 
except in an imprecise sense, one cannot speak of a debate as being 
logical when the case is organized around a resolution, a subjective, 
which is neither true nor false but advisable or inadvisable. 1130 
27chapter IV of this study, pp. 103-112. 
2Brt is noteworthy that both Mortenson and Anderson were at 
Minnesota working on their doctorates at the same time Scott was 
interested in logical themes and was working on his two articles. 
29shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," 243. 
30.!.!?ig., 244. 
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The second gap Shepard identifies concerns different orientations 
between the two positions with regard to probability. The logical phil-
osopher tends toward a mathematical calculation of the odds whereas the 
rhetorician is concerned with probability as a basis for choice. 31 The 
calculating of odds for a roll of the dice is very different from the 
contemplating of various choices for human action in Shepard's mind. 
Therefore, he reconmends a step away from formal logic and an approach 
to ethical and emotional proof. 
Mortenson and Anderson would agree with each of Shepard's 
contentions. They themselves characterize formal logic using Toulmin's 
terminology as "context-invariant1132 argument. They warn that: 
The critic should remember that the invariant connectives 
of formal logic are workable only under certain conditions. 
Logics utilizing context-invariant connectives are capable 
of elucidating only the relationships inherent within those 
deductive arguments containing premises and conclusions that 
are reducible to true or false claims. This means, then, 
that arguments containing evaluative premises as well as 
non-analytic (i.e. inductive) arguments are be~nd the scope 
of logics using context-invariant connectives. 3 
Specifically, they point to the impossibility of "translating" rhetorical 
argument into formally logical argument. 
The,point here is simply that the critic may be able to 
supply equivalent connectives from the syllogistic only 
when arguments exhibit a minimum of linguistic sophistication. 
The belief that one can cast the relations of less tractable 
arguments into context-free form without distortion denies the 
fact that the connective terms in marketplac~ discourse derive 
31shepard, "Rhetoric and Formal Argument," 245-246. 




their meaning, and thus their powers of inference, from the 
phrases, sentences, and paragraphs in which they function. 
Ultimately, it is incorrect to hold that the terms of connection 
in conventional discourse are content-free and topic neutral. 34 
Arguments based on "moral imperatives, metaphors, similes, evaluative 
claims, etc." 35 are nqt within the province of a metchanistic evaluation 
via formal logic. Rather, "everyday marketplace" arguments must evolve 
and bee,,aluated via content-variant, contextual criteria. According to 
Mortenson and Anderson, most arguments are rational but within the 
province of rhetoric which must by no means be equated with the province 
of logic. The borders of the two overlap but the subject matter of one 
is often not the subject matter of the other. 
Mills and Petrie, in defense of the interlocking concepts of 
argument, rhetoric, logic, validity, and rationality, naturally disagree 
with the conclusions of Scott, Delia, Shepard, and Mortenson and 
Anderson. Indeed, Mills and Petrie are appalled by Scott, Delia, Shepard, 
Mortenson, and Anderson's conclusions. In writing "The Role of 
Logic in Rhetoric," Mills and Petrie state that "the authors hope herein 
to restate the relevance of logic to verbal communication and thereby 
prevent the debasement of rhetoric into sophistry."36 Their first 
argument amounts to something of a concession; ••• "while defending 
logical argument as~ means of persuasion and as one of the legitimate 
tools for the analysis of rhetorical argument, we feel no obligation 
to assume that man is only, or even essentially, rational. 1137 Mills and 
34Mortenson and Anderson, "The Limits of Logic," 76. 
35Mortenson and Anderson, "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation," 14 7. 
36Mills and Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," 267. 
37!.e!.g., 260. 
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Petrie argue that man can be rational and, resting on the presumption 
of the status quo, demand that opponents of logic not emphasize its lack 
of efficacy but prove that it fails to function in any fashion in every 
case. 38 Mills and Petrie's second argument concerns what they think is 
an unnecessary diminution of the range of logic. They argue that it is 
unfair to equate and attack formal deductive logic as "logic." Induction 
and new "logics1139 function where deductive formal argument cannot go. 
Mills and Petrie argue that the critics of n1ogic" must criticize 
deductive logic, induction, and "the new logics" together to fairly 
attack "logic" as inapplicable to argument. 
Mills and Petrie then respond to some of the specific charges in 
the attacks on logic. First, concerning propositions, it may be true 
that formal logic doesn't handle value and policy propositions quite as 
conveniently as it does purely formal propositions but Toulmin, Hare, 
Baier, and Stevenson seem to regard formal relations as somewhat 
applicable. 40 Second, regarding translation difficulties, it is true 
that the "risk of distortion is always present. However, it does not 
follow that such translation !!!!:!.U, distort. 1141 As previously noted, to 
assume distortion assumes some ideal of correctness lest one would have 
3~ills and Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," 260. 
39Petrie, "Does Logic Have Any Relevance to Argumentation?," 55. 
40 Mills and Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," 262. 
41 .!!?l.g_., 264. 
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42 no concept of why distortion occurred. Third, they argue that if 
formal logic, broadly conceived, can't do the job there is no viable 
substitute and man is thrown into chaos and subjected to the trials of 
43 a new sophistic. Where there is no truth, some men will create it. 
Mills and Petrie obviously missed the point on some arguments. 
Scott, Delia, Shepard, and Mortenson and Anderson never claimed logic 
was totally inapplicable just that it was rarely totally relevant to 
everyday argumentation. As concerns Mills and Petrie's claims for 
induction, anything but complete induction lacks the conclusiveness 
that traditionalists seek. Shepard points out that probability cannot 
substitute for certainty. Formal logicians proclaim the efficacy 
of induction but rarely use it. The complete enumeration of all members 
of a category is sometimes impossible and many times extremely difficult. 
Induction simply does not fill the gaps that Mills and Petrie claim it 
does. New logics are proclaimed by many but applied by few. As with so 
many others, Mills and Petrie claim new logics function where traditional 
logic fails but give no examples. Their claims that several contemporary 
philosophers, including of all possible examples, Toulmin, use formal 
methods ~s applied to ethics and propositions of policy and value misses 
the point entirely that they do so in many cases to show the very 
inapplicability of deductive methodology to ethics. Situational ethics, 
a broad generic term for the type of ethical philosophy associated with 
those whom Mills and Petrie name, is timebound and emphasizes context in 
42 Page 145 of this chapter. 
43Mi1ls and Petrie, "The Role of Logic in Rhetoric," 267. 
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opposition to form. Mills and Petrie supposedly have the critics at 
bay with their last implied argmnent, namely, that if there is no black 
and white in the world all is chaos; if argument isn't "logical" it just 
isn't argument. Again, however, Mills and Petrie are foiled because 
there are substitutes for strict logic for argument and, though they don't 
develop them extensively themselves, Scott, Delia, Shepard, and Mortenson 
and Anderson by implication or direct reference point to ordinary 
language philosophy, dialectic, symbolic interaction, and/or psychologic 
as substitutes for logic in an expanded vision of the rational. 
Before examining these, however, an acute problem in argumentation 
theory today should be discussed. The traditional association of 
rhetoric and formal logic is being assaulted on all fronts. Aristotle 
is being reinterpreted as somewhat more humanistic and somewhat less 
as an analytic philosopher. Ch. Perelman and Stephen Toulmin are 
ripping apart the very fabric of the argumentation-demonstration linkage. 
The meaning of rhetoric, dialectic, logic, validity, proof, argument, 
and even rationality is shifting in consequence of the battle. Some 
implications of the struggle and some idea of the use of the terminology 
can be gleaned in the debate between Mills and Petrie versus Shepard, 
Mortenson and Anderson, Delia, and Scott in the current speech 
communication journals. The judgment of this study has been that the 
traditionalists have lost. The question which remains is, ''What is to 
replace the system now torn asunder?" Aristotle, Perelman, and Toulmin 
contribute some answers to that question but so also do the ideas of 
ordinary language philosophy, dialectic, symbolic interaction, and 
psychologic which immediately follow. 
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Argumentation and Ordinary Language Philosophy 
Ordinary language philosophy is a reaction against logical positi-
vism and specifically a reaction against the attempts of Wittgenstein 
in his Tractatus44 and Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathe-
matica45 to derive a systematic, axiomatic artificial language. Caton 
states that ordin~y language philosophy is generally used to refer to 
work which is influenced by • •• "similar to, or reminiscent of the 
later work of G. E. Moore, John Wisdom, and Ludwig Wittgenstein at 
Cambridge and of the work of Gilbert Ryle and J. L. Austin at Oxford. 1146 
To this distinguished list of names can be added the names of Max Black, 
P. F. Strawson, Hubert Alexander, and, as Holt Spicer pointed out many 
years ago, Stephen Toulmin. 47 Ordinary language philosophy seeks to 
derive a counnon logic or logics from the "ordinary" use of words. The 
feeling is, as J. L. Austin states at the beginning of this chapter 
" ••• our counnon stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have 
found worth drawing and t~e connections they have found worth making 
in the 0lifetimes of many generations • • • 1148 The study of the 
distinctions and connections of "ordinary" words, to ordinary language 
44Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated 
and edited by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, (London: Routledge and 
K~gan Paul, 1961). 
45Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead, Principia Mathematica, 
three volumes (Cambridge: The University Press, 1913). 
46charles E. Caton, editor, Philosophy and Ordinary Language 
(Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1963), pp. v-vi. 
47Holt Spicer, "Stephen Toulmin's Functional Analysis of Logic and 
Ethics and Its Relation to ~hetoric, 11 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Oklahoma, 1964). Spicer's dissertation is the first 
synthetic analysis of ordinary language I can find in the speech 
conmunication field. 
48J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 130. 
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philosophers, is and will always be much more productive than the 
artificial generation of new symbolic systematizations. 
Having proceeded this far we need to ask what ordinary language 
philosophers mean by ordinary language and what kinds of linguistic 
analysis techniques are available through ordinary language philosophy. 
The first question happens to be the more easily answered as it can be 
approached through an analysis of some of the better works of ordinary 
language philosophy as described in the dissertations of Charles E. 
Caton in philosophy49 and John Steward in speech coumunication.50 
Thus, the definition of ordinary language will be approached first. The 
second question requires more depth and is probably best approached through 
an analysis of some of the work of ordinary language philosophers. For 
this purpose, the works of Wittgenstein, 51 Austin,52 Ryle, 53 and 
Strawson5~ have been chosen as models. 
49charles E. Caton, "A Description and Evaluation of the Method of 
the Ordinary-Language Philosophers and Its Doctrinal Basis," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1956). 
50John Steward, "Rhetoricians on Language and Meaning: An 
Ordinary Language Philosophy Critique," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Southern Calif., 1970). 
51wittgenstein made a complete reversal in his philosophy and only 
his later works fit the ordinary language tradition. Those works that 
are most significant in regards to natural language are: Philosophical 
Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blaiaell, 1953),,The 
Blue and Brown Books, {Oxford: Blackwell, 1958). 
52Austin's most important works include: Philosophical Papers, 
and How to do Things with Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1962). 
53Ryle has written prolifically not always on concerns having 
anything to do with natural language. His most relevant works are: 
Dilemmas (Cambridge: The University Press, 1969), and The Concept of 
H!!!g (N. Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1949) in which is developed 
the famous "ghost in the machine doctrine." 
54 P. F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: 
Methuen & Co. .Ltd. , 1952). 
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Ordinary language is most frequently defined in contrast to the 
symbolic systems of formal logic. Passmore states "in contrast with the 
formalized writing of symbolic logicians, ordinary language philosophers 
discuss logical issues in an informal way, without recourse to 
specialized invented languages, and secondly they believe that a 
consideration of 'what we ordinarily say' is at least a useful prelimin-
ary to the discussion of philosophic problems. " 55 Caton argues that 
ordinary language ". • • may now be explained as the language defined 
by the set of all rules for the ordinary (standard) use of expressions. 11 56 
He goes on to proclaim that the major difference between formal 
logicians and ordinary language philosophers "is that ordinary language 
philosophers are concerned with the logic of language as it is actually 
used, with no attempt ••• to improve upon it. 1157 Ordinary language 
is the language of the people. It is the language of "speech acts1158 
or of conmon "language games." 59 It is the emotion laden and shifting 
parlance of politics, ethics, religion, of propositions of value and 
policy. It is the language of "coumand, reproaches, questions, 
55John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Baltimore: Penquin 
Books, 1957), p. 488.' 
56caton, "A Description and Evaluation of Ordinary Language 
Philosophy," p. 148. 
571!tl.£., p. 132. 
58This term is esp. associated with John Searle, Speech Acts 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1969) but is used by many ordinary 
language philosophers. 
59wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 11. 
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laments, exhortations, and plaudits ••• 1160 as well as the language of 
declarative sentences. Ordinary language is common, colloquial, natural, 
vernacular as opposed to the technical or artificial symbol systems of 
specialists. 
Ordinary language is also sometimes defined in opposition to the 
linguistic interpretations of general semanticists and other linguistic 
scholars. Steward opposes ordinary language to the general semantics 
concept that ultimately a word must "refer" to something. 61 In fact, 
Steward argues that the ordinary language philosopher does not really 
deal with individual words. What has meaning is the sentence, the 
paragraph, the larger structure in context. 62 As Ryle explains, "our 
characteristic questions are not questions in the logical statics of 
insulated and single concepts, but questions in the logical dynamics 
rr63 of apparently interfering systems of concepts. Ordinary language 
is the dynamic interaction of linguistic concepts as they evolve and 
are utilized in common discourse. As Ryle says: 
We are interested in the informal logic of the employment 
of expressions, the nature of the logical howlers that 
people do or might commit if they strung their words 
together in certain ways, or, more positively in the logical 
force that expressions have as components of theories and as 
pivots of concrete arguments.64 
60Ryle "If So ' ' , Black (Ithaca, N. Y.: 
and Because," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Max 
Cornell U. Press, 1950), p. 325. 
61steward, "Rhetoricians on Language and Meaning," p. 2. 
62.!.ei.!!., p. 134. 
63Ryle, Dilemmas, p. 125. 
64-ayle in Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language, p. 127. 
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Ordinary language philosophy is concerned with words in patterns, patterns 
that repeat themselves and form the basis of the functioning of language 
in society. Ordinary language is concerned with meaning, but functional 
as opposed to referential meaning. 
Ordinary language is also positively defined. In its positive 
guise it much parallels the Whorfian hypothesis. A. M. Quinton states: 
••• there is a theory of meaning in direct opposition to the 
logical atomism of the Tractatus, a theory which lacks for 
the meaning of a word in its use in public acts of communication 
between the users of language, and not in any objects for which 
it may be used to stand, whether these are understood to be in 
the world outside us or to be within our minds.65 
Waisman, in Flew's excellent collection of ordinary language philosophy 
essays, says 11 ••• we have to interpret reality.' The elements of such 
an interpretation, without our being aware of it, are already present 
in language--for instance, in such moulds as the notion of thinghood, 
of causality, of number, or again in the way we render colour, etc. 1166 
Like Burke, ordinary language philosophers see language as effecting 
action and as a type of action at one and the same time. 67 Language is 
a type of behavior but effects many other types of behavior. As such, 
I 
ordinary language represents an intrinsic expression of man's ordinary 
rationality. According to these philosophers, ordinary language, the 
key artifact of civilized man, directly reflects in its many arguments 
that rationality which man possesses. 
65wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection 
of Critical Essays, edited by George Pitcher (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966), p. 10. 
66 A.G. N. Flew, editor, Logic and Language, First Series (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1968), p. 141. 
67Ryle in Caton, Philosophy and Ordinary Language, p. 127. 
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It should be obvious by this point from its definition that ordinary 
language is one of the substitutes for formal logic. Ordinary language 
is not restricted to the declarative sentence. Ordinary language can 
successfully encompass emotional statements. It stresses context and 
analyzes meanings in patterns and by functional use rather than through 
reference. Ordinary language allows for type and temporal shifts. In 
other words, it fills many of the gaps in rhetorical analysis created 
by dependence on formal logic. The question then becomes how ordinary 
language philosophy techniques might be utilized in an analysis of 
argument. 
Steward examines one possible technique taken from John Wilson's 
Thinking with Concepts: 
First, the philosopher focuses on some philosophically interesting 
concept or language use. 
Second, he examines, in as much detail as possible, instances 
of the use of expressions relevant to the concept he is studying 
••• The philosopher is thus engaged in 'analysis of informal 
logic' of the expressions that define the concept. 
His third step is to indig3te what important insights he has 
gained from his analysis. 
Waisman mentions another pattern which is nothing more nor less than 
comparing the ordinary language technique to that of a trial judge, a 
comparison that ought to be familiar as mentioned by Aristotle, Perelman, 
and Toulmin. 
Coming to a decision, though a rational process, is very 
unlike drawing conclusions from given premises, just as it 
is very unlike doing sums. A judge has to judge, we say, 
implying that he has to use discernment in contrast to 
applying, machinelike, a set of mechanical rules ••• what 
68s teward, "Rhetoricians on Language and Meaning," pp. 155-157. 
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is required is insight, judgment. Now in arriving at a 
verdict, you are like a judge in this that you are not 
carrying out a number of formal logical steps; you 
ha~ tg9use discernment, e.g. to descry the pivotal 
point. 
Subh generalized patterns are exemplified by the analyses of Wittgenstein, 
Austin, Ryle, and Strawson. 
Wittgenstein is one of the acknowledged fathers of ordinary 
language philosophy. His ordinary language techniques are explained 
in the~ and Brown Books and in Philosophical Investigations. 
Unfortunately for the would be interpreter of Wittgenstein, these books 
are patchworks published posthumously. In addition there is the 
difficulty that Wittgenstein, by his own admission, could not write. 70 
Nevertheless, as Burke would say, we shall persevere in an attempt to 
describe Wittgenstein's vision for the functioning of natural language 
analysis. Wittgenstein thought that what the philosopher must do is 
simply describe language about its everyday work, "assemble reminders 
so that the actual pattern of uses is made clear to us. Everything 
in the pattern is perfectly familiar to us already, what the philosopher 
has to do is make us aware of it as a pattern. 1171 Wittgenstein's most 
famous example of this process concerns games. 
Consider for example the proceedings which we call 'games.' 
I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and 
so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: 'There must be 
something common or they would not be called 'games'; but 
look and see whether there 'is anything common to all--for if 
you look at them you will not see something that is in common 
69F. Waismann, nHow I See Philosophy," in Contemporary British 
Philosophy, edited by H. D. Lewis (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1956), pp. 480-481. 
70wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. viii. 
71A. M. Quinton, "Excerpt from 'Contemporary British Philosophy,"' 
in Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of 
Critical Essays, edited by George Pitcher, p. 15. 
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to all, but similarities, relationships and a whole series 
of them at that ••• And the result of this examination is; 
we see a complicated network of similarities everlapping and 
criss-crossing ••• I can think of no better expression to 
characterize these similarities than 'family-resemblances'; 
for the various resemblances between members of a family: 
build, features, colours of eyes, gait, temperament, etc., 
etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way--And I shall 
say: 'games' form a family. 72 1 
Games are very much like one another yet different. They form a 
pattern, but one which is not perfectly clear. Ordinary language 
discourse, according to Wittgenstein, is similar to games in this 
fashion. Ordinary discourse forms patterns of similarity and difference 
which are like one another but not crystal clear. 
Within the pattern formed by various language games, Wittgenstein 
insisted on something he called "depth grammar. 1173 On the surface the 
pattern of words might appear to perform the same functions as some 
other pattern whereas at a depth they performed very differently. One 
could usually tell upon close inspection just exactly what the case was 
because every set of words acts according to the informal rules of 
some language game. These rules are not precise like those of formal 
logic nor can they be applied in cookie-cutter fashion. Wittgenstein 
insisted on the rules being bent to fit the situation rather than the 
74 situation being compressed to meet the rules. But once we understand 
that discourse functions like a game and begin comprehending the informal 
rules of depth granunar, Wittgenstein argues we will have clarified 
72wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, pp. 32-33. 
73rbid., pp. 47-ad infinitum-
74The idea that there can be rules which are purposely broken 
disturbs some people but Wittgenstein had a very flexible mind. 
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meaning and accomplished the task of philosophy which is "to clear the 
ground a little, removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to 
knowledge. 1175 
J. L. Austin's ordinary language techniques are not dis:limilar to 
those of Wittgenstein. Austin too believes in clearing away the rubbish 
of linguistic confusion in order to further, philosophic knowledge. 
Austin's method for clearing away such ribbish is what he calls the 
examination of "speech-acts.1176 Speech acts are sentences or longer 
pieces of discourse filled with "performatives," exclamations, commands, 
wishes, etc. in opposition to th': mere "constatives," descriptions, of 
formal logic. 77 Speech acts reflect their social milieu and particular 
circumstances. They are perceptual sets much like the "associational 
clusters" of Kenneth Burke. 78 As Austin puts it: 
When we examine what we should say when, what words we should 
use in what situations, we are looking not merely at words but 
also at the realities we use the words to talk about; we are 
using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception 
of, though not as a final arbiter of, phenomena of various sorts. 79 
Speech acts are examined through a process of "linguistic phenomenology. 1180 
A group of interested philosophers gets together and thoroughly explore 
75wittgenstein quoting John Locke's Epistle to the Reader from 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. (No other citation given) 
76J. L. Austin,, Philosophical Papers, p. 197. 
77J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 3-4. 
78Austin'a main purpose in How to Do Things with Words is,,to explain 
the functioning of performatives. For the comparison to Burke see The 
Philosophy of Literary Form (N. Y.: Random House, 1957), p. 18. 
79Austin, Philosophical Papers, p. 130. 
80 .!.!2i!!. 
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what they know to be the various uses of some one set of ordinary 
words. Some have called this process "group introspection. 1181 Through 
this process of analysis, whether it is to be called group introspection 
or something else, all the common meanings, uses, distinctions, 
connections, and even the distortions of the group of words will 
supposedly become clear. This is important because Austin contends in 
a by now familiar quotation at last given in toto: 
First, words are our tools, and, as a minimum, we should use 
clean tools; we should know what we mean and what we do not, 
and we must forearm ourselves against the traps that language 
sets us. Secondly, words are not facts or things; we need 
therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from 
and against it, so that we can realize their'inadequacies and 
arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. 
Thirdly, and more hopefully, our c0111110n stock of words embodies 
all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the 
connextions they have found worth making, in the lifetimes of 
many generations; these surely are likely to be more numerous, 
more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the 
survivial of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all 
ordinary and reasonably practical matters, than any that you 
or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon. 
They are to be neglected at our peril; if not the end-all, they 
are certainly the 'begin-all' of philosophy.82 
A thorough examination by a group of philosophers of the functioning of 
a group or set of words will reveal the 11lanY "meanings" or "functions'1 
of those words under particular circumstances and at particular times. 
According to Austin, this contextual analysis is the essence of true 
philosophy for it reveals man and his artifacts as he actually is not 
as he supposedly ought to be. 
81K. T. Fann, editor, Symposium on J. L. Austin, (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 87. 
82Austin, Philosophical Papers, pp. 129-130. 
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Gilbert Ryle is perhaps the most readable and understanding of 
the ordinary language philosophers and, for this reason, probably the 
best known. In Dilemmas, The Concept of Mind, and in a series of essays 
over the years including "If, So, and Because, n83 "Systematically Mis-
leading Express ions," 84 and "Ordinary Language," 85 he describes his 
technique of ordinary language analysis, the reducti~ ad absurdum. 86 
For Ryle" ••• the only proper business of philosophy is the detection 
of the sources in linguistic idiom of recurrent misconception and 
absurd theories."87 The method of doing this is through the reductio ab 
absurdum. "By deducing from a proposition or complex of propositions 
' 
consequences which are inconsistent with each other or with the original 
proposition the philosopher demonstrates the 'absurdity' of the proposi-
tion or complex of propositions in question. 1188 In other words, Ryle's 
technique is the constant examination of ramifications and consequences 
in argument for the finding of inevitable inconsistencies. 
83Ryle, "If, So, and Because," in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by 
Max Black, pp. 323-340. 
84Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expression," in Logic and 
Language, 1st Series, edited by A.G. N. Flew, pp. 11-36. 
85ayle, "Ordinary Language, 11 in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, 
ed. by Charles E. Caton, pp. 108-127. 
86This is not Ryle's only technique but he does employ it most 
frequently. The idea is similar to the ad hominem argument of Henry 
Johnstone, and Johnstone may well, in fact, have taken many of his ideas 
from Ryle. 
87Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," p. 36. 
88Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy. p. 444. 
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Ryle argues that this technique is a valid one because "questions 
which can be decided by calculation are different, toto caelo different, 
from the problems that perplex. 089 Problems that can be calculated con-
cern topic-neutral logical constants while problems that perplex are 
concerned with topic-variant concepts such as "pleasure,or perception or 
moral responsibility. 1190 Problems of calculation .are the subject of 
logic while problems that perplex are the raw material for philosophy. 
Logic calculates. Philosophy argues. In fact, "philosophy is simply 
argumentation. 11 91 Establishing boundaries, changing definitions, 
exploring for understanding is the constant task of philosophy. The 
business of philosophy is not answers but the methodology for finding 
answers. As Howard says of "Ryle's Idea of Philosophy," 
What strikes us in Ryle's procedure is that he takes his 
initial datum as it appears in language: He does this because 
the philosopher's task is a conceptual one and because it 
is in language that concepts both reveal themselves and 
become manageable. Success for Ryle practically always 
consists in establishing the boundaries of related concepts. 92 
According to Ryle, one shouldn't look to philosophy for answers but 
rather for the techniques by which problems are clarified. Philosophers 
through the tool of reductio ad absurdum clarify problems. They do not 
answer problems. 
89Ryle, Dilemmas, p. 114. 
golbid., p. 111. 
91R. J. Howard, ''Ryle's Idea of Philosophy," New Scholasticism, 
XXXVII (April, 1963), 148. 
92 Howard, "Ryle's Idea of Philosophy," 161. 
-167-
Ryle realizes that his stance is going to disappoint or even 
enrage a great many. He responds to the formalists charges of "'muddler 
through,' 'romantic,' 'anti-scientist,' 'hunch-rider,' and 'literateur 11193 
with arguments already developed in this study. First, "the hope that 
philosophical problems can be, by some stereotyped separation, rendered 
to standard problems in Formal Logic is a baseless dream." 94 Second, 
philosophical argument must not be evaluated on the basis of validity 
or invalidity but rather--as to "the question of whether the argument 
has much, little, or no force."95 Ryle argues that only those seeking 
the simple comfort of a world of truth, a static world, only those 
seeking simple stereotypes and final answers, will see the reductio ad 
absurdum as sheerly a negative methodology. Those who can revise their 
logical stereotypes and step away from their preconceived linguistic 
mouldings will see that the method is the basis for a positive philosophy 
is those areas where final, single answers are not only fallacious but 
invidious: religion, ethics, politics, and philosophy. 
P. F. Strawson in Introduction to Logical Theory and "On Referring1196 
argues that "side by side with the study of formal logic, and over-
lapping it, we have another study; the study of the logical features of 
ordinary speech. 1197 Strawson has no objection to the construction of 
9:3 Dilemmas, 114. Ryle, p. 
94rbid., p. 126. 
95Ibid., p. 112. 
96P. F. Strawson, "On Referring," in Philosophy and Ordinary 
Language, edited by Charles E. Caton, pp. 162-193. 
97strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 231. 
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formal systems as such. Formal systems, he thinks, are useful in 
appraising "context-free" discourse, as exemplified., say, in mathematics 
I 
and physics. A formal logic, however, needs to be supplemented by a 
logic of everyday discourse, for formal logic is incapable of coping 
with the complexities of ordinary speech. 98 Formal logic deals with 
discourse through "entailment rules," that is, rules which make an utter.:. 
ance true "at any time, at any place, by any speaker. 1199 Ordinary 
language deals with discourse through "referring rules." "A referring 
rule lays down a contextual requirement for the correct employment of 
an expression."lOO Strawson argues that it can make a difference as to 
where a sentence is uttered, by whom, and at what time. Ordinary 
language logic considers context where formal logic does not. Strawson 
admits that following referring rules instead of entailment rules leads 
only to general classifications and diffuse standards as opposed to the 
elegance and system which belongs to the construction of formal logic. 
"It is none the less true," he argues, "that the logic of ordinary 
speech provides a field of intellectual study unsurpassed in richness, 
complexity, and the power to absorb.nlOl What ordinary language gives 
up in elegance it makes up in utility. 
98Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy. p. 462. 
99strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 213. 
lOOibid. 
101~., p. 232. 
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To summarize briefly, ordinary language philosophy arose 
in opposition to the attempts by Wittgenstein, Russell and Whitehead, 
and others at the beginnings of the twentieth century to systematize 
and, supposedly, purify language. Ordinary language philosophy is 
defined in opposition to formal logic and to general semantics. 
Ordinary language philosophy deals explicitly with the informal logic 
that applies to the slippery discourse of ethics, politics, religion, 
and the law. Ordinary language is concerned with discourse in context 
rather than with single arguments in abstraction. Ordinary language 
philosophers examine discourse by establishing patterns of depth grammar, 
by looking for the similarities in the "performatives" of various "speech 
acts," by reductio ad absurdum, and through "referring contextual rules." 
Ordinary language philosophy fills a big gap left by formal logic for 
the rhetorical critic. Aristotle pointed to the importance of the 
speech of the ordinary man. 102 Perelman specifically noted how the 
language of questions of "a moral, social, political, philosophic, or 
religious order11103 eluded the formal logician. Toulmin, an ordinary 
language philosopher himself, is constantly referring to everyday 
discourse and ordinary usage as opposed to analytic demonstration. 104 
102 As noted previously, Aristotle was the father of several 
types of metaphysical and ethical speculation as well as of analytic 
philosophy. It is unfair to stress either of his concerns to the 
exclusion of the other. 
103Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise 
on Argumentation, translated by John Wilkinson and Purcell Weaver 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1969), p. 512. 
104Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 1-8. 
-170-
Argumentation and Dialectic 
~here is no univocal notion of dialectic105 yet everyone who has 
ever written about it claims that dialectic has some important part to 
play in relation to argument. Nicholas AbbagDSD found four connnon 
interpretations for dialectic when he examined the subject in 1958: 
dialectic as a method of division, dialectic as the logic of the 
probable, dialectic as logic, and dialectic as the synthesis of 
opposites. 106 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy lists eight definitions 
of dialectic, noting that among the more important meanings of the term 
have been: 
(1) the method of refutation by examining logical consequences, 
(2) sophistical reasoning, (3) the method of division or 
repeated logical analysis of genera into species, (4) an 
investigation of the supremely general abstract notions by 
some process of reasoning leading up to them from particular 
cases or hypotheses, (5) logical reasoning or debate using 
premises that are merely probable or generally accepted, 
(6) formal logic, (7) the criticism of the logic of illusion, 
showing the contradictions into which reason falls in trying to 
go beyond experience to deal with transcendental objects, 
and (8) the logical development of thought or reality through 
thesis and antithesis to a synthesis of these opposites.107 
In addition to the many meanings for dialectic, two associated terms, 
discourse and dialogue, are also fraught with multiple interpretations. 
Dialectic is an important but thorny subject. 
This short section seeks to examine dialectic only as it relates 
directly to argument. As in the section on ordinary language philosophy, 
the hints as to the points to be covered oome from Aristotle, Perelman, 
and Toulmin. Aristotle pointed to dialectic 11 as the logic of the opinion, 
lOSNicholas Abbagnano, "Four Kinds of Dialectics," Revista di 
Philosofia, XLIX (April, 1958), 123. 
106 l!?.!.2,. 
10711Dialectic," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1967, 385. 
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of the probable. 108 He argued that dialectic permitted reasoning in a 
field "which, in a certain sense, is intermediate between that which is 
certainly true (apodeictic reasoning) and that which is certainly false 
(sophistic reasoning) •109 Dialectic is really a logic "juridim; it is 
modelled on the techniques of rationality and of decision proper to 
110 Greek juridical practice." As previously noted, Perelman would have 
called The New Rhetoric the new dialectic had not Hegelian historical 
connotations been addended to the term. 111 Toulmin's insistence on 
dealing with "practical arguments" as opposed to the issues of formal 
logi~~ puts him squarely within the dialectical tradition as practical 
problems are the very essence of the concern of dialectic. 112 
As with the section on ordinary language philosophy, the primary 
concern of this portion of the paper is with various techniques of 
dialectic as applied or as potentially applicable to arguments. As was 
the case in that instance, so too here the best method for an analysis 
of such techniques is a quick examination of the practice of those 
involved with dialectic; in this case, Kenneth Burke, 113 Henry w. 
lOSAlessandro Giuliani, "The Aristotelian Theory of the Dialectical 
Definition," Philosophy and Rhetoric, V (Sunnner, 1972), 129. 
109~. 
llOibid., 130. 
111chapter III, p. 77 • 
112Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 2. Toulmin doesn't like to 
deal with the term dialectic but admits the sorts of problems he deals 
with would traditionally have been called dialectical difficulties. 
113All Burke's works directly or indirectly have something to do 
with dialectic. We shall be particularly concerned here, however, with 
Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley, Calif.: University of 
California Press, 1969) and Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion 
Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1970). 
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Johnstone, Jr., 114 and Mortimer Adler. 115 Kenneth Burke's work with 
dialectic is peculiarly related to his involvement with language and 
will only be briefly mentioned here as Burke is also a symbolic inter-
actionist and more concerning his theories will be of concern in the 
next section of the dissertation. Henry Johnstone's concern for 
dialectic is related to his concern for what he calls the essential 
philosophic argument, the argumentum ad hominem. 116 Adler's pre-
occupation with dialectic is more far reaching and encompassing and 
centers on dialectic as at "once being the technique of ordinary con-
versation when it is confronted by the conflict of opinion, and as being 
the essential form of philosophical thought. 11117 
Kenneth Burke notes that "by dialectics in the most general sense 
we mean the employment of the possibilities of linguistic transformation. 11 118 
Dialectic, for Burke, is the essential mechanism for merger and division. 
Quoting Socrates in Plato's Phaedrus, Burke proclaims: 
I am a great lover of these processes of division and 
generalization; they help me to speak and think. If I find 
any man who is able to see unity and plurality in nature, 
I follow him, walking in his steps as if he were a god. 119 
And those who have this art, I usually call dialecticians. 
114The idea of the argumentum ad hominem is the major theme of 
much of Johnstone's work. We shall be particularly concerned here with 
Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument (University Park, Penn.: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1959). 
115 Mortimer Adler, Dialectic (N. Y.: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1927). 
116Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., Philosophy and Argument, p. 76. 
117Adler, Dialectic, p. vi. 
118Burke, Grammar of Motives, pp. 403-404. 
119Ibid. 
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Merger and division, in turn, are related to the whole strategic 
process of dramatisim, Burke's overarching mechanism for linguistic 
analysis. Burke explains that dramatism functions through the con-
struction and destruction of linguistic hierarchies centered about 
various key functional terms or "god terms." 
As regards the analysis of particular forms; one looks for 
key terms, one seeks to decide which terms are ancestral and 
which derivative; and one expects to find terms possessing 
ambiguities that will bridge the gulf between other terms 
or otherwise serve as developmental functions.120 
Dialectic or dramatism, in Burke's scheme of things, is a method for 
"an ever closer approximation to truth by successive redefinition. 11121 
Burke's Rhetoric of Religion is probably the best example of the 
methodology of dramatism or of dialectic in process. In this work 
Burke works out a "cycle of terms" implicit in the idea of order. 122 
Through logological analysis, or "studies-in words-about-words, 11123 
Burke analyzes the intermeshing of God, order, covenant, sin, guilt, 
victamage, transcendence, and redemption, the religious paradigm for 
the pattern of all persuasion. 124 What is important to note about this 
analysis is Burke's unique blending of literary and rhetorical criticism 
through dialectic analysis. The key is in the revelation of the 
hierarchies of the cylces of change. Words flow from words, imply other 
words, and are inherently contrasted with still other words. The 
patterns of language are fixed, then broken, then created anew. This 
120Burke, Grammar of Motives, p •. 402 
121.1!?.!.g,., p. 403. 
122Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion, see esp. p. 184. 
123Ibid., p. vi. 
124Ibid. 
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is the cycle of change, and the essence of the dialectical method is 
the intense observation of linguistic hierarchies, the noting of their 
structure, and the analysis of their destruction and renewal. 125 The 
war of words is the war for Burke and that war is "dialectical." 
Henry w. Johnstone, Jr., works out quite a different interpreta-
tion of dialectic yet one which can also be used in opposition to the 
methods of formal logic. Johnstone's perpetual thesis has been that true 
philosophic argument is essentially ad hom.inem argument. Lest there be 
any confusion, Johnstone means something quite different by ad hominem 
argumentation than personal insult or attack. Essentially, ad hominem 
argumentation is the systematic working out of the consequences of 
' 
maintaining some single perspective on the world. 126 Johnstone points 
conveniently to (1) how an ad hominem argument is to be worked out in 
his system and (2) to how much arguments are,.to be evaluated. 
For Johnstone, an ad hominem argument takes place when two 
philosophic systems come into conflict. Such a conflict is "not 
fundamentally logical. 11127 It is dialogicai. 128 In dialogic argument 
125Burke is interested in patterns of words which relate to one 
another. Ultimately, I think, he thinks all language is interrelated, 
but some patterns are stronger and more, important than others. Burke 
thinks that "rectilinearity" or "cyclical" analysis does a better job 
of criticism than "narrative" or "linear" analysis. Narrative or linear 
analysis is not strictly logical analysis but shares most attributes 
with the type of analysis we have been calling "formal logic." See Burke, 
The Rhetoric of Religion, p. 217. 
126Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, p. 73. 
127Ibid., p. 2. 
12S1bid., pp. 15 and 81. 
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conflicting value systems are at issue. 129 Unlike propositions of fact 
which can be individually reviewed, value systems must be reviewed in 
systematic context. 130 The involved philosophers are not searching for 
truth but for a relative comparison of their systems. Philosophic 
arguments are not true or false but strong or weak "relative to the 
arguments through which they are established. 11131 The ad hominem 
argument proceeds bilaterally from mutually accepted propositions to an 
examination of the ramifications of those propositions.132 The quest is 
to see how systematically everything fits together and how the proposi-
tions effect one another with the goal of establishing the acceptability 
of a philosophy once its consequences are perfectly clear. 
Johnstone evaluates an ad hominem argument according to its 
relevance and its force. 133 An argument is relevant to the extent that 
it truly takes into consideration the originally agreed upon propositions. 
An argument is forceful to the extent it shows that some inherent rami-
fication of these propositions lead to conclusions unacceptable to 
their original proponents. Johnstone explains how these evaluative 
rubrics apply to seven types of ad hominem argumentation: (1) Through 
the Charge of Unintelligibility if the argument is ambiguous or incon-
sistent, (2) Through the Charge of Dogmatism if the argument fails to 
129Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, p. 32. 
lJOlbid., p. 25. 
1311bid. 
l32irbis parallels Aristotle's interpretation and Ryle's reductio 
ad absurdum. 
133 6 ~-, p. 2. 
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meet its own criteria or if there is no evidence, (3) Through the Charge 
of Tu Quogue if the argument connnits the same error it aims to abolish, 
(4) Through the Charge of Ineffectiveness if the statement of the argu-
ment fails to do justice to its propositions, (5) Through the Charge 
of Denying Presuppositions when the argument turns on its own foundations, 
(6) Through the Charge of Self-Disqualification when the argument 
"defeats its own purpose o •• by advocacy of content ••• which could 
not, by its own account, be genuine knowledge, 11 134 and (7) Through the 
eaarge of Self-Denial if the argument denies its own worth. 135 Some 
would argue that what Johnstone has done is merely to describe a method 
for the evaluation of systematic philosophies which are based on logic. 136 
However, because he believes that no philosophy is ever really complete, 
what Johnstone has really done is to describe the perpetual process 
whereby partial systems of values enter into the marketplace of ideas and 
are tested, disassembled, reconstructed, and tried once again. 137 
Mortimer J. Adler defines dialectic in opposition to empiricism or 
scientific thought and to symbolism or logical thought. Scientific 
thought checks on facts. Logical thought deals with the self-consistency 
of symbol systems. Dialectic deals with opinions and values. 138 Adler 
argues that the study of dialectic "as a method of argument, of controversy~ 
l34this parallels Aristotle's interpretation and Ryle's reductio 
ad absurdum, p. 91. 
135Ioid., pp. 85-92. 
136B. L. Ware, Jr., "Argument, Dialectic, and Philosophy: A Study 
in Conceptual Slippage" (unpublished paper, University of Kansas, 1973), 
p. 2. 
137 Johnstone, Philosophy and Argument, p. 15. 
138Adler, Dialectic, p. 23. 
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and disputation11139 used to be valued as an intrinsic part of the 
education of a gentleman but "in so far as investigation, experiment, 
and demonstration have been the dominant intellectual concerns of the 
era introduced by Galileo and Newton, dialectic has been ignored, its 
value underestimated or condemned, its form misunderstood. 11140 
Properly understood: 
Dialectic is a convenient technical name for the kind of thinking 
which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when 
they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some 
theory or idea ••• It is an intellectual process in which all 
men engage in so far as they undertake to be critical of their 
own opinions, or the opinions of others, and are willing to 
face the difficulties that arise in conmunication because of 
the opposition and conflict of diverse insights ••• It is not 
only a method of dealing with disagreement, but an attitude to 
be taken toward agreement which interprets it as merely relative 
to the situation in which it is achieved.141 
Adler vociferously advocates that a study of dialectic as the method for 
the impassioned yet impartial review of values and opinion as related to 
religion, law, politics, and ethics be studied once again. 
Adler buttresses his contentions with a review of what he considers 
to be the values of the dialectical process as opposed to the processes 
of empiricism and logic. First, as concerns language, Adler argues that 
a dialectical consideration of language has many advantages over the 
traditional empirical or logical considerations of language. Dialectic 
recognizes connotative as well as denotative meanings. 142 Dialectic 
can deal with indicative and subjunctive sentences as well as with im-
perative and interrogative sentences. 143 Dialectic can take argumentative 
139Adler, Dialectic, p. 7. 
140tbid. 
141Ibid., p. v. 
142!!?.!s_., pp. 85-86. 
143tbid., p. 91. 
-178-
notice of the functioning metaphor. 144 Dialectic takes advantage of 
the "vast network of definitions, implied classifications and 
distinctions," 145 of common discourse. Second, as concerns method, 
dialectic is in process as opposed to the statis of logic. Adler 
explains that dialectic is the process of actualizing the implicit 
relationships in language "by definition, analysis, syn.thesis, systemati-
zation, and hierarchical ordering. 11146 Dialectic "always deals with 
systems rather than isolated propositions. 11147 It considers context: 
time, place, and circumstance as an inherent part of its method. Third 
and finally, dialectic, as Adler conceives it, looks at the rationality 
of man in a sophisticated manner. The dialectician recognizes that 
men are emotional beings. Partisanship is therefore built into the 
dialectical Process but so too are demands for an explicit revelation 
of partisanship148 and for an ultimate attitude of philosophic 
impartiality towards any given set of beliefs. The dialectician seeks 
not truth but understanding. He recognizes that the dialectical process 
149 will never completely resolve any value conflict. Dialectic begins 
in "the neg~tive implied in any definition. 11150 It continues in analysis 
whereby the implicit ramifications of opposition are explored. It ends 
in synthesis, "the finding of a whole that implies and includes the 
151 systems in conflict as its parts." Then the process or cycle begins 
again. 
144Adler, Dialectic, p. 94. 148tbid., P,• 13. 
145Ibid., p. 90. 149Ibid., pp. 168-170. 
146!lli·, p. 143. lSOibid., p. 158., 
147Jlli., p. 157. 151Ibid., P• 166. 
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Dialectic, for Burke, Johnstone, and Adler is the proper process 
for any examination of ethics, politics, religion, law, or philosophy. 
Dialecticians recognize the whole man through recognition of the 
logical and psychological components of argumentQ Dialectic plans for 
the whole man. Partisanship is built into the bilateral dialectic 
process. Because of the very nature of that process, however, partisan-
ship is checked; it is checked by the ultimate philosophic attitude of 
impartiality towards any given set of beliefs and by the antagonists 
mutual uncovering of each other's biases, prejudices, or fundamental 
beliefs through intense scrutiny of philosophic or epistemic beginnings. 
Dialecticians recognize all the many possibilities of language. Dialectic 
plans for the use of all language. Only a few terms function uni-
vocally. Most of language consists of ambiguous, shifting terminology. 
Dialecticians recognize the possibility of univocality but are far more 
interested in the vast linguistic hierarchies which phase in and out as 
various terms gain prominence and acquire subtle connotations then recede 
to the linguistic background once again. Last, and probably most 
importantly, dialecticians seek to understand and to know rather than to 
find truthe The very nature of dialectic as a process requires an in-
complete resolution to any particular linguistic dilennna. What is agreed 
to by some will not be agreed to by others. What were "truths': for one 
generation will be the "shibboleths" of anotherQ The dialectician looks 
upon this never-ending process as inevitable and right, an inherent part 
of the ongoing functioning of dialectic. 
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Argumentation and Symbolic Interaction 
In keeping with the pattern established in the last two sections, 
this section of the study will briefly define symbolic interaction and 
then explore some applications of symbolic interaction theory to 
argument. In this particular case the definition of symbolic inter-
action will be rather far ranging but the exploration of technique will 
be confined to the writings of but one man, Kenneth Burke. This pattern 
of arrangement is chosen because many persons can be classified as 
symbolic interactionists152 but few have applied symbolic interaction 
theories to the actual criticism of argument153 and none as fully, as 
consistently, or as successfully as the bourbon drinking "professor." 
Finding the parameters of symbolic interaction is no easy task. 
First, symbolic interactionism is itself an ambiguous concept utilized 
by different scholars to cover a host of differing perspectives on social 
psychology. Second, symbolic interactionism, like most critical 
conceptions, is an amalgam of other, also ambiguous, associated sub-
conceptions. To define and analyze symbolic interaction is to find and 
152Jackson Harrell in his dissertation, "Symbolic Interaction as 
the Basis for Rhetorical Theory" at one time or another classifies all 
of the following as symbolic interactionists: George Herbert Mead, 
Kenneth Burke, Herbert Blumer, Arnold Rose, Hugh Dalziel Duncan, Karlyn 
Kohrs Campbell, Herbert Simons, and, to a limited extent, also 
classifies most of the "new" rhetoricians as having, at least, some 
symbolic interactionist perspectives. 
153rn addition to Burke perhaps only Griffin, Campbell, and maybe 
Brock have done major work that would be recognized as symbolic inter-
actionist criticism in the speech communication field. However, anyone 
claiming to do "Burkeian11 criticism of any sort might also be encompassed 
within the symbolic interactionist field. 
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reveal the different emphases of the most important authors utilizing 
the term and to cull from their works the relevant subconceptions which 
cluster about symbolic interaction. Nevertheless, we shall make the 
attempt using Burke's own suggested technique of looking at a subject 
in the macrocosm, then at its constituent parts, then putting it all 
back together again. 
Symbolic Interaction: The Macrocosm 
Herbert Blumer states that symbolic interaction rests on three 
simple premises: 
The first premise is that human beings act toward things on 
the basis of the meanings that the things have for them ••• 
The second premise is that the meaning of such things is 
derived from, or arise out of, the social interaction that 
one has with one's fellows. The third premise is that these 
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative 
process used by the person in dealing with the things he 
encounters. 154 
He states that "human beings interpret and define each other's actions 
instead of merely reacting to each other's actions. 11155 The human 
animal interacts with and is defined by society. To be human is to be a 
social being. The human animal is self-reflexive. He interprets 
reality based upon past meanings under present conditions looking toward 
anticipated future consequences. The human animal is a symbol user. 
Symbols mutually created by the individual being and his society define 
154Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), Po 2. 
155Ibide, p. 3. 
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reality in construct sets. As Arnold Rose puts it "man lives in a 
symbolic environment which mediates the relation of the physical 
enviromnent to him. 11156 Man acts with his fellows in a world of objects 
that he and society have mutually symbolized or given meaning, and as 
he acts or makes gestures and takes roles man defines himself and renews 
the social order. 
Symbolic interaction then involves a complex of concepts which 
continually intertwine and mutually imply one another. These concepts 
include: 1) Process, emergent evolution, or becoming, 2) act and 
interaction, 3) objects or constructs, 4) gesture, 5) symbol and 
significant symbol, 6) role-taking, 7) self, 8), mind, and 9) society. 
To know the meanings of these terms is to know symbolic interaction for 
they are the cluster that surrounds the concept. 
The Microcosm Part I: Process, Emergent Evolution, or Becoming 
\ 
Delia maintains that the "metaphysical underpinning of communica-
tion in'Mead's system can be comprehended in terms of a single idea--
, 157 the ~oncept of process." For Mead, mind, self, society, everything 
is in the constant process of becoming. ''That is to say that the 
processes within nature are conditioned by the past, take place in the 
present, and are directed and controlled by the future. 11158 Things or 
156 Arnold Rose, Human Behavior and Social Processes (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962), p. 2. 
157 Jesse Delia, "Emergent Evolution and Symbolic Interaction: 
George Herbert Mead's Theory of Human Conmunication," (unpublished M.A. 
thesis, University of Kansas, 1968), p. 320 
158Paul E. Pfuetze, Self, Society, and Existence (N. Y.: Harper & 
Brothers, 1954), p. 52. 
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objects, ideas, or human beings are all new in process. All life, 
all existence, is continually changing. Objects and beings cannot 
be separated from ene another because they all exist in the flux of time 
and space, and any one has some small influence on all the rest. 
Structures are artificial creations and relationships are tenuous at 
best because of flux. Therefore, to separate perception from feeling, 
thinking, and acting is fallacious as all are interrelated. To call a 
human being a stimulus-response mechanism is fallacious because the 
very being changes as any action takes place. 
The Microcosm Part II: The Act 
Since existence is becoming, Mead and his followers define things 
in process or in acts rather than in structures. "Action is seen as 
conduct which is constructed by the actor instead of response elicited 
from some kind of performed organization in him. 11159 Acts may be short 
term affairs such as the shining of one's shoes or long term considera-
tions such as the desire to create a career. "Within the act, all the 
separated categories of the traditional, orthodox psychologies find a 
place. Attention, perception, imagination, reasoning, emotion and so 
forth, are seen as parts of the act-•rather than as more or less extrinsic 
influences upon it. Human behavior presents its~lf in the form of acts, 
rather than of concatenation of of minute responses.11160 Thus,, symbolic 
159Gregory P. Stone and Harvey A. Farberman, eds., Social Psychology 
Through Symbolic Interaction (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970), 
p. 285. 
160Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltz~r, Symbolic Interaction: 
A Reader in Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 17. 
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interactionists stress meaning in situations or context. The act is an 
evolving process. To view an act is to view man in relationships' both 
to objects and to other men in both time and space. 
Furthermore, acts are purposeful. Man is a reflexive creature 
and does things with intent. As Manis and Meltzer note, "behavior is 
constructed as it goes along, ior decision must be made at several 
. t 11161 po1.n s. The process of act is the process of choice making. From 
an original problem situation or felt want, the individual proceeds 
toward desired goals. As he wends his way, the individual is influenced 
by and influences his enviromnent. Past meanings help the individual to 
interpret present reality and guess as future consequences. Man does not 
merely react, he takes considered actiono 
The Microcosm Part III: Objects in the Construct System of Man 
When man considers his actions, he does so by considering objects. 
Objects are similar to George Kelly's constructs. 162 They are "Anything 
that can be designated or referred to--a cloud, a book, a legislator, 
a banker, a religious doctrine, a ghost, and so forth. 11163 An object 
or construct can be physical, social, or abstracto Anything which can be 
161Jerome G. Manis and Bernard N. Meltzer, Synlbolic Interaction: 
A Reader in Social Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1967), p. 17. 
162The idea of the construct involves a more or less permanent 
conceptualization about something. The something may be concrete or 
abstract. The construct is not inherent to the thirig but is given to it 
by the individual involved. Constructs arrange themselves in patterns or 
hierarchies whereby one implies others. For more information see George 
A. Kelly, A Theory of Personality (N. Y.: w. w. Norton & Co., 1963). 
16~1umer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method, p. 10. 
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extricated from its setting, held apart, given meaning, can be an object. 
The importance of this construct lies in the fact that the meaning of an 
object does not lie in its intrinsic nature but in how it is conceptual-
ized in the human mind. The physical world exists somewhere out there 
164 but it can only be viewed through the "terministic screens" of each 
individual. 
The Microcosm Part IV: Gesture 
An act can be subdivided into parts both in a time sense and in 
terms of a sequence of happenings. A significant act will involve gesture, 
significant symbols, and role-taking, Gestures come first within the 
act and are also significant happenings themselves and ought therefore 
to be explained in both senses. First, not all events are acts, Not all 
acts are significant. Some actions are merely reactions or rote, 
ritualistic, learned responses. To Mead and the symbolic interactionists, 
such responses "below the human level ••• not conscious, that is, not 
165 self-conscious" are gestures. Gestures are instinctive, non-reflex-
tive acts or the beginnings of some larger action. At the one level, 
the gesture is the act of an animal or a non-thinking human being. At 
the second level, the "gesture signalizes or stands for the whole on• 
164.rhe term is Kenneth Burke's. 
165George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. edited by 
Charles Morris (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 81. 
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coming overt act, and in this sense is regarded as a truncated act. 11166 
The example of gesture that Mead was most fond of employing is the dog 
fight. One dog assumes a certain position and the other responds, 
instinctively, with a counter. This is a gesture, a simple non-reflexive 
act which also signalizes the whole action of the fight. 
The Microcosm Part V: Symbol and Significant Symbol 
Mead wastes very little time in consideration,of the gesture, 
swiftly moving on to the more important part of the act, the symbol, 
particularly the significant symbol. "A symbol is defined as a 
stimulus that has a learned meaning and value for people, and man's 
response to a symbol is in terms of its meaning and value rather than 
in terms of its physical stimulation of his sense organs. 11167 A 
significant symbol differs from a gesture in that the gesture is made 
without interpretation while symbolic interaction always involves 
interpretation of its action. As Stone and Farberman put it: 
There is a fundamental distinction between the 'nonsignificant' 
gestures of dogs engaged in the 'conversation of a dog fight' and 
the significant gesture of socialized persons engaged in mutual 
talk. The later envisons futures and takes one another's future 
conduct into account in their present actions.168 
In other words, symbolic interaction or action is considered action based 
on past learning in anticipation of future consequences. 
How do significant symbols acquire meaning? How do they become 
"significant?" Mead states that: 
166Pfuetze, Self. Society, and Existence, p. 69. 
167 Rose, Human Behavior and Social Processes, p. 5. 
168 Stone and Farberman, Social Psychology Through Symbolic Inter-
action, p. 17. 
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The significant gesture or symbol always presupposes for its 
significance the social process of experience and behavior 
in which it arises; or as the logicians say, a universe of 
discourse is always implied as the context in terms of which, 
or as the field within which, gignificant gestures or symbols 
do in fact have significance. 1 
What Mead is stating is that meaning is arbitrary, created by human 
beings and attributed to objects. However, Mead is unclear as to whether 
the individual determines this meaning or whether society does. In some 
sense meaning comes from the individual's learned experiences and 
behavior patterns. In other senses meaning comes from society, for to 
be significant, meaning must be shared. Society sets the parameters 
for fields of experience or social contexts within which meanings are 
assigned. Mead does not provide the exact meaning of the significant 
symbol, but in some ways it involves both the individual and society in 
its creation and has meaning because both the individual and society 
insist that it be significant. 
The Microcosm Part VI: Role-taking 
' 
The significant act has as its precursor the gesture. The 
significant act has as its substance significant symbols, symbols 
assigned meaning in context by individual and society. Last, but not 
least, the significant act has as its process role-taking. As Manis 
and Meltzer state "the imaginative completion of an act ••• necessarily 
takes place through role-taking. 11170 Role-taking is involved in all 
169Mead, Mind, Self, and Society. p. 89. 
17~anis and Meltzer, Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social 
Psychology. p. 8. 
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cotmnunication by means of significant symbols; it means that the 
individual communicator imagines--evokes within himself how the recipient 
of his c0tmnunication understands that coumunication. 11171 Some have 
called this process empathy, others getting inside the other person's 
shoes, but, in either case, it is that process through which the 
individual simultaneously thinks what the other person is thinking and 
reacts to that thought with his own. 
According to Mead and later symbolic interactionists, the process 
of role-taking is learned through imitation, play, and games. In the 
beginning the child mindlessly imitates others actions, for example, 
slavish imitation of his mother. Then, in play, the child begins to 
consciously play other individual roles such as that of father, mother, 
fireman, doctor, cowboy, etc. Finally, in games the child has to 
consider many others' roles simultaneously. At this point, the child is 
beginning to transcend individual roles and to adopt the role of the 
generalized other. Desmonde calls the generalized other "the importation 
of the social organization within the individual. 11172 Pfuetze states 
that the generalized other is the group's or society's norms, attitudes, 
and values inculcated within the individual. 173 At the level of the 
generalized other, ~he individual knows not only what a specific other 
is thinking in relation to him and his probable response to his actions, 
171Rose, Human Behavior and Social Processes, p. 8. 
172william Desmond, "The Position of George Herbert Mead," in 
Social Psychology through Symbolic Interaction, edited by Stone and 
Farberman, p. 61. 
l73pfuetze, Self, Society, and Existence, p. 76. 
-189-
but what society is thinking and its probable reactions to his actions. 
It is at this point, according to the symbolic interactionists, that the 
individual truely attains his selfhood and becomes a member of society. 
The Microcosm Part VII: The Mind and the Self 
The mind, and the self arise through human interaction. They 
result from the overall process of role-taking. Not only are mind and 
self formed through process, however, they are processes. It is critical 
to symbolic interactionism to consider mind and self processes rather 
than structural entities in order for symbolic interactionists to 
explain how society and the individual both have independent existences 
yet are inextricably intermeshed. If they did not consider both as 
processes, they could not explain the seeming paradox that mind and self 
are prerequisite to symbolic interaction yet formed through symbolic 
interaction. As it is, they can explain the paradox by intertwining 
the two processes. The overlap takes place at the level of "I" and 
"me" as explained by Stone and Farberman: 
One cannot engage in symbolic connnunication until he has 
formed a conception of self. He must conceive that he is 
different from but related to otherso This conception emerges 
as one takes over other's reactions toward himself in the 
form of a 'me~• The 'me' is given full expression when one 
takes over the attitudes of the 'generalized other,' the 
conanunity, or a social world, and regulates his own conduct 
in terms of such organized expectations. One becomes 
something. Yet, there is always process. One acts against, 
or in dialogue with, these other attitudes. Because these 
attitudes have been incorporated, the 'I' is engaged in 
constant conversation between the 'I' and the 'me' between 
experience and conceptualization.174 
174stone and Farberman, editors, Social Psychology Through 
Svmbolic Interaction, p. 17. 
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The I of the self and the me of society both expand and develop as the 
individual grows. The self and society are dependent conceptions and 
mind is the product of them both. 
Blumer states that selfhood is the ability to treat oneself as an 
object. 175 Manis and Meltzer describe mind as a process "which 
manifests itself whenever the individual is interacting with himself 
by using significant symbols. nl 76 They go on to state that: 
Minded behavior arises around problems. It represents, to 
repeat an important point, a temporary inhibition of action 
wherein the individual is attempting to provision the future. 
It consists of presenting to oneself, tentatively and in advance 
of overt behavior, the different possibilities or alternatives 
of future action with reference to a given situation ••• 
This implies that the individual constructs his act, rather 
than responding in predetermined ways.177 
In other words, the mind and the self are products of interaction within 
the individual and of the individual within society. The "I" and the "me" 
' represent the instinctive reactions of the animal within the being and 
the trained patterns of society respectively. The individual has a 
mind and a self when he can treat himself as an object and reflexively 
utilize the symbols of society to construct acts in situations rather 
than reacting to situations. 
The Microcosm Part VIII: Society 
The last concept of significance to symbolic interactionists is 
society. Some comments'concerning society have already been made in 
175B1umer, Symbolic Interactionism, p. 181. 
17~anis and Meltzer, Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social 
Psychology~ p. 13. 
177Ibid., p. 14. 
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previous sections on significant symbols and on mind and self. 
Obviously society consists of all beings who use significant symbols, 
yet it is something more than this mere aggragation of individuals. 
Like Gestalt psychologists, symbolic interactionist sociologists see 
society as more than the sum of its parts. Society is the great con-
census which gives symbols meaning. Society is organization, structure, 
connnunity. Society is a complex system o~ mores and values which 
combine to form culture. There is something permanent and enduring 
about society. It is the mortar of civilization. It is the essence 
of man. For symbolic interactionists, the finest product of mankind 
is not his great cities or renowned works of art, it is the growing, 
expanding organism which is society.178 
The Macrocosm II 
Putting the cluster of terms which surrounds symbolic interaction 
(process, act, objects, gesture, significant symbol, role-taking, mind, 
self, and society) back together again, one can once more look at 
symbolic interaction in the macrocosm. Fundamentally, symbolic inter-
actionism is concerned with the flux of existence as made meaningful 
by human beings. The human animal is unique for the symbolic inter-
actionists, because, through gesture, role-taking, and symbolization, 
178see Mead in Mind. Self. and Society. pp. 253-336, for more 
specific references. Mead treats society as a metaphor for a number of 
conceptualizations. Society precedes the individual yet is composed of 
all individuals. Society is always changing yet it is what unifies 
man and what makes meaning permanent. Like many other of Mead's 
concepts, society is fascinati~g and frustrating, an insightful concept 
yet most difficult to understand. 
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he reflects on his existence. Rather than reacting to the present, 
the hum6ll constructs action utilizing the past and looking to the future. 
The individual reflexively creates a self and mankind creates a society. 
Thus, the stress of symbolic interaction is upon 1) human 2) intentional 
3) symbolic 4) interaction as it creates and expresses 5) self and 6) 
society. 
Burke and Dramatism: 
Symbolic Interaction Approaches Rhetoric and Argument 
Kenneth Burke criticizes human intentional symbolic interaction in 
an almost endless but profound stream of books and essays. 179 As 
mentioned in the section on dialectics, Burke calls his method of 
criticism "dramatism. ul80 This section of the study will concentrate 
a bit more on dramatism as a possible technique for the analysis of 
argument. The analysis this time will be based on the background of 
symbolic interaction rather than upon dialectic though Burke, in his 
179Each person who has studied Burke has his own list of 
favorites as regards any subjecte In my own opinion the most important 
books and articles by Burke with regards to ''dramatism" as related to 
symbolic interaction are: Kenneth Burke, A Grannnar of Motives (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1969), Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of 
Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), Kenneth 
Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form (N. Y.: Random House, 1957), 
Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Religion (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1970), Kenneth Burke, "Definition of Man," Hudson 
Review, XVI {Winter 1963-64), Kenneth Burke, "A Dramatistic View of 
the Origins of Language," Q .J .s,, XXXVIII (Oct. , Dec. , 1952) and XXXIX 
(Feb., Apr., 1963). For Burke's method in actual operation the best 
articles or books are The Rhetoric of Religion and "The Rhetoric of 
Hitler's 'Battle'" and "Antony in Behalf of the Play" in The Philosophy 
of Literary Form. 
180-surke, Grannnar of Motives, p. xxii. 
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typical encompassing and inclusive as opposed to exclusive fashion, 
often equates "dramatism" and "dialectic." 181 
Jackson Harrell argues that dramatism as a critical method shifts 
the emphasis of critical analysis "from the rather heavy emphasis upon 
'logical argument' in traditional rhetoric to 'psychological argument' 
in the newer theory." 182 This is hardly surprising based on the 
background of symbolic interaction theory which establishes that 
argument is relative, societally created and maintained, and tempor-
arily cradled in tenuous linguistic hiem:-chies. It is also not sur-
prising that Burke should seek a new god term for the act of persuasion 
which he calls "identification." Identification "ranges from the 
bluntest question of advantage ••• to a 'pure' form that delights 
in the process of appeal for itself alone. n 183 Identification takes 
place in context, which is revealed in language: the "symbolic means 
of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols. 111 84 
Now it is often pointed out that Burke expands upon logical 
analysis and that his god term for the act of persuasion is identification 
and that identification is revealed in language. What is not often 
pointed out is that the interaction of these factors constitutes the 
essence of Burkeian dramatism which might also be called contextual 
181Burke, Grammar of Motives, p. 33. 
182 Jackson Harrell, "Symbolic Interaction as the Basis for Rhetori-
cal Theory," p. 161. 
183Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives, p. xiv. 
184Ibid., p. 43. 
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analysis of the rhetorical situation. This factor is so important 
that I want to emphasize it here. For Burke, "critical and imaginative 
works are answers to questions posed by the situations in which they 
arose. 11185 Such critical and imaginative works, which we might call 
rhetoric or argument, "are strategic answers, stylized answers11186 to 
the exigencies pose,d by a particular situation. In a much more 
sophisticated fashion than Bitzer and long before him, 187 Burke 
established rhetorical situations composed of various genre of identifi-
cation strategies. These strategies "size up the situations, name their 
structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that 
contains an attitude toward them. 11188 In dramatism Burke has created a 
new and more sophisticated definition for argument, a definition which 
might well partially meet the pleas of Perelman and Toulmin who 
constantly lamented with regards to the logical analysis of discourse 
that there just had to be more to argument than that. 189 
Burke believes there is more to argument than "logic chopping" 
analysis. His own technique, "dramatism," seeks for a gradual unfolding 
of the argumentative structure. Burke believes that by getting beneath 
185 Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 3. 
186Ibid. 
187Lloyd F. Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation, 11 Philosophy and 
Rhetoric, I (1968), 1-14. The same criticism applies here as it did 
previously as regards Bitzer. Once again he claims to have found a 
concept that no one before him had ever developed. Once again I think 
he is dead wrong about this. 
188nurke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 3. 
189 Chapter III, p.70; and Chapter IV, pp. 103~104. 
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the key terms of the argument and noting the logological hierarchies, 
or what Perelman called the associations and disassociations of words, 
190 the critic can break through the superficial "terministic screens" of 
discourse to get to the essence of the strategic response to the 
rhetorical situation. Each rhetorical situation is different and each 
analysis must be unique, but Burke suggests there is just enough 
similarity that criticism is possible. Burke particularly argues that 
the use of the pentad, Scene, Act, Agent, Agency, and Purpose, 191 can 
aid the critic in his task. Somewhat similar to the Latin notion of 
stasis, 192 the terms of the pentad can be translated into the questions: 
(1) when and where did the argument take place?; (2) what was the 
argument?; (3) who gave the argument?; (4) how was the argument present-
193 ed?; and (5) why was the argument given? Burke contends that the 
answers to these questions, "using all there is to use, 11194 will result 
in a fuller, more productive analysis than the typical rectilinear 
critique of formal logic. 
To summarize, symbolic interaction theory expands upon the 
definitions of man and of the potential uses of language and in so doing 
190 Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 18. 
19~urke, A Grammar of Motives, p. xv. 
192someone could probably do an excellent paper on this comparison. 
Materials are available from Burke's Granmar of Motives and from resources 
as footnoted in Otto Dieter, "Stasis," Speech Monographs, XVII (Nov., 
1950), 345-369. 
193Burke, Grammar of Motives, p. xv. 
194:surke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 21. 
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expands the definition of argument and caises the creation of a new 
method for the analysis of argument. Man is the symbol using animal 
and the social animal for symbolic interactionists. Man only becomes 
"hmnan" through a sharing of gestures and the creation of mind in 
society. Man's "rationality" is socially determined. Language is 
composed of a vast set of mutually interrelated and ever shifting 
significant symbols. Language filters the perceptions of men. Man 
discovers himself in language through language. Argument is created 
by men in society in strategic response to the exigencies of varying 
rhetorical situations. Arguments consist of shifting symbol sets 
in response to changing needs. Argument can only be evaluated in the 
context of the needs of the situation as revealed in an analysis of 
the shifts in god terms and verbal hierarchies revealed in its strufture. 
Burke argues that the methods of "~amatism" allow for a proper evalua-
tion of s~bol using man and for a thorough consideration of the various 
changing attitudes revealed in linguistic and social symbolically inter-
active context .. 
Retrospect and Prospect: The Genre of Rational Argument 
Finally the last alternative to formal logic has be~n considered. 
Thus, it is finally time to synthesize the positive results of the study 
vis-a-vis its two fundamental questions. It may be remembered that these 
questions are: (1) What constitutes a rational argument, and (2) How 
ought one to go about evaluating rational argument? This last section 
will attempt to answer these questions in retrospect to the results of 
the study and in prospect of what others may do with these results in 
future analyses. First, the author will provide a few paragraphs on the 
nature and expression of argument. Next, several pages will concern the 
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evaluation of the argumentation process. 
The study of argument is much more complex than the study of logic, 
because an argument is a much more complex mechanism than is a piece of 
logical demonstration. Argumentation is more complex than logic both 
as to its substance and as to its form. It is more substantively 
complex in the nature of the subject matter about which it is concerned. 
It is more dispositionally complex in the nature of the patterns by 
which it encompasses these subject matters. It is impossible to talk 
about substance and form without mixing remarks, but in the next few 
paragraphs the effort is made to discuss first the substance of argument 
and then its form. 
Aristotle noted that there were two sorts of things in the universe, 
those which change or are in process and those which do not change but 
remain fairly static. 195 The study of those things which do not change 
is the study of the sciences. The method of the sciences is demonstra-
tion. The study of those things which do change is the study of dialectic 
and rhetoric. The method of dialectic and rhetoric is argument. There-
fore, according to Aristotle, the substance of, argument is process. 196 
Perelman would seem to agree with Aristotle's contention with regards to 
process as the substance of argument when he stresses the interaction of 
words. 197 Toulmin also falls into line for one of his key contentions is 
195Aristotle, Ethics, trans. by J. A. K. Thomson (N. Y.: Penquin 
Books, 1953), 1139b. 
196.IbJJl. 
197 Perelman, The New Rhetoric, pp. 186-190. 
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that argument must apply to concepts as they shift meaning through 
time. 198 And, of course, the thrust of ordinary language philosophy, 
dialectic, and symbolic interaction is that language is in process. To 
the extent that the merger and division of linguistic hierarchies is 
the essence of argument, to that extent argument is process for 
ordinary language philosophers, dialecticians, and symbolic interaction-
ists. The substance of argument is process. 
If the substance of argument is process, what is in process? 
Ultimately, everything is in process but some .. ings much more so than 
others. The particular concern of Aristotle, Perelman, Toulmin, the 
ordinary language philosophers, dialecticians, and symbolic interaction-
ists is that values are in process. For Aristotle, the realm of the 
contingent is the realm of values. Perelman notes that one does not 
argue about necessary propositions or about the facts, one argues about 
the contingent or the probable; one argues about values. 199 Toulmin is 
very much concerned with the realm of human decision and action. For 
him, demonstration and calculation are used for facts, argument for values. 
Ordinary language philosophers, dialecticians, and symbolic interaction-
ists are concerned about the values too. One doesn't much find such 
persons dealing with science or math but with politics, ethics, lw.w, 
religion, and philosophy. The substance of argument is process, process 
related to changing human values. 
198substantive argument can account for temporal shifts whereas 
analytic argument must remain universal and timeless in Toulmin's 
system. 
199Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 3. 
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These changing human values are not studied in isolation but as 
related to one another in hierarchical order. Perelman, for example, 
discusses the concept of a hierarchy of values. He notes that values 
are inherently meaningless except in comparison and contrast to other 
values. Kenneth Burke analyzes values in "associational clusters." 
He believes that there is a sort of "interanimation" between value 
200 concepts. Adler argues that dialectic, as a method, always deals 
with systems, never with isolated propositions. The,very idea of 
value implies prioritization and hierarchical order. Thus, the substance 
of argument is changing human values as they appear in value hierarchies. 
· Since an argument is a linguistic response to a practical problem 
201 or set of problems, an argument is more complexly stated than a 
com.parable demonstration. This is 'because an argument must deal with a 
significant piece of discourse rather than with concepts artifically 
abstracted from reality and viewed in isolation. Aristotle's "enthymeme" 
proceeds from the basis of the priorly accepted social value system 
and is only meaningful as an extension of that value system. Perelman 
notes that an argument is nearly always more complicated than a 
demonstration. Whereas a demonstration can "prove" something on the 
basis of if "X" then "Y," an argument can only provide reasons, and 
not even compelling reasons, for the adoption of an opinion or the making 
of a decision. 202 Toulmin shows his appreciation for the complex form 
200-surke, The Philosophy of Literary Form, p. 18. Burke does not 
use the specific term interanimation but it applies. 
201Aristotle would not agree to this definition but it fits the 
work of Perelman, Toulmin, the ordinary language philosophers, 
dialecticians, and symbolic interactionists. 
202Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 120. 
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of argument in two ways. First, he argues that a substantive argument 
as opposed to an analytic syllogism must be viewed in organic totality 
as well as in physiological detail. The critic has to see the whole 
thrust of an argument as well as the many particular contentions of an 
argument. Competing policy systems must be weighed in toto. 203 Second, 
Toulmin adds backing, qualifier, and rebuttal to the "layout" of argu-
ment. His hope is that the addition of these factors will add sophisti-
cation to argumentative structure. Ordinary language philosophers 
and symbolic interactionists stress the examination of "speech acts." 
Arguments are called "speech acts" not only to stress their process 
orientation but to force a more complex examination of the structuring 
and restructuring of value hierarchies. 
The second key factor to note about the form of argument is its 
expression in ordinary language. For Aristotle, there was some question 
as to whether or not an argument should be relayed in symbolic form 
or through ordinary language. This was because the two modes were still 
conjoined and confused. In our own time, however, it is clear that 
there is a split between logic as expressed in strictly classified 
symbols and argument as expressed in ordinary language. Perelman argues 
that the use of ordinary language allows for the possibility of argument 
through utilization of the many associations and dissociations of words, 
value hierarchies, and metaphors implicit in ordinary expression. He 
states that ordinary language provides for a middle way between 
individual subjectivity and universal arbitrariness since ordinary 
203Toulmin, The Uses of Argument, pp. 94-96. This is the dis-
cussion of the distinction in chapter IV, p.112. 
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language is the expression, not of one man but of many men organized 
in society. 204 Toulmin blasts the univocality assumed by the analytic 
and reflects on the many criteria of various fields mirrored in common 
tenns. Ordinary language philosophy and symbolic interaction, of course, 
concentrate on the study of ordinary language as the key artifact of 
man. Argument concentrates on the structuring and restructuring of 
man's value hierarchies as expressed in the complex forms of discourse 
and through ordinary language. 
In sum, Aristotle, Perelman, Toulmin, ordinary language 
philosophers, dialecticians, and symbolic interactionists present a 
complex view of argument. The substance of argument is the study of 
human value hierarchies in complex interaction. Argument primarily 
concerns value and policy propositions. Its substance is the study of 
ethics, politics, religion, law, and philosophy, Argument also takes 
complex form. Arguments are expressed in significant pieces of discourse 
from Aristotle's "enthymeme" to Toulmin's "layout" of argument, And 
arguments are expressed in ordinary language with all that implies. In 
terms of traditional theory, argument is rhetoric. 205 Rhetorical 
scholars are or should be, must be, students of argument. Students of 
argument, conversely, cannot help but be rhetorical scholars. 
' 
204Perelman, The New Rhetoric, p. 510. See the discussion of 
this in chapter III, PP• 72-74. 
205wayne Brockriede, "Rhetorical Criticism as Argument," (un-
published paper presented to the annual conference on rhetorical 
criticism at California State College at Hayward, May, 1972). 
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Now how does one evaluate argument or rhetoric? First, it ought to 
be clear that argument must be evaluated in rhetorical context. 
Aristotle pointed out that it was important who said what to whom at 
what time and under what conditions. Toulmin added backing, qualifiers, 
and rebuttal to data, warrants, and conclusions in a pointed attempt 
to more clearly manifest a concern for argument in context. Ordinary 
language philosophers note that the same thing said under different 
circumstances may very well mean something quite different and that 
different things said under the same circumstances may very well mean 
( 
much the same thing. Dialectic is a constant working out of the 
patterns implicit in language, of the development and destruction of 
verbal hierarchies, of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Symbolic 
interaction depends on interaction. Burke's methodology of "dramatism" 
demands the identification of and the descriptions of the interrelations 
between Scene, Act, Agent, Agency, and Purpose. Argument is evaluated 
in contexto 
Second, argument should be evaluated as to its strength or 
weakness, relevance or irrelevance, force or lack of force not according 
to whether or not it is correct or incorrect, valid or invalid, 
Aristotle said that an argument was forceful when many men or the best 
of men found it so. Perelman states that an argument has "presence" 
and a potential for justice. Presence concerns the strength or weakness 
of an argument as similar arguments are treated in similar fashions 
under like circumstances according to the dictates of just precedent. 
Toulmin argues for the simultaneous consideration of the force of an 
argument and for its evaluation according to field-independent criteria. 
Extending upon the ideas of Aristotle, Toulmin has placed the "best" of 
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men in particular substantive disciplines. These "experts 11 evaluate 
an argument according to how it meets the needs of their field. 206 For 
ordinary language philosophers a good argument is a consistent 
argument, not necessarily a formally consistent argument but an argument 
which meets the predispositions of society and maximally utilizes the 
full implicit potentialities of language. Argument must not only be 
evaluated in context but relatively. 
Third, it is important to argument to know who will judge. 
Perelman and Toulmin establish jurisprudential models of argument and 
the example of the court frequently appears in argumentation theory. 
In jurisprudence a case must first have standing then it is evaluated 
according to its merits. In some instances ordinary language 
philosophers, symbolic interactionists, and dialecticians insist, all 
men will judge. Perelman's ideas concerning the universal audience 
would also apply in this regard. In other instances, the field of an 
argument having been relatively clearly established, those who are 
expert in the standards of the field will judge. Perelman and 
Toulmin both establish that the best judges in some cases are the 
expert members of a field. 207 Wittgenstein establishes that only 
the members of a particular language game can really judge that 
particular game. Johnstone and Adler establish only the two members of 
206see the discussion of field-dependency as related to disciplines 
in chapter IV, pp. 119-126. 
207 The exact constituents of a field, unfortunately, are unclear 
in both cases as discussed in the chapters on Perelman and Toulmin. 
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the dialectical process as judge for only the two intimately involved 
are committed to the presuppositions of their inquiry and to the implicit 
ramifications of those epistemic starting points. Most men or the best 
men, the majority or the expert, it is important to know who will judge. 
Audience is a critical concept in argumentation. Whether an argument 
is strong or weak as evaluated in context very much depends on who 
the judges aree 
Fourth, argument must be evaluated according to some rules. The 
rules may be flexible and ambiguous, but there must be rules. Perelman 
established the rule of justice. Toulmin insists on field-dependent 
criteria. Ordinary language philosophers insist on a full examination 
of the ramifications of the "ordinary" use of a term. Symbolic inter-
actionists want to know what terms were used in what fashion in an 
argument, how those terms fit together in verbal hierarchies, and how 
they merge and divide, what in other words, the exact interaction 
amounted to. Argument is evaluated in context as relevant or irrelevant 
and as strong or weak by a given set of critics according to some rules. 
Fifth, argument is evaluated in process over a period of time. 
Aristotle thought that the truth would prevail but only if given time 
and an active advocacy process. Toulmin insists on standards of 
intellectual ecology. "A sound argument, a well-grounded or firmly-
backed claim, is one which will stand up to criticism.11208 A good 
argument is that argument which survives in the intellectual jungles. 
The "ordinary" use of a term isn't es tab limed till the term is given 
20SL -roulmin, The Uses of Argument, p. 8. 
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some time. Dialectic, according to Jbhnstone, demands an open, honest 
evaluation of presuppositions and a thorough working out of the ramifica-
tions of linguistic terms. Adler argues that the essence of the dialecti-
cal process is the continual clash of partial systems of values. 
Argument needs to be evaluated over time. Only when time is available 
can the social nature of argument manifest itself through the advocacy 
process. Argument is evaluated in context, by degree, by a given set 
of judges, according to rules, and over time. 
There are many ways of evaluating argument. This study has 
briefly examined a revised Aristotelian model, models by Perelman and 
Toulmin, and some of the methods of ordinary language, dialectic, and 
symbolic interaction. It~remains for others to thoroughly explore the 
details of the functioning of these models and to critically apply 
these models to actual specimens of argument. However, in accord with 
the analysis of this study just summaried as to the nature of argument 
and as to the rubrics of how argument should be evaluated, some comments 
can be made on how argument could be evaluated. 
First, it is obvious that the Scene or rhetorical situation ought 
to be thoroughly detailed. The Scene provides background information 
but also provides information on the availability of choices for the 
I 
act of rhetoric. Next, the value hierarchies chosen to meet the 
problems of the rhetorical situation as reflected in the associated 
clusters of concepts ought to be exhaustingly examined. The methods of 
"enthymematic analysis,""reductio ad absurdum," "ad hominem," and 
logology could be combined here. It is clear that the emphasis of the 
new argument is on the effects of language. As Mortenson and Anderson 
state it has gradually become plain that the student of argument "must 
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above all else be a student of language. 11209 Having set the scene and 
examined the symbolic interaction, the critic would then be prepared to 
make two sets of judgments. The first set of judgments concerns the 
ethics of the situation. Since the essence of rhetoric or arguments 
concerns values, the critic should explicitly evaluate the choices of 
the protagonist. The second set of judgments concerns language choice. 
The critic should make a judgment of the particular associational 
clusters chosen by the advocate vis-a-vis the potential range of all 
such choices ~hich were available. Value judgments about value 
hierarchies and criticism in language about language; this is the e-ssence 
of the complexity of argumentative or rhetorical criticism. It is not 
easy criticism nor simple criticism nor even thoroughly rule bound 
criticism. As Scott writes, however: 
Once free of the false notion that man can make what he thinks 
fully rational,' that he can if he simply presents his thoughts 
in proper form win the assent of all wovthy listeners, perhaps 
speech teachers can find ways to enable man to take more 
nearly complete advantage of these powers of reason that he 
does possess. 210 
It may not be simple or easy criticism, but, if it is those perplexing 
problems which attract the interest and involvement of the good critic, 
then the genre of rational argument should maintain its interest. 
209Anderson and Mortenson, "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation," 
P• 150. 
210scott, "On Viewing Rhetoric as Epistemic," p. 12. 
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